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Summary
It is essential to protect IT systems against security threats. An example would
be the control of aircraft, which uses an internal network that passengers can
access. It is important to ensure that malicious code on passenger equipment
cannot endanger flight safety.
Information flow control is an important approach to the protection of sys-
tems against such threats. Notable examples include tainting analyses in lan-
guages such as Javascript, and program transformations on cryptographic algo-
rithms to avoid information leakage through running time. A wide variety of
techniques, including type systems and reference monitors, have been proposed
in the context of programming languages and process calculi, to enforce such
properties. The most widely used definitions of information flow security are
noninterference-like properties.
For concurrent systems where processes communicate with each other to ac-
complish computational tasks, fine-grained security policies can be formulated
by distinguishing between whether communication can happen, and what is
communicated. As the first contribution of this PhD thesis, we formulate a
noninterference-like property that takes all combinations of sensitivity levels for
“whether” and “what” into consideration, emphasizing the importance of the
integrity case where the former is more sensitive than the latter. This case cap-
tures the effect of Message Authentication Codes (MAC) and the consequence of
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is also proved that the property degenerates
to a classical one when the two dimensions are intentionally blurred.
As the second contribution, we focus on the “what” dimension and further
allow the flow policy to vary under different contents stored and communicated.
This is the area of content-dependent (or conditional) information flow, which
has recently been studied for sequential programs. We generalize the use and
enforcement of content-dependent flow policies to concurrent, communicating
processes. A security type system is developed, incorporating a Hoare logic
component that provides approximations of the memory contents at different
program points. Most proofs for the theoretical results on content-dependency
are performed in the Coq proof assistant.
ii
The third contribution of this thesis is the obtainment of compositionality
results that support modular security analyses of computer systems.
Amultiplexer pattern that separates sensitive and non-sensitive network traf-
fic is used as a running example. Whether communications can happen is easily
influenced by an attacker — attacking one of the incoming channels would suf-
fice. In any case, the two data paths are still differentiable by the sensitivity
levels of what is communicated. In case the destinations of messages are de-
termined by their tagging, content-dependent policies are able to convey the
correlation between the sensitivity level of a message and its tagging, and our
Hoare-logic equipped type system allows a modular analysis of the overall sys-
tem.
Resume
Det er nødvendigt at beskytte IT systemer mod udefra kommende sikkerheds-
trusler. Et eksempel kunne være kontrolsystemet på et fly, som benytter et
internt netværk, som også passagerne kan tilgå. Det er her vigtigt at sikre, at
ondsindet kode på passagerernes udstyr ikke kan bringe flysikkerheden i fare.
Kontrol af informationsflowet er en vigtig tilgangsvinkel til at beskytte IT sy-
stemer mod sådanne trusler. Klassiske eksempler er brugen af “tainting” analyser
i sprog som JavaScript og brugen af programtransformationer på kryptografiske
algoritmer (for at undgå at variationer i tidsforbruget lækker fortrolige oplys-
ninger). Der er et utal af teknikker, der kan sikre at programmerne overholder
det ønskede informationsflow, som for eksempel brugen af type-systemer og mo-
nitorer. Den præcise definition af, hvad korrekt informationsflow egentligt er,
udtrykkes normalt i form af en såkaldt “non-interference” betingelse.
For parallelle systemer, hvor processer kommunikerer med hinanden, kan
man formulere meget finkornede sikkerhedspolitikker ved at skelne mellem hvor-
vidt der kommunikeres og hvad der (i givet fald) kommunikeres. Som det første
bidrag i denne PhD afhandling formulerer vi en “non-interference” betingelse,
som kan tage højde for alle fire kombinationer af sikkerhedsniveauer for “hvor-
vidt” og “hvad”. Vi fokuser på integritet, fordi “hvorvidt” her er mere følsom
end “hvad” (i modsætning til litteraturens fokus på fortrolighed). Det gør os i
stand til at modellere “Message Authentication Codes (MAC)” og konsekven-
serne af angreb på tilgængeligheden (“Denial of Service”). Vi viser, at en bevidst
sammenblanding af “hvorvidt” og “hvad” giver anledning til en velkendt sikker-
hedsegenskab.
Som det andet bidrag udvider vi vore sikkerhedspolitikker til også af af-
hænge af de data, der kommunikeres eller lagres. Dette område, data-afhængigt
informationsflow, har hidtil kun været studeret for sekventielle programmer, og
vi generaliserer det til data-afhængige politikker for parallelle og kommunike-
rende processer. På det tekniske plan udvikler vi et type-system, som inddrager
elementer fra Hoare’s aksiomatiske logik for at karakterisere data værdierne på
de forskellige programpunkter. Hovedparten af korrekthedsbeviserne er blevet
kontrolleret ved hjælp af Coq bevisassistenten.
iv
Et tredje bidrag er resultater, der viser hvordan man kan opnå sikkerhed på
modulær vis, ved at analysere systemet komponent for komponent.
Som gennemgående eksempel benytter vi en multiplexer, der skal holde sen-
sitive og ikke-sensitive data adskilte. Den er følsom over for angreb på “hvorvidt”
der kommunikeres, fx hvis der er angreb på en af de indgående kanaler. Vi er her
i stand til at udtrykke de relevante sikkerhedspolitikker til at adskille de to kom-
munikationsveje gennem multiplexeren. Data-afhængige politikker er i stand til
at beskrive situationer, hvor adresserne afhænger af rutningsdata. Vores type-
system udvidet med Hoare’s aksiomatiske semantik tillader en modulær analyse
af det samlede system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information flow control aims to provide end-to-end guarantees against inad-
vertent information leakage/corruption in computer systems. In a system, an
agent a may be granted the privilege to observe certain values/behaviors, and
it is important to control the extent to which a can deduce other system-wide
values/behaviors based on its observation. Similarly, a may obtain rights to
modify certain values/behaviors, and it is vital to control the extent to which
a can influence other system-wide values/behaviors via the modifications it is
allowed to make. These are the typical issues of concern in information flow
control. Compared with access control, which is focused on mediating accesses
attempted at the perimeter of a system, the stress of information flow measures
is more on restricting the propagation of the effects of such accesses within the
system.
One of the earliest investigations into information flow problems is the se-
curity model by Bell and LaPadula [BL76], designed for operating systems. In
this model, subjects (processes operating on behalf of users) and objects (files,
segments, devices, etc.) are both assigned security levels. A basic principle is
no read up, no write down, i.e., reading operations cannot be performed by a
subject from a more highly protected object, and writing attempts cannot be
made by a subject to a less protected object. These levels being confidentiality
levels, the aim is to avoid information flow to less “secretive” subjects/objects.
Denning [Den76] addresses explicit flows arising out of assignments and im-
plicit flows of conditionals, using lattice-based security models. The approach
is applied to the certification of programs in Denning&Denning [DD77].
Information flow measures are important for safety-critical systems. A com-
pelling example is about timing channels in RSA implementations: an attacker
can deduce certain parameters (such as the key) based on its observation on
timing. Language-based measures can be applied to eliminate such un-desirable
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information flow [Aga00, SM03a, MS15]. The area has also gained practi-
cal impact in securing voting systems [CCM08], and in the end-to-end secu-
rity enforcement in real-world programming languages like PHP [JKK06] and
JavaScript [HBBS14]. In the latter direction, the FlowSafe project [AF09, Flo10]
of Mozilla is a notable initiative taken in the industry.
The Common Criteria (CC, [Org12]) has “information flow control policy”
as one of the Security Functional Requirements to be considered in the certifi-
cation of systems. Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS [Rus08]) is
an architecture that aims to achieve resource sharing by constructing a system
in partitions, and controlled information flow between these partitions. It has a
wide range of applications (e.g., [HHOAF05, AFOTH06, MPTB12, ATRS15]).
There are numerous approaches to the enforcement of information flow secu-
rity — an important one is typing, which was initiated by Volpano et al. [VIS96].
In [VIS96], the principles of the analysis by Denning&Denning [DD77] are
captured in a type system and a soundness result with respect to a nonin-
terference property is proved. The typing approach has been studied exten-
sively [ML97, SV98, Aga00, SS00, BC02, Smi06, CM06, BS10, ADZ+12, RHS12,
MAC12, BPR13, LC15] in languages with different features.
On the other hand, the security guarantee is usually formulated as a noninter-
ference-like property, requiring that the public parts of a system should stay in-
variant against variations in the confidential parts [Coh77, GM82]. For confiden-
tiality, noninterference1 requires that variations in confidential behaviors/con-
tents, cannot cause variations in publicly observable behaviors/contents. This
requirement is imposed by comparing different executions of the same spec-
ification/program, and mandating that these executions should have similar
public behaviors/contents, despite the differences in previous secret behaviors/-
contents. This relational nature makes noninterference properties qualify as
“hyperproperties” [CS10], in comparison to classical “properties” [AS87].
Due to the different semantic elements of state-machine-based formalisms,
process calculi, and programming languages, and different application scenar-
ios (programs, protocols, choreographies, etc.), noninterference properties can
take different forms that embody similar spirits. Previous research in the for-
mulation and “meta-properties” of noninterference properties is again exten-
sive [SS00, FG01, SM02, Man03, FRS05, Cas07, MZ08, MS10, AM11, HS12,
VDMZ13, RS14]. A key “meta-property” here is compositionality, that scales
up the security guarantee for composites, no matter what enforcement methods
are used for the security guarantee of individual components. The investiga-
tion into compositional security started a long time ago [McC87], and is still an
important element in recent theoretical research (e.g., [RS14]).
1In a narrow sense, “noninterference” often points to the particular security condition of
Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] but we have rather chosen to use the same term to refer to all
possibilistic security conditions embodying similar spirits.
3Today’s computing systems are prevalently concurrent, distributed, and in-
teractive. Scientific computing, banking, service booking, industrial control,
traffic management — are all concerned with some of these traits, which arise
along with the Internet and for the efficiency and effectiveness of an increasingly
collaborative society. Communication between different system components has
become a vital element of contemporary IT systems. Compared with the setting
of sequential programs, concurrent and distributed systems admit new forms
of information leakage and corruption, such as through racing behaviors, and
create the need for different noninterference properties. Interactivity calls for
investigation into open systems, and approaches to describing and constraining
the computation environment.
Contributions In this thesis, we demonstrate how the information flow se-
curity of concurrent, communicating systems can be specified and verified in
a finer-grained way than provided by previous approaches, in the following as-
pects:
1. The presence and content of communication can be protected separately.
For integrity, in particular, communication channels with low presence
integrity and high content integrity are related to the use of Message Au-
thentication Codes (MAC) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
2. Different policies can be specified and enforced under different contents of
communication and memory, which is particularly meaningful in scenarios
where the destinations of messages between different processes depend on
their tagging.
Moreover, the fine-grained distinction (2) of contents can be largely integrated
with the distinction (1) between “presence” and “content”.
We define security properties and study their compositionality, which ei-
ther serves as an analysis approach in itself, or facilitates soundness proofs for
information flow type systems. The property proposed to support “presence”
and “content” as independent dimensions is a process-algebraic property and its
relation with classical process-algebraic noninterference properties is studied.
Structure In Chapter 2, we introduce some general technical background
for this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we present the Quality Calculus [NNV12],
in which the connection of two important means of stating noninterference re-
sults — through unwinding and in terms of self-bisimilarity — is discussed. In
Chapter 4, we investigate the distinction between the “presence” and “content”
of communication in the Quality Calculus. The study is carried out on integrity,
as opposed to confidentiality, since this provides new insights vis-à-vis existing
literature. In Chapter 5, we investigate the information flow security of con-
current programs, with the use of confidentiality policies that are dependent on
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the content of memory and communication. The “presence” of communication
is again treated as a separate dimension from “content”. Comparisons are made
between our proposed noninterference properties and existing ones. The conclu-
sion is given in Chapter 6, followed with a further discussion of several elements
of our development and opportunities for future work.
For the study of content-dependent security policies, we direct our attention
from the Quality Calculus to a less advanced concurrent, imperative language.
On the one hand, this is driven by the need of our partner Airbus in the Eu-
ropean Artemis project SESAMO [SES] to ensure the information flow security
of the software implementation hosted in the IT system onboard aircraft. A
comparatively minor reason is: to our knowledge, most of the related work that
addresses content-dependency has been performed in a language-based, rather
than process-algebraic setting.
We developed (13 K lines of) proofs2 for most of the theoretical results in
Chapter 5 in the Coq proof assistant [CPA]. The Coq formalization of our lan-
guage and type system, together with the statements of lemmas and theorems,
are detailed in Appendix B. This presentation is generated using the “coqdoc”
tool [Tea14].
2http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/123041334/phd388 Li X dif com coq.zip
Chapter 2
Setting the Scene
This dissertation builds on certain common practices in process-algebraic and
langauge-based information flow control, and the area is introduced briefly in
Section 2.1. A key element of our technical development will be bisimulation-
based noninterference properties. We motivate the use of such properties in
Section 2.2, with a slightly philosophical digression in Sub-section 2.2.1, on the
manifestation of the noninterference-style thinking in a variety of areas. We
then discuss the need for treating the system and the environment separately
in Section 2.3. Two important elements of the environment are strategies and
schedulers. After that, we compare the respective merits of different analysis
techniques for information flow (Section 2.4), motivating our development of a
type system for content-dependent flow policies later in Chapter 5.
2.1 Process-Algebraic and Language-Based Secu-
rity
Information flow security has been studied extensively in process calculi and
minimal languages derived from core calculi. This collection of calculi in-
clude the pi-calculus [Pot02, HY07], CCS-like calculi [FG01, FR06, vBV11],
CSP [Ros95, RH13], calculi designed for session-based communication [CCDR10],
for generative communication and coordination [TNH06, Ald06], for mobil-
ity [CF01, BCF08], and so on.
Understanding information flow problems in process-calculi helps make sys-
tems security-enabled from the design phase. In addition, many operators in
process calculi are well-understood, and generality is enjoyed by the information
flow constraints induced by these operators.
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Information flow security has also been studied extensively in programming
languages (e.g., [ML97, BC02, Dam06, BS10, MC12]). So far, downgrading and
downgrading policies [SM03b, CM04, CM06, MR07, LM08, SS09, MB09] have
been studied more heavily for language-based security than for process-algebraic
security. Downgrading is the operation that allows one to relax information
flow constraints by treating a variable as having a less restrictive security class
than the one originally assigned to it. Downgrading policies govern the kind
of downgrading operations that are relatively safe. Hence the great amount of
work in downgrading for language-based security reflects the concern in dealing
with real code, thereby needing to reason about the relative security of code,
when strict noninterference is broken.
A notion of timing-sensitive noninterference in language-based security has
been reduced to the process-algebraic security condition PBNDC [FR06], by
suitably encoding programs as processes in VSPA — a CCS-like process calcu-
lus [FRS05]. This demonstrates the existence of certain cross-language/formalism
patterns in the essence of noninterference conditions, which are involved in the
BNDC-like properties. In fact, this pattern will recur as the basis of the security
properties studied in this thesis.
2.2 Noninterference
Before devising an analysis for information flow security, a key question to an-
swer is:
What are secure systems?
This question is often answered by formulating a noninterference-like condi-
tion [Man11].
One important origin of noninterference is Cohen’s seminal work [Coh77]
inspired by information theory and cybernetics. Information flow is captured by
dependencies, which are in turn characterized by the propagation of varieties.
In more detail, computations are thought of as holistic “pipes” F , where F
corresponds to the program executed. When a certain variable x varies at
one end of F , thereby introducing some “perturbation”, with all the other
variables staying constant, the observation that another variable y also varies,
at the other end of F , unveils a dependency of y on x, or a flow from x to y.
This immediately leads to two research tracks pursued separately ever since —
a quantitative one [CHM05, Smi09], and a qualitative one [VIS96, SV98, BC02,
Man03, MSS11] — in the area of information flow analysis. The quantitative
approach studies how much of x is leaked into y, which is reflected by how heavily
the variations of x cause variations of y, captured in information-theoretic terms.
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The qualitative approach, on the other hand, requires outright that no variation
of y should be observed under variations of x.
F	    F 
F1 
F2 
z 
x 
x 
z 
z 
Figure 2.1: Intuition for Bisimulation-Based Noninterference
The left part of Figure 2.1 depicts the scenario where the variation in x at
one end of F cannot cause any variation in z at the other end of F . In this
case we say that there is no flow from x to z, or that the value of x does not
interfere with the value of z. A formal expression can be
∀v1, v2, v : (JF K[x 7→ v1][z 7→ v]) z = (JF K[x 7→ v2][z 7→ v]) z.
Suppose an attacker can make observations of z at the intermediate stages
of the computation F . Then the equality on z needs to be imposed at all these
stages. Due to the difference in the value of x, F may well evolve into different
programs F1 and F2: take for instance F = if x > 0 then F1 else F2. We need
to express:
1. the values of z are equal when F1 and F2 are reached, respectively, and
2. they will also be equal in the future derivatives of F1 and F2.
This further creates the need to build an association relation (illustrated by
the tilde between F1 and F2 in the right part of Figure 2.1) on all pairs of
derivatives of F where the comparison between the possible values of z needs to
be performed. And we now have the motivation to use a small-step semantics
and a bisimulation-based noninterference property (e.g., [SS00, FG01, Dam06,
Smi06, PHN13, RS14]).
Similarly, concurrency and nondeterminacy render the most simple-minded
two-run comparison flawed. Consider the following program with four processes
running concurrently:
(x := 1 || c!2 || c!3 || c?z) \ {c}.
The first process assigns 1 to x, the second and the third output the values 2 and
3, respectively, over channel c, and the fourth inputs from channel c into z. It
is represented by • \ {c} that communication over c must be a synchronization
between an output and an input. In this program, there is no information
leakage from x into z. However, it is not the case that comparing an arbitrary
pair of executions of the program starting from different values in x, we end
up with the same value in z. Because of the race between the two outputs, it
is undetermined which of them actually synchronizes with the input. On the
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other hand, the bisimulation-like requirement that for all possible executions,
there exists an execution starting from a different value in x, leading to the
same value in z, seems to match the intuition for the security of this program
reasonably well.
For confidentiality, we distinguish between confidential channels/variables
and public ones, and want to make sure that public content/behaviors should
stay invariant under potential perturbation in confidential content/behaviors.
For integrity, we distinguish between corrupt (low integrity) channels/variables
and clean (high integrity) ones, and aims to guarantee that clean content/be-
haviors should stay unaffected under variations of corrupt content/behaviors.
It is customary to use a security lattice L whose elements denote the security
classes of communication channels and variables. And such distinction can be
represented by a partition of L into sets U and D, where D is a downward-closed
subset (e.g., [DP02], also formulated in Definition 2.1) of L. In fact, requiring
the downward-closedness of D is equivalent to requiring the upward-closedness
of U (Lemma 2.2, whose proof is straightforward).
Definition 2.1 (Downward-closed and Upward-closed Subsets)
Suppose L is a lattice.
1. A set A ⊆ L is a downward-closed subset (or down-set) of L, if ∀l1, l2 :
l2 ∈ A ∧ l1 v l2 ⇒ l1 ∈ A.
2. A set B ⊆ L is an upward-closed subset (or up-set) of L, if ∀l1, l2 : l1 ∈
B ∧ l1 v l2 ⇒ l2 ∈ B.
Lemma 2.2 For a lattice L and its partition into U and D, D is a down-set
of L if and only if U is an up-set of L.
For confidentiality, elements (often called labels) of the set D usually denote
low confidentiality, and elements of U often denote high confidentiality. For
integrity, on the other hand, elements of the set D usually denote high integrity,
and elements of U often denotes low integrity. Note that this is all in line with
the intuition for D and U to be an up-set and a down-set, respectively, of L.
In this dissertation, we also use the term “clean” to describe entities with high
integrity, and the term “corrupt” to describe entities with low integrity.
For the convenience of discussion, existing work [SV98, ZM01, BC02, Smi06,
MZ08, BDG11, RS14] often uses a two-point lattice ({H,L}, L v H) where
the levels H and L represent membership in U and D, respectively; unless the
topic of discussion is the practical meaningfulness of the elements of a specific
type of L [ML97, CM06, MB09, SRMM12]. For confidentiality, when the two-
point lattice is used, H (resp. L) thus denotes high confidentiality (resp. low
confidentiality).
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Remark 2.1 Another way of distinguishing between high and low is by picking
a reference element l from the lattice L, and then regarding l′ v l as l′ being
low, l′ 6v l as l′ being high (e.g., [VIS96, ZM05]). The security condition will
then be stated by ranging over all such reference labels l. The approach of down-
sets and up-sets presented above leads to more partitions than using a reference
element does. Take the lattice below as an example, it is not difficult to verify
that {A3, A4,⊥} (resp. {A1, A2,>}) qualifies as a down-set (resp. up-set) of
it. However, it is impossible to pick l0 ∈ {A1, A2, A3, A4,>,⊥} such that all
l′ satisfying l′ v l0 constitute the set {A3, A4,⊥} and all l′ satisfying l′ 6v l0
constitute the set {A1, A2,>}.
A1 A2 A3 A4
>
⊥
It can be seen that using down-sets and up-sets allows more freedom in regarding
an element incomparable to the reference element as either high or low.
2.2.1 The Noninterference-Style Thinking at Large
The idea of noninterference embodies a kind of thinking that manifests itself in
many different places.
Whereas noninterference mandates that certain elements should be resillient
to potentially significant variations in certain other elements, the notion of con-
tinuity in mathematics requires that small variations of certain variables only
create small variations of certain other variables. The recent work in continu-
ity analysis [CGL10] for programs is an application of this mathematical idea
of continuity in programming languages. In program analysis [NNH05], a live
variable analysis provides approximative answers to the question of whether a
variable may be used before being modified. The semantic characterization of
a variable being dead is: variations of the variable cannot interfere with the
future execution of the program [Nie85]. For man-made systems, fault toler-
ance [KK07] requires that normal system functionalities should stay unaffected
under perturbation created by faulty components (e.g., [Web89]). For biological
systems, “equi-finality” captures the phenomenon that certain organisms eventu-
ally develop into the same form despite the differences in their environment (e.g.,
[VB03]). The Turing test [Tur50] is concerned with the non-distinguishability
of two different worlds, one involving a computer and the other a human be-
ing. The idea of having experimental groups and control groups in scientific
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experiments helps identify whether a medicine, etc., has observable effects.
Going back to computer security, the notion of “robust declassification” [ZM01]
in information flow control says that the decision and content of declassifications
should not be influenced by changes in low integrity data. It has a more for-
mal expression roughly saying: the fact that a system is non-interfering should
stay unaffected under variations in the placement of attack commands in certain
holes of the original code. Differential privacy [Dwo06] is concerned with the
privacy guarantees provided by data extraction protocols for databases. In more
detail, the probability for a value to be yielded by the protocol should not vary
much, under all possible differences of the source database in only one element.
“Semantic security” [GM84] requires that the information that an eavesdropper
can compute about the cleartext should remain the same no matter if it has
access to the ciphertext or not. A zero knowledge proof is a proof that reveals
only the validity of the assertion proved and nothing else [GMR85]. This is
formulated by saying that comparing two scenarios, one in which an agent is
given the proof, the other in which it is given the (valid) assertion, the agent
cannot feasibly compute more in the former scenario than in the latter. This
kind of “simulation paradigm” also manifests itself in the security characteriza-
tion used by Multiparty Computation (MPC, e.g., [Orl11]). In MPC, multiple
parties run a distributed, decentralized protocol to compute a function of their
inputs, that they intend to keep confidential against the others. An MPC pro-
tocol is deemed secure if every attack by a dishonest party can be “simulated” in
an alternative, ideal world, where the protocol is replaced with an honest third
party performing the computation in a centralized manner.
2.2.2 Traced-based and Knowledge-based Security Prop-
erties
The noninterference properties studied in this dissertation are bisimulation-
based. In the literature, trace-based properties [GM82, Man03, RHS12] and
knowledge-based properties [BDG11, AM11, AC12, vDHS15] are two other im-
portant classes of security properties.
Mantel [Man03] proposed a rather comprehensive framework of trace-based
properties. There are a series of “basic security predicates” (BSP) in the frame-
work that can be composed to form the security requirement suitable in each
particular application scenario. A BSP is typically a closure property stating
that inserting/removing certain confidential events in a trace results in another
trace having the same public view; thus the attacker cannot deduce the non-
occurrence/occurrence of these events by accessing the public view of traces.
Several classical trace-based properties can also be obtained by composing BSPs.
Knowledge-based properties directly characterize the change in the knowl-
edge possessed by the attacker as it observes the execution of a program. This
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knowledge is typically in the form of a set of possible initial memories or possible
input environments, and it grows when the set shrinks. “Exclusion knowledge”,
on the other hand, gives the set of initial memories or input environments that
can be excluded given the observation; this leads to a more natural description
of knowledge increase [BvDS15]. Knowledge-based properties are fairly intuitive
and suitable for interpreting dynamic policies (e.g., [BS10, AC12, BvDS15]).
Trace-based properties emphasize the results of perturbations (which are
the observations), whereas knowledge-based properties emphasize the causes of
observations (which are the perturbations). The connection between certain
properties belonging to the two respective classes has been established, e.g., by
Balliu [Bal13]. On the other hand, in line with the well-known fact that bisimu-
lation equivalence is finer than trace equivalence, bisimulation-based properties
are often stronger than (and can be used to prove) their trace-based coun-
terparts (e.g., [FG01]), although results on the coincidence of trace-based and
bisimulation-based properties do exist [MS01].
2.3 Systems and their Environment
The computational systems that we consider will be specified in a process-
algebraic language, or a simple programming language. The advantage of using
a language (over abstract models such as state machines) is that the specifica-
tion/realization of systems is eased. Using a simple programming language also
provides insights to the analysis of real world code.
In a language that is expressive enough, the environment can be modeled by
an ordinary process just like any other process executing in the system itself.
However, the environment is often given a separate model, for example as a
function having access to certain observables, for the following reasons:
1. It may be cumbersome to “program” the environment, but relatively easy
to specify it in an abstract manner. Many concrete details of the envi-
ronment are also unknown and need to be under-specified: an example of
unknown detail is the implementation of certain APIs.
2. The environment might be of a different “nature” than that of the sys-
tem; examples are where the system is benign whereas the environment
is malign (e.g., an attacker with a certain profile), where the system is
possibilistic, whereas the environment is probabilistic (e.g, a probabilistic
scheduler), etc.
3. To get a realistic view of computation, it is desirable for the boundary
between the system and the environment to be distinguished from the
boundary between different processes within the system.
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In this section we will discuss an important feature of the environment in
information flow control, that is its totality. Then we provide an overview of two
incarnations of the environment, strategies and schedulers, with somewhat sim-
ilar forms, but different purposes. All these three elements of the environment
are closely related to the development of this thesis.
2.3.1 Totality of Environment
An environment is total (e.g., [Man03]) with respect to a set of actions if at each
state of computation (a process, a memory or a combination of both, depending
on the language or formalism), the environment allows each action in the set
to be performed. In the literature, the terms “input-enabled” (e.g., [EGP08])
and “input-complete” (e.g., [TLHL11]) often carry the same kind of meaning as
“total” does.
In a communication-oriented setting, there are two aspects of totality:
• given channel c, whether communication is allowed over c, and
• the possible contents that can be received over c.
Our development will not hinge on any particular totality assumptions.
Finer-grained specification of the environment is made possible through the use
of strategies: one is able to specify the possible channels that the process can
communicate over, and data that can be received, after a particular computation
history.
2.3.2 Strategies
Strategies [WJ90, OCC06, MC12, RHS12] are one kind of abstraction of the
environment process. They are introduced to provide more flexibility in the
specification of environments that deviate from a total one.
In general, environment strategies are functions that make decisions on how
to interact with the system, based on certain observations. We use strategies for
process-algebraic systems, and the observations of our strategies are thus about
the histories of computation composed of communication actions. On the other
hand, the interaction decisions are expressed by a set of communication binders,
that can synchronize with the active communication binders of the system, for
the next transition step.
The most powerful such strategy can attempt to interact with the system
in all possible ways, including blockage of communication, or feeding arbitrar-
ily corrupted data to the system, based on any observation it has made. An
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environment with this strategy is the implicit assumption of classical process-
algebraic security properties like SBNDC [FG01]. A less powerful strategy is
obtained by constraining this ability. This is sensible since the attackers often
act under certain resource constraints in practice.
2.3.3 Schedulers
Schedulers are a similar abstraction of the environment with a particular pur-
pose: managing the switches between different processes in the course of execu-
tion. The interaction of a scheduler with the system proceeds in a fairly fixed
pattern: the scheduler decides on which process(es)1 to execute next, the se-
lected process(es) execute for a specified time slice, before the next such round
begins.
Process-algebraic security is more in line with modeling schedulers as ordi-
nary processes. On the other hand, dealing with schedulers as a separate ab-
straction is an important subject in securing concurrent programs (e.g., [SS00,
Smi06, RS09, MS10]). For concurrent programs, the basic way of specifying
an operational semantics is by selecting a process to execute for one step fully
non-deterministically. However, a refinement of this mechanism that reduces
non-determinacy can break security. Unfortunately, such reduction in non-
determinacy is usually caused by the employment of a particular scheduler.
We illustrate this point with the following program taken from [BC02].
Shared variables (h and l) are used rather than communication, to simplify
the scenario for the problem to be more easily perceived. Here h is confidential
while l is public. It is not difficult to see that for each scheduled execution
reaching its first assignment to l, there exists a schedule with different evalua-
tion of h = 1 (likely to be different than the first schedule), such that the same
assignment is also the first to l reached. This is the intuition for the security of
the system under a fully (cooperatively) non-deterministic scheduler [SV98].
(if h = 1 then skip; skip else skip; l := 1) | l := 2
We introduce certain constraints on the scheduling, and assume a round robin
scheduler with time slice 3 is used. Assume that the evaluation of each condi-
tional, as well as the execution of each assignment, takes one time unit. Now any
execution with 1 as the initial value of h will eventually assign 1 to l; whereas
any execution with a different initial value than 1 in h will end up with 2 in l.
Information in h has leaked into l.
There are two classes of security properties when the scheduler is considered
— for a specific scheduler or for a class of schedulers. The most general kind
1Suppose two processes can be selected at the same time for their synchronous communi-
cation.
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of properties in the latter class are called scheduler-independent security. They
assert that a system is secure under the control of virtually all schedulers2.
2.4 Analysis Techniques
The verification of information flow security can be performed in several al-
ternative means: dynamic monitoring [Fen74], multi-execution [DP10, RS13],
self-composition [TA05, BDR11], model checking [CFK+14], bisimulation check-
ing [FG01], exploitation of compositionality [RS14], type systems [VIS96], and
so on.
Secure multi-execution runs a program once for each security level. State-
ments producing observable outputs are only executed in the run at their own
security level, while inputs at high security levels are modified to an undefined
value. The enforcement is precise in that if a program is termination-sensitively
noninterferent, then eventually we have all the outputs as produced by the nor-
mal (single) execution. However, performance issues become pressing when the
computational task is heavy and the security lattice is huge.
Dynamic monitoring enforces termination-insensitive noninterference. It
may incur slight performance issues, and is not suitable for safety critical sys-
tems in that the execution needs to be stopped when information leaks are
dynamically detected. In some cases, halted executions themselves can result in
termination leaks.
Model checking also allows for precise and permissive enforcement of infor-
mation flow policies, but the approach suffers from state-space explosion when
dealing with software, especially systems with fine-grained concurrency, and/or
big data-domains that call for delicate abstraction techniques to be employed.
Bisimulation-checking has similar advantages and disadvantages to those of
model checking.
Self-composition reduces information flow properties to standard properties
(as opposed to hyperproperties) that can be expressed in a classical program
logic or temporal logic. Its value is mostly in making it possible for security
verification to borrow techniques and insights from safety verification.
Finally, information flow type systems are a good choice of technique for the
static verification of large-scale software applications. The analysis is performed
statically and insecure code will not be executed, which makes the approach suit-
able for safety critical systems. The analysis does not explore the state-space,
which makes it scale to larger systems compared with model checking. Dealing
with complex security lattices poses no great difficulty, as long as it is simple
2Certain constraints, like the scheduler is not able to observe confidential memory, are
often unavoidable though.
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to decide the partial order between two elements of the lattice. However, infor-
mation flow type systems are often overly coarse and they fire too many “false
alarms”. When a false alarm is fired, it may be difficult to locate the cause of the
type-checking failure (e.g., the Jif system [Mye99]). Downgrading operations are
frequently needed, partially compensating for the imprecision [NNL15b]. How-
ever, the use of downgrading makes it more difficult to articulate the security
guarantee, despite the extensive study of downgrading policies [SS09]. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the aforementioned merits of information flow type systems
make them irreplaceable by other techniques, and we work on more fine-grained
typing to counter the drawbacks in permissiveness.
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Chapter 3
Unwinding Security as
Self-Bisimilarity
In process-algebraic security, an important class of security properties is the
BNDC-like (BNDC for “Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Compositions”)
properties studied by Focardi et al (e.g., [FG01, FR06]). Many of the BNDC-
like properties follow a pattern called “unwinding”. That is, they require that
for all derivatives P ′ of the initial process P , two different processes reachable
from P ′ via some particular actions should be related in some way (typically
they should be equivalent with respect to their public/clean behaviors).
In language-based security, the formulation of security properties frequently
follows a different pattern. That is, a particular kind of bisimulation is defined
such that bisimilarity is not reflexive, and a process P is deemed secure if P is
bisimilar to itself (e.g., [SS00, BC02, Dam06]).
The connection between language-based security and process-algebraic se-
curity has been established [FRS05, Cas07]. In more detail, under an en-
coding of While programs in the process calculus VSPA, a notion of timing-
sensitive security for such programs is shown to coincide with PBNDC (Persis-
tent BNDC [FR06]). At about the same time, Crafa and Rossi [CR05] showed
that the PBNDC property coincides with self-bisimilarity in the pi-calculus.
In this chapter, we present a similar result to that of Crafa and Rossi in
our setting. That is, by suitably relating the formulation of a process-algebraic
bisimulation to the unwinding pattern, a process is unwinding secure, if and only
if it is self-bisimilar. Our purpose is to pave the way for our further development
in Chapter 4, where a security property capturing the meaning of security levels
in two different dimensions — presence and content — will be presented. We
intend to build our property on the unwinding framework, but find its direct
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form more difficult to use (for our very purpose) than that of self-bisimilarity.
A benefit of our presentation might be that the close relationship between
the two patterns is exposed with leanest machinery. In [FRS05] and [Cas07],
program variables are encoded as processes that support reading/writing op-
erations, and related complication is caused. In [CR05], the expression of the
noninterference properties meshes with typing.
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the Quality Calculus [NNV12],
a recent variant of the pi-calculus made to help build robust systems in the
presence of unreliable communication links. The Quality Calculus will be used
to develop the theory of this chapter as well as that of Chapter 4.
We will work with integrity, and assume the existence of an integrity envi-
ronment I : Ch∪{⊥} → {H,L,⊥} that maps channels to their integrity levels.
Naturally, H means high integrity and L means low integrity. We stipulate
that I(⊥) = ⊥, and ∀c ∈ Ch : I(c) 6= ⊥, i.e., the function I(−) is strict and
bottom-reflecting.
3.1 The Quality Calculus
3.1.1 Syntax
The Quality Calculus [NNV12] has its roots in the pi-calculus and CCS, but
allows one to specify criteria on which communications have to succeed for the
computation to continue. This can be expressed by the construct &q(b1, ..., bn)
with predicate q and communication binders b1,...,bn. Using the construct
case e of some(y) : P1 else P2, one can then specify different continuations of
the computation, depending on whether each of these communications has suc-
ceeded. The predicate q can refer to any specific binder among b1, ..., bn, by its
index (1,...,n), and can denote any boolean combination of their evaluation sta-
tus. Since some previous inputs might be unsuccessful, the optional data types
from languages like Standard ML are used: expressions are evaluated to some(c)
with some constant c if they are not missing data, or to none otherwise. For
a quick example, consider the process &1∨2(c1?x1, c2?x2).case x1 of some(y1) :
P1 else P2. The computation can proceed to the case construct as long as either
the input over c1, or the input over c2, is successful. In case the former succeeds,
receiving datum d1, x1 will be bound to some(d1), and subsequently P1 will be
executed, making use of y1, which will be bound to d1. If the input over c1 does
not succeed until the case construct is reached, then x1 will be bound to none,
which will lead to the execution of P2 instead of P1.
The complete syntax is given in Table 3.1. Terms and expressions are sep-
arate syntactical categories that capture the distinction between data and op-
tional data. Correspondingly a term variable y can be bound to data and an
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Table 3.1: The Syntax of the Quality Calculus
(Terms) t ::= c | y | f(t1, . . . , tn)
(Expressions) e ::= x | some(t) | none
(Binders) b ::= t?x | t!t′{x} | &q(b1, ..., bn)
(Processes) P ::= (νc)P | P1|P2 | b.P | A(~e) | 0 |
case e of some(y) : P1 else P2 |
if t then P1 else P2
expression variable x can be bound to some(−) or none, containing information
about whether there is data at all.
We use c to refer to a constant. The set of constants that can serve as the
communication media are channels (Ch) and those that can be communicated
are data (Dt). We allow channels to be communicated but refrain from requiring
that all channels can. On the other hand, it is certainly not true that all data can
serve as communication media. Hence Ch ∩Dt 6= ∅ but in general there is no
inclusion relationship between the two sets. The members of Dt are sometimes
denoted by d (potentially with subscripts and primes).
Atomic output binders are of the form t!t′{x}, where the variable x is used
as an indicator of whether the output has succeeded, the output content is also
bound to x in case it has. We abbreviate t!t′{x} to t!t′ when such indication pro-
vided by x is not needed. With a procedure call A(~e), where ~e is the vector/list
of actual arguments, the procedure A needs to be defined as a process, with
A(~x) , P , where ~x is the vector/list of formal parameters. The other features
not mentioned so far are mostly standard. For operator precedence, we assume
that “ .” (prefixing with binder) binds more tightly than “ |” (parallel composi-
tion). Although the Quality Calculus does not have a non-deterministic choice
operator, an encoding of internal nondeterminstic choice (in the style of Hoare’s
CSP) can be done using composite binders &q(b1, ..., bn) and case constructs, as
presented in [NNV12].
Vector Notation For a vector ~v, we write |~v| for its total number of com-
ponents, and vj for the j-th one.
3.1.2 Semantics
We make use of a structural congruence that identifies processes that are struc-
turally different but behaviorally equivalent. This structural congruence is the
smallest congruence relation satisfying the rules in Table 3.3, where P ≡α P ′
represents that P and P ′ are α-equivalent. Note that putting two constructs
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that are related in a congruence relation in the same context yields related
constructs.
In Table 3.3, fc(P ) gives the set of free constants of the process P , and is
characterized by the defining equations in Figure 3.2 as the least fixpoint. We
fc((νc)P ) = fc(P ) \ {c}
fc(P1|P2) = fc(P1) ∪ fc(P2)
fc(b.P ) = fc(b) ∪ fc(P )
fc(A(~e)) = fc(P ) ∪ fc(~e) where A(~e) , P
fc(0) = ∅
fc(case e of some(y) : P1 else P2) = fc(e) ∪ fc(P1) ∪ fc(P2)
fc(if t then P1 else P2) = fc(t) ∪ fc(P1) ∪ fc(P2)
Figure 3.2: The Defining Equations for fc(P )
can complete the part of the equation system for binders, expressions and terms
in the natural way.
Table 3.3: The Structural Congruence
P1|P2 ≡ P2|P1 (νc1)(νc2)P ≡
P1|(P2|P3) ≡ (P1|P2)|P3 (νc2)(νc1)P (if c1 6= c2)
P | 0 ≡ P (νc)(P1|P2) ≡ ((νc)P1)|P2
(νc)P ≡ P (if c 6∈ fc(P )) (if c 6∈ fc(P2))
P ≡α P ′ ⇒ P ≡ P ′
The transition relation for processes is given in Table 3.4 and the transition
relation for binders is given in Table 3.5. We follow [NNV12] to use without
specifying in detail an evaluation relation . for terms and expressions.
The transitions for processes take the form P α−→ P ′, representing that the
process P performs the action1 α and becomes P ′. In Table 3.4, the rules for
communication come first. The rule for output simply says that if the binder
b can perform an output c!c′, then we check whether all sub-binders necessary
for b to be passed have already performed their own communications, using the
binder evaluation relation b ::v θ defined in Table 3.5. If b can be passed, then we
embark on the continuation P with the substitution θ; otherwise we stay with
the derivative b′ of b that records all the communications that have happened
so far. The input rule is analogous. The only operation that produces a τ is
internal synchronization, as expressed by the third rule.
1Note that the α here has nothing to do with ≡α.
3.1 The Quality Calculus 21
Table 3.4: The Transition Relation for Processes
b
c!c′−−→ b′
b.P
c!c′−−→ P ′
where P ′=
{
Pθ b′::ttθ
b′.P b′::ffθ
b
c?c′−−→ b′
b.P
c?c′−−→ P ′
where P ′=
{
Pθ b′::ttθ
b′.P b′::ffθ
P1
c!c′−→ P ′1 P2 c?c
′−→ P ′2
P1|P2 τ−→ P ′1|P ′2
e . some(c) P1[c/y]
α−→ P ′
case e of some(y) : P1 else P2
α−→ P ′
e . none P2
α−→ P ′
case e of some(y) : P1 else P2
α−→ P ′
t . tt P1
α−→ P ′
if t then P1 else P2
α−→ P ′
t . ff P2
α−→ P ′
if t then P1 else P2
α−→ P ′
~e . ~w P [~w/~x]
α−→ P ′
A(~e)
α−→ P ′
if A(~x) , P
P
α−→ P ′
(νc)P
α−→ (νc)P ′
if c 6∈ Ch(α)
P1
α−→ P2
P1|P α−→ P2|P
P1 ≡ P2 P2 α−→ P3 P3 ≡ P4
P1
α−→ P4
Table 3.5: The Transition Relation for Binders
t . c
t?x
c?c′−−→ [c : some(c′)/x]
t . c t′ . c′
t!t′{x} c!c′−−→ [c : some(c′)/x]
bj
α−→ b′j
&q(. . . , bj , . . .)
α−→ &q(. . . , b′j , . . .)
t!t′{x} ::ff [none/x] t?x ::ff [none/x] [c : some(c′)/x] ::tt [some(c′)/x]
b1 ::v1 θ1 . . . bn ::vn θn
&q(b1, ..., bn) ::v θn . . . θ1
v = [{q}](v1, . . . , vn)
The rules for the case construct base the decision as to which branch to take
on whether the evaluation of e results in some(−) or none. If the first branch
is taken, the substitution [c/y] is applied to it, to signal that y has been bound
to the constant c. The rule for procedure calls execute the procedure body for
one step, after substituting the evaluation result of the actual arguments for the
formal ones. Note that by ~e . ~w we mean |~e| = |~w| and ∀i : ei . wi. The rule
for (νc)P says that (νc)P can perform an action that P can perform, provided
that the channel c does not appear in α.
A property of this semantics is that all actions are communication actions,
among which (only) internal communications are represented by τ ’s.
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We now turn to the transition and evaluation of binders specified in Table 3.5.
The transitions for binders take the form b α−→ b′, representing that the binder
b performs the action α and becomes b′. Since a composite binder is not always
passed after performing a communication action, the intermediate form [c :
some(c′)/x] (essentially an extension to the binder syntax) is used to record
the data involved in the communications that have already happened. In the
case of input, the received content c′ is picked non-deterministically and any
constant is possible. The notation b′ ::v θ defined in the same table represents
the evaluation of binder b′ into substitution θ and boolean v, where θ records
the data bound to variables and v indicates whether the binder can already be
passed. The notation [{q}](v1, . . . , vn) specifies how to combine the evaluation
statuses of the sub-binders of a composite binder with predicate q. Two simple
examples are given below.
[{∀}](v1, . . . , vn) = [{1 ∧ ... ∧ n}](v1, . . . , vn) = v1 ∧ ... ∧ vn
[{∃}](v1, . . . , vn) = [{1 ∨ ... ∨ n}](v1, . . . , vn) = v1 ∨ ... ∨ vn
The semantics of the Quality Calculus is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.1 Consider the procedure call M , where
M ,&1∨2(c1?x1, c2?x2).
case x1 of some(y1) : c
′
1!y1.M
else case x2 of some(y2) : c
′′
2 !y2.M
else 0
We have the following transition sequence.
M
c2?d−→ case none of some(y1) : c
′
1!y1.M
else case some(d) of some(y2) : c
′′
2 !y2.M else 0
c′′2 !d−→ M
We elaborate on the derivation of the first step above. We have the binder tran-
sition &1∨2(c1?x1, c2?x2)
c2?d−→ &1∨2(c1?x1, [c2 : some(d)/x2]), and the evaluation
&1∨2(c1?x1, [c2 : some(d)/x2]) ::tt [some(d)/x2]. Thus the binder &1∨2(c1?x1, c2?x2)
can be passed, with the substitution [some(d)/x2] applied to the process that re-
mains. 
We introduce several pieces of notation related to the semantics to pave way
for further development. The channel used by an action α is represented by
ch(α), as formulated in the definition below.
Definition 3.1 (ch(α)) ch(α) =
{
c if ∃ρ, c′ : α = cρc′
⊥ otherwise
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The weak transition α̂=⇒ represents ( τ−→)∗◦ α−→ ◦( τ−→)∗ when α 6= τ , and
(
τ−→)∗ (rather than ( τ−→)∗◦ τ−→ ◦( τ−→)∗) when α = τ . We write P →∗ P ′ to
represent that there is a transition sequence starting from P and reaching P ′
in zero or more steps. The zero-step transition P →0 P ′ is understood in the
more general sense of P ≡ P ′, rather than P = P ′.
3.2 Security through Unwinding
An important approach to the non-interference-style characterization of process-
algebraic security is unwinding [BFPR03b, BPR04].
In more detail, a process is said to be secure if it belongs to an unwinding
class parameterized by a relation ∼ on processes and a transition sequence 99K:
W(∼, 99K) = {P | ∀P ′, P ′′, α s.t. P →∗ P ′ ∧ P ′ α−→ P ′′ ∧ I(ch(α)) = L :
∃P ′′′ : P ′ 99K P ′′′ ∧ P ′′ ∼ P ′′′}.
For integrity, W(∼, 99K) contains processes P that satisfy the following condi-
tion. For each derivative P ′ of P , and P ′′ reachable from P ′ by performing a
low integrity action, there exists P ′′′ reachable from P ′ over 99K, such that P ′′
is related to P ′′′ in ∼.
There are two classes of choices for ∼, one being a (non-standard) bisim-
ulation relation, the other being a trace-equivalence. We focus on the former
class, where all the notable security properties (SBNDC, PBNDC, CP BNDC)
are expressed by instantiating ∼ with “weak bisimilarity on non-corrupt actions”
(denoted by ≈H) [BFPR03b, BPR04]. The relation ≈H is the union of all “weak
bisimulations on non-corrupt actions”, defined below.
Definition 3.2 (Weak Bisimulation on Non-Corrupt Actions)
A symmetric relation R is a weak bisimulation on non-corrupt actions if for all
processes P1, P2, P1 R P2 implies
∀α, P ′1 s.t. P1 α−→ P ′1 ∧ I(ch(α)) 6= L :
∃P ′2 : P2 α̂=⇒ P ′2 ∧ P ′1 R P ′2.
We restrict ourselves to W(≈H , 99K) in the subsequent discussion. About
99K, we make the following assumptions, which are met by all the major security
properties SBNDC, PBNDC and CP BNDC.
Assumption 3.1 For all processes P and P ′, and communication actions α,
1. P τ−→ P ′ ⇒ P 99K P ′,
2. P α−→ P ′ ∧ I(ch(α)) = H ⇒ P 99K P ′, and
3. 99K is transitive.
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3.3 Security through Self-Bisimilarity
The unwinding scheme requires that a low integrity action should be “simulated”
by a sequence 99K of actions, directly in the formulation of W(−,−). The sim-
ulation requirement of a high integrity action, on the other hand, is embedded
inside ∼.
In this section, we formulate a kind of bisimulation that combines the simu-
lation requirements for actions of low and high integrity. We then characterize
the security of processes P as the bisimilarity of P to itself. The term “self-
bisimilarity” may sound unfortunate since standard bisimilarity is an equiva-
lence relation, and “self-bisimilarity” suggests triviality. Note that this is not
the case with the (partial) bisimulations often used in language-based secu-
rity [SS00, BC02, FRS05, Dam06].
We introduce the parameterized transition sequence α=⇒99K defined as:
α
=⇒99K=
{
99K if I(ch(α)) = L
α̂
=⇒ otherwise
We then define a notion of 99K-bisimulation that is parameterized over the
transition sequence 99K.
Definition 3.3 (99K-Bisimulation) A symmetric relation R qualifies as
a 99K-bisimulation if P1 R P2 implies
∀α, P ′1 s.t. P1 α−→ P ′1 : ∃P ′2 : P2 α=⇒99K P ′2 ∧ P ′1 R P ′2
We define 99K-bisimilarity ∼99K as the union of all 99K-bisimulations, and
99K-security of a process P as the self-relatedness of P in ∼99K.
Definition 3.4 (99K-Security) A process P is 99K-secure if and only if
P ∼99K P .
3.4 Unwinding Security as Self-Bisimilarity
In this section we establish the connection between the two patterns in defining
security with a concise proof.
Lemma 3.5 The relation ≈H is an equivalence relation.
Proof. The transitivity of ≈H can be shown as follows. Suppose P1 ≈H P2 and
P2 ≈H P3. Then there exist weak bisimulations on non-corrupt actions, R′ and
R′′, such that (P1, P2) ∈ R′ and (P2, P3) ∈ R′′. It is not difficult to show that
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the relation {(Pa, Pc) | (Pa, Pb) ∈ R′ ∧ (Pb, Pc) ∈ R′′} is a weak bisimulation on
non-corrupt actions that relates P1 and P3. The proofs for the reflexivity and
symmetry of ≈H are also straightforward. 
Lemma 3.6 For all processes P1 and P2, if P1 ≈H P2, and P1 99K P ′1, then
there exists process P ′2 such that P2 99K P ′2, and P ′1 ≈H P ′2.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward by induction on the length of
P1 99K P ′1, and use of Assumption 3.1 and Definition 3.2.
Lemma 3.7 (Unwinding Security Implies Self-Bisimilarity)
For all processes P , if P ∈ W(≈H , 99K), then P ∼99K P .
Proof. Construct the relation
R? = {(P1, P2) | P →∗ P1 ∧ P →∗ P2 ∧ P1 ≈H P2}
Lemma 3.5 gives the symmetry of R?, and the validity of P R? P . We now
show that R? is a 99K-bisimulation.
Suppose there is transition P1
α−→ P ′1. We make a case distinction based on
I(ch(α)).
1. I(ch(α)) = L. Since P →∗ P1, and P ∈ W(≈H , 99K), there exists some
P ′′1 such that P1 99K P ′′1 and P ′1 ≈H P ′′1 . By Lemma 3.6, there exists some
process P ′2 such that P2 99K P ′2 and P ′′1 ≈H P ′2. By Lemma 3.5, we have
P ′1 ≈H P ′2. Hence we have P2 α=⇒99K P ′2 and (P ′1, P ′2) ∈ R?.
2. I(ch(α)) 6= L. By the definition of≈H , there exists P ′2 such that P2 α̂=⇒ P ′2
and P ′1 ≈H P ′2. Hence we have P2 α=⇒99K P ′2 and (P ′1, P ′2) ∈ R?.
Therefore R? qualifies as a 99K-bisimulation, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.8 ∼99K⊆≈H
Proof. The proof is trivial by noting that each 99K-bisimulation R qualifies as
a weak bisimulation on non-corrupt actions. 
Lemma 3.9 (Self-Bisimilarity implies Unwinding Security)
For all processes P , if P ∼99K P , then P ∈ W(≈H , 99K).
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Proof. Assume that P ∼99K P . It is not difficult to show that for all P1 such
that P →∗ P1, there exists P2 such that P →∗ P2 and P1 ∼99K P2. Note that
there is no constraint on either transition sequence.
For all α, P ′1 such that P1
α−→ P ′1 and I(ch(α)) = L, there exists P ′2 such that
P2
α
=⇒99K P ′2 (which boils down to P2 99K P ′2) and P ′1 ∼99K P ′2. By Lemma 3.8,
we have P1 ≈H P2 and P ′1 ≈H P ′2. By the symmetry of ≈H (Lemma 3.5),
we have P2 ≈H P1. By Lemma 3.6, there exists P ′′1 such that P1 99K P ′′1 and
P ′2 ≈H P ′′1 . By the transitivity of ≈H we have P ′1 ≈H P ′′1 . 
Theorem 3.10 (Unwinding Security as Self-Bisimilarity) For
all processes P , P ∈ W(≈H , 99K) if and only if P ∼99K P .
Theorem 3.10 essentially states that the unwinding class P ∈ W(≈H , 99K)
characterizes exactly the reflexive fragment of the partial equivalence relation
∼99K.
Remark 3.1 A different perspective on the secure semantics induced by the
unwinding-condition is provided — essentially that of the bisimulation-game for
∼99K. In more detail, a game is played continually between an attacker and a
defender: at any point of execution, the attacker tries to exert malicious influ-
ence by choosing to perform/suspend a low integrity action; whereas the defender
attempts to nullify the effects by being able to perform the same high integrity
action.
SBNDC as Self-Bisimilarity
We specialize the previous result and obtain a notion of process-algebraic secu-
rity that coincides with SBNDC (Strong Bisimulation-Based non Deducibility
on Compositions [FG01]), but possesses the form of “self-bisimilarity”. This
provides a basis for the development in Chapter 4.
The following definitions are taken from [LNN15], but actually define α=⇒≡
and ≡-bisimulation (recall that ≡ is the structural congruence) in the framework
of this chapter.
Definition 3.11 ( α=⇒) α=⇒=
{
≡ if I(ch(α)) = L
α̂
=⇒ otherwise
Definition 3.12 (-bisimulation) A binary relationR on processes qual-
ifies as a -bisimulation if it is a symmetric relation, and P1 R P2 implies
∀P ′1, α s.t. P1 α−→ P ′1 : ∃P ′2 : P2 α=⇒ P ′2 ∧ P ′1 R P ′2.
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In -bisimulation,  is not a parameter, but merely part of the name that
reflects the fact that a low integrity communication is simulated by inaction,
resulting in a triangular structure2. Note the strong resemblance between the
requirement imposed for low and high integrity actions in -bisimulation and
the unwinding conditions lrH and oscL,∅,H in [Man01].
We will denote by ∼ the union of all -bisimulations, i.e., -bisimilarity.
It is obvious that ∼ is identical to ∼≡ and that it is a -bisimulation itself.
The relation ∼ has the following simple property, which will be used in our
further development in the next chapter.
Lemma 3.13 For all processes P1, P ′1, and P2, if P1 ∼ P2, and P1 ≡ P ′1,
then P ′1 ∼ P2.
Proof. Construct the relation
R? = {(P ′a, P ′b) | Pa ∼ Pb ∧ Pa ≡ P ′a ∧ Pb ≡ P ′b}.
Using the definition of ∼, it is trivial to show that R? is a -bisimulation such
that P ′1 R? P2. 
We next give the definition of SBNDC as a specialization of the unwinding
class, and state the equivalence of SBNDC and self-relatedness in ∼ as a
corollary of Theorem 3.10.
Definition 3.14 (SBNDC) A process P ∈ SBNDC if P ∈ W(≈H ,≡).
Corollary 3.15 For all processes P , P ∈ SBNDC if and only if P ∼ P .
Remark 3.2 In [LNN15], we suspected that the side result on identifying SB-
NDC and self-bisimilarity may be the first such coincidence result derived for a
process algebra. This conjecture is falsified due to similar results in [CR05].
2The notion of -bisimulation is close, although not identical, to the notion of “Weak
Bisimulation up to H with zero τ ” that is used in an alternative formulation [BFPR03a] of
SBNDC. Here the “H” means high confidentiality.
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Chapter 4
Presence and Content,
Independently
Communication is important in many process calculi (e.g., [SW01, Hoa85]).
Communication channels can often be compared to variables: writing to a chan-
nel resembles assigning to a variable, and reading from a channel resembles eval-
uating a variable. Unlike the usual treatment of assignments in programming
languages, communications are oftentimes blocking operations in process cal-
culi. There is a need for synchronization, and failing to synchronize can block
further computation. Thus it becomes more relevant to consider whether a
communication can happen at all as a separate aspect in addition to what the
communication content is. And the analogy of communication to assignments
is retained in the dimension of content.
For a concrete example, consider the communicating process c?x.c′!d, versus
the simple program x := z; z′ := d. The content of the variable z cannot
be leaked via the content of the variable z′. Similarly, the content received
from the channel c cannot be leaked via the output content over channel c′.
However, when c?x could potentially be blocked, the presence of the input over
c can be leaked via the mere presence of the output over c′. Hence, if c′ is
public, then c cannot be confidential. This is the requirement of the SBNDC
condition discussed in Section 3.4, and the viewpoint taken in [FG01], [Kob05],
[Cas07], [CCDR10], [vBV11], and [RHS12]. Allowing the distinction between
the presence and content of communications, we immediately obtain a finer-
grained analysis. Supposing both the “presence” level and the “content” level
of c′ are public, then the content level of c can still be confidential — only the
presence level needs to be public, for the process to be secure.
The fine-grained distinction between “presence” and “content” is, however,
not new: this approach has been pursued in previous developments on secur-
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ing interactive programs (e.g., [SM02, RHS12, RS14]). Nevertheless, being con-
cerned with confidentiality, existing work imposes the constraint that “presence”
can be no more confidential than “content”: observing the content of a commu-
nication implies the knowledge that the communication is happening (present).
By the usually perceived duality (e.g., [MPP13]) between confidentiality and
integrity, separating “presence” and “content” applies for integrity as well. Still
consider the process c1?x.c2!d. If both the “presence” and the “content” of com-
munication over c2 are of high integrity, then only the “presence” of communi-
cation over c1 needs to be of high integrity as well, the input content can still
be of low integrity, for the process to be secure. However, the aforementioned
constraint would preclude the use of channels with low presence integrity and
high content integrity. Nevertheless, this combination is practically meaningful.
When message authentication codes (MAC) are used, a MAC-checker can de-
tect tampered (low integrity) content and choose to accept only high integrity
content. As a result, the content, once received by an end user, can be used
by her with confidence that no harm will arise. The worry, though, is that the
communication allowing her to receive that content may not be present. The
suspension of this communication may be caused, for example, by message re-
jection in the MAC-checker due to content corruption. It is therefore sensible
to regard the user channel as having low presence integrity and high content
integrity.
In this chapter, we formulate a novel bisimulation-based noninterference
property for integrity, where the presence and content of communication events
are dealt with separately, and all combinations of integrity levels for these
two dimensions are allowed. The property is shown to degenerate to SBNDC
(e.g., [FG01]) when the distinction between presence and content is intension-
ally blurred, and a compositionality result is obtained to facilitate a structural
approach to information flow analysis in a concurrent setting.
In Section 4.1, we further motivate the distinction between presence integrity
and content integrity with a few concrete example processes in the Quality
Calculus. In Section 4.2, we introduce a semantics for the Quality Calculus
that is parameterized with the strategy of the environment, which will help
formulate a concise and intuitive security condition. In Section 4.3, we introduce
δ-security — a noninterference notion that articulates the integrity guarantee
of presence labels and content labels. Two theoretical properties of δ-security
— its connection with PBNDC and its compositionality — are then discussed
in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we present further examples that illustrate our
compositionality result, and provide further insight on the difference between
integrity and confidentiality when “presence” and “content” are considered as
separate dimensions. Finally, related work is discussed in Section 4.6.
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Syntactical Convention In the examples to be presented in this chapter,
we sometimes write c?x[y].P and &q(..., c?x[y], ...).P in case the input has to
happen for the binder corresponding to c?x to be passed. This represents
c?x.case x of some(y) : P else P ′ and &q(..., c?x[y], ...).case x of some(y) :
P else P ′, respectively, where in the latter situation the case can also be nested
in other branching constructs. This is only to prevent parts of our specifications
from becoming unnecessarily bloated.
4.1 Presence Integrity and Content Integrity
Let us give a few examples (in Fig.4.1) to frame our mind in terms of presence
integrity and content integrity, and further motivate the noninterference prop-
erty to be proposed. Channels with two subscripts (L or H, representing their
integrity classification) will often be used. The first level describes the presence
dimension and the second describes the content dimension. For each subscript,
an L (resp. H) will denote low (resp. high) integrity. Recall from Section 3.1
that “.” binds more tightly than “|”.
1. cHL?x[y].c′HL!y
2. cLH?x[y].c′LH !y
3. cLH?x1[y1].cLL?x2[y2].c′LH !f(y1, y2),
where ∀d2, d′2 s.t. d2 6= d′2 : ∃d1 : f(d1, d2) 6= f(d1, d′2)
4. cLH?x[y].c′LH !y | c′LH !d
5. cHH?x[y].c′HH !y | c′HH !d
6. M where
M , &1∨2(cLH?x1, cLL?x2).
case x1 of some(y1) : c
′
LH !y1.M
else case x2 of some(y2) : c
′
LL!y2.M
else 0
7. A where
A , &1∨2(cLL?x1, c′LL?x2).
case x1 of some(y1) : cHL!y1.A
else case x2 of some(y2) : cHL!y2.A
else 0
Figure 4.1: Example Processes for Presence and Content Integrity
Processes 1 and 2 are intuitively secure. In process 1, given the low content
integrity and high presence integrity of cHL, the corruption of the input content
by an attacker can be “passed on” to the output content, while the input cannot
be blocked by the attacker, consequently blocking the output. Hence the low
content integrity, high presence integrity of c′HL can be justified in accordance
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with the integrity classes of cHL. In process 2, any influence on the presence
of the input can in turn influence the presence of the output, but cannot by
itself corrupt the output content, which also demonstrates the consistency of
the integrity classes of cLH and c′LH . On the other hand, process 3 is insecure:
the classification of c′LH does not meet the intuition that both the presence of
the final output, and its content, can be badly influenced.
One might think that the presence integrity can either be high for all chan-
nels, or low for all channels, hence at most one of the classes “high” and “low” is
needed. This is not true, as illustrated by the insecurity of process 4, and the
security of process 5. In process 4, the content integrity of the output channel
cannot be H, since the presence of the input leads to more choices for the output
content over c′LH , some of which (6= d) may not be possible with the input still
blocked.
Given the occasional existence of insecure dependency of high integrity con-
tent on low integrity presence such as that in process 4, it becomes interesting to
see when certain source channels have the presence level L, which sink channels
can still have the content level H without being affected. Process 6 is a call to
the procedure M whose definition starts from the subsequent line. This process
is in fact a simple-minded “multiplexer” that directs incoming data from cLH to
c′LH , and from cLL to c
′
LL. Note that if one of the four channels has low presence
integrity, then all channels have low presence integrity, since the influence by
the presence of communication over one of the channels on the control flow is
global. However, c′LH preserves the high content integrity of cLH , despite this
pervasive corruption on the “presence” dimension.
The process 7 is a call to procedure A whose body uses the same predicate
1 ∨ 2, which enables it to source from alternative channels cLL and c′LL. The
input content, no matter from which source channel, will be output over the
channel cHL. The process is not secure if the environment can block the two
inputs at the same time. However, cLL and c′LL might represent sources that are
geographically distant or that fail with drastically different causes, which can be
modeled by an environment strategy (e.g., [RHS12, MC12]) that always provides
at least one of the inputs when the computation proceeds to the composite input
binder. The procedure call will be secure under that strategy.
We end this section with a conceptualization of presence integrity and con-
tent integrity, although a more technical characterization comes along with our
security property to be presented later.
• Presence integrity: for each i, whether the existence of the i-th output/in-
put over channel c in a finite sequence pi of communication actions can be
influenced by the attacker
• Content integrity: for each i, whether the content of the i-th output/input
over channel c can be influenced by the attacker, in case the input/output
exists in a finite sequence pi of communication actions
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c! c! c! · · ·
i1 i2 i3
c!d1
c!d2
c!d3
Presence
C
ontent
Figure 4.2: The Presence Dimension and the Content Dimension
Note that it is not only whether an input/output on a channel c is eventually
available, that matters, but how many times it occurs in each computation
sequence, since we are concerned with nonterminating computations and looping
behaviors: the processes 6 and 7 in Fig. 4.1 are such examples1.
It is illustrated in Figure 4.2 that under the impact of the attacker, the i-th
use of channel c for output can happen alternatively at global indices i1, i2
and i3, and in each case, the output content can also vary within {d1, d2, d3}.
Note that the perturbation in presence does not necessarily cause variation in
content, and vice versa.
Remark 4.1 The most intuitive viewpoint on corruption in data content may
be the introduction of certain fragments provided by an attacker into the content,
or the substitution of these fragments for original ones. This pertains mainly
to explicit flows and to the authenticity of the content provider, and is a special
case of our view of content corruption as influence on its possibilities.
4.2 An Environment-Parameterized Semantics of
the Quality Calculus
The semantics to be presented in this section is parameterized on the strategy
of the computation environment (in the spirit of [WJ90, MC12]), to facilitate
the specification of open systems. This is unusual for process calculi, since from
a purely theoretical point of view, the environment is nothing but a process.
However, as has been mentioned in Section 2.3, we distinguish the environment
(a strategy) from the system (a process) to ease the abstract specification of the
former, and to allow the former to have different traits than the latter.
In this environment-parameterized semantics, processes and binders make
transitions together with sequences pi ∈ Π. Each such sequence contains a
separator 4, which delimits the environment’s past actions interacting with the
1On the other hand, [ZM05] addresses the problem of whether the eventual availability of
data in a variable can depend on variables of low integrity/availability.
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process, and optionally a future communication attempt. Each communication
action/attempt is represented by an “abstract binder” bˆ ∈ AB :
bˆ ::= c?[ ] | c?c′ | c!c′ | .
The abstract binders c?[ ] and c?c′ (c ∈ Ch and c′ ∈ Dt) represent a pending in-
put and a completed input, respectively, of the environment ; on the other hand,
c!c′ (c ∈ Ch and c′ ∈ Dt) represents either a pending output or a completed
output, also of the environment. In addition,  represents the suspension of
any communication by one step.
We write [pi]4 for the prefix of pi up to and including the 4 in it, and Π4
for the set {[pi]4 | pi ∈ Π}. We introduce next environment strategies
δ : Π4 → 2AB\{c?c′ | c∈Ch∧c′∈Dt}
that constitute the set Strat. For each pi ∈ Π4, δ(pi) gives the set of abstract
binders that represent the environment’s intended ways of “exercising” the speci-
fication for one more step. Note that in the case where the environment attempts
to perform an input, an abstract binder given by δ(−) contains a hole rather
than any concrete content — the environment can prescribe over which channel
it wants to receive content from the process, but not which content the process
has to provide.
The transition relation for processes is given in Table 4.3. As in the previ-
ous chapter, we make use of an unspecified evaluation relation . for terms and
expressions. Each rule is of the form δ ` 〈P, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉 or δ ` 〈P, pi〉 env−→
〈P, pi′〉, representing the transition of process P under environment pi into pro-
cess P ′, turning the environment into pi′. The action performed is either a
communication α, or a lookahead “env” by the environment. This transition
relation is defined assuming the same structural congruence ≡ of Table 3.3 as
the standard semantics presented in Section 3.1 did.
In the rules for communication in Table 4.3, b ::v θ is still defined by Ta-
ble 3.5 of Chapter 3. The communication rules build on transition rules for
binder, which will be explained later. The process case e of some(y) : P1 else P2
is abbreviated as CS (e, y, P1, P2), and Ch(α) represents the set of channels oc-
curring in α.
The second last transition rule of Table 4.3 says that when a process P
cannot perform any communication action when the environment attempts to
use the abstract binder α for the next interaction, we allow P to do a -step,
signaling that there is one step of delay. At the same time, the observational
history of the environment is extended by a , recording the observation of this
delay.
The last transition rule says that the environment can make its next in-
teraction attempt when its observational history ends with a 4: it can only
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Table 4.3: The Environment-Parameterized Transition Relation for Processes
α 6= 
〈b, pi〉 c!c′−−→ 〈b′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈b.P, pi〉 c!c′−−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
where P ′=
{
Pθ (if b′::ttθ)
b′.P (otherwise)
〈b, pi〉 c?c′−−→ 〈b′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈b.P, pi〉 c?c′−−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
where P ′=
{
Pθ (if b′::ttθ)
b′.P (otherwise)
δ ` 〈P1, 4c?[ ]〉 c!c
′−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉 δ ` 〈P2, 4c!c′〉 c?c
′−→ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉
δ ` 〈P1|P2, pi〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1|P ′2, pi〉
e . some(c) δ ` 〈P1[c/y], pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈CS(e, y, P1, P2), pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
e . none δ ` 〈P2, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈CS(e, y, P1, P2), pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
t . tt δ ` 〈P1, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈if t then P1 else P2, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
t . ff δ ` 〈P2, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈if t then P1 else P2, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
~e . ~w δ ` 〈P [~w/~x], pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈A(~e), pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
if A(~x) , P
δ ` 〈P, pi〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉
δ ` 〈(νc)P, pi〉 α−→ 〈(νc)P ′, pi′〉
if c 6∈ Ch(α)
δ ` 〈P1, pi〉 α−→ 〈P2, pi′〉
δ ` 〈P1|P, pi〉 α−→ 〈P2|P, pi′〉
P1 ≡ P2 δ ` 〈P2, pi〉 α−→ 〈P3, pi′〉 P3 ≡ P4
δ ` 〈P1, pi〉 α−→ 〈P4, pi′〉
¬(∃c, c′, α, P ′, pi′ : (α = c!c′ ∨ α = c?c′) ∧ δ ` 〈P, pi4β〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉)
δ ` 〈P, pi4β〉 −→ 〈P, pi.4〉
δ ` 〈P, pi〉 env−−→ 〈P, pi.β〉 if pi = [pi]4 ∧ β ∈ δ(pi)
“prescribe” the most imminent interaction, without further predication of the
future.
The transition relation for binders is given in Table 4.4. Each transition rule
is of the form 〈b, pi〉 α−→ 〈b′, pi′〉, representing that the binder b performs the
communication action α (α 6= τ) under the environment pi and becomes b′, turn-
ing the environment into pi′. The movement of 4 in the resulting environment
records the communication action that has just happened. As in the semantics
of Section 3.1, the intermediate binder [c : some(c′)/x] (essentially an extension
to the binder syntax) is used to record the data involved in the communications
that have already happened.
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Table 4.4: The Environment-Parameterized Transition Relation for Binders
t . c
〈t?x, pi4c!c′〉 c?c
′−−→ 〈[c : some(c′)/x], pi.c!c′4〉
t . c t′ . c′
〈t!t′{x}, pi4c?[ ]〉 c!c
′−−→ 〈[c : some(c′)/x], pi.c?c′4〉
〈bj , pi〉 α−→ 〈b′j , pi′〉
〈&q(b1, ..., bj , ..., bn), pi〉 α−→ 〈&q(b1, ..., b′j , ..., bn), pi′〉
We illustrate the semantics presented above in Example 4.1, where
δALL = λpi4.{c!c′ | c ∈ Ch ∧ c′ ∈ Dt} ∪ {c?[ ] | c ∈ Ch} ∪ {},
i.e., δALL is the strategy that allows the environment to produce any legitimate
abstract binder with any observation it has made.
Example 4.1 The procedure call M in Fig. 4.1 has the following transition
sequence.
δALL ` 〈M, 4〉 env−→ 〈M, 4cLL!d〉
cLL?d−→ 〈 case none of some(y1) : c
′
LH !y1.M
else case some(d) of some(y2) : c
′′
LL!y2.M else 0
, cLL!d4〉
env−→ 〈 case none of some(y1) : c
′
LH !y1.M
else case some(d) of some(y2) : c
′′
LL!y2.M else 0
, cLL!d4c
′′
LL?x〉
c′′LL!d−→ 〈M, cLL!d.c′′LL?d4〉
We elaborate slightly on the second step above. According to the transition
rules for binders, we have 〈cLL?x2, 4cLL!d〉 cLL?d−→ 〈[cLL : some(d)/x2], cLL!d4〉,
which gives rise to 〈&1∨2(cLH?x1, cLL?x2), 4cLL!d〉 cLL?d−→ 〈&1∨2(cLH?x1, [cLL :
some(d)/x2]), cLL!d4〉. Using the evaluation rules for binders (Table 3.5), we
have
&1∨2(cLH?x1, [cLL : some(d)/x2]) ::tt [none/x1][some(d)/x2].
Hence by the transition rule for b.P , with b is taken to be &1∨2(cLH?x1, [cLL :
some(d)/x2]), the second transition is derived. 
For a polarity ρ ∈ {!, ?}, we write ρ˜ for its opposite polarity. Thus we have
!˜ =? and ?˜ =!. We also overload the operator ·˜ on communication actions and
write c˜!c′ for c?[ ] and c˜?c′ for c!c′.
The environment-parameterized semantics has the following correspondence
with the original semantics presented in Section 3.1. Roughly speaking, if an
action sequence contains at most one external communication, then the action
sequence can be directly performed by a process in the original semantics, if
4.3 δ-Security 37
and only if it can be performed by the process in the new semantics, after a
corresponding interaction attempt made by the environment.
Lemma 4.1 For all processes P , P ′, actions α1, α2, ..., and αn such that
there is at most one i ∈ {1, ..., n} for which αi 6= τ , and ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} : αi 6= ,
histories pi such that pi = [pi]4, and pi0 such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} : αi 6= τ ⇒ pi0 =
pi.α˜i, the following are equivalent:
1. P α1...αn=⇒ P ′, and
2. δALL ` 〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉 ∧ ∃pi′0 : δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is given in Appendix A.
The following lemma is fairly obvious; we nevertheless state it here since it
will be used in our proofs to be presented in Section 4.4. For a communication
action α 6= τ , we write dt(α) for the data communicated in α.
Lemma 4.2 The following statements hold.
1. If δ ` 〈b, pi.β〉 α−→ 〈b′, pi′〉 ∧ α 6= τ ∧ α 6= , then [pi.β]4 = pi ∧ β = α˜ ∧ pi′ =
pi.(ch(α)ρ˜(α)dt(α))4.
2. If δ ` 〈P, pi.β〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉 ∧ α 6= τ ∧ α 6= , then [pi.β]4 = pi ∧ β = α˜ ∧ pi′ =
pi.(ch(α)ρ˜(α)dt(α))4.
Lemma 4.2 can be proved with a straightforward induction on the semantic
derivations, with 2 proved with the help of 1.
We will use the more compact notation δ ` 〈P, pi〉 env,α−−−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉 to represent
∃pi0 : δ ` 〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉 ∧ δ ` 〈P, pi0〉 α−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉.
We will also use rch(P ) (rch is short for “reachable channels”) to represent the
channel, polarity pairs of all possible communications that can be performed by
a derivative of 〈P, 4〉 under the strategy δALL, i.e.,
rch(P ) = {(c, ρ) | ∃P ′, pi′, c′ : δALL ` 〈P, 4〉 →∗ 〈P ′, pi′〉 cρc
′
−→}.
4.3 δ-Security
In this section, we build up to our noninterference condition for behavioral
integrity. We introduce the classification mapping E such that E◦ and E• keep
track of the presence levels and content levels, respectively, for communication
channels. In our definitions and propositions, we tacitly assume that all variables
that are not explicitly quantified are in fact universally quantified.
We start by introducing a way of indexing into traces: pi@c,ρi is (n, c
′) if the i-
th communication over channel c with polarity ρ in pi is the n-th communication
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overall in pi, and the content of the communication is c′. All the indices start
with 0. If the number of communications over c with polarity ρ in pi is less
than or equal to i, then pi@c,ρi is ⊥. This is formalized in Definition 4.3 and
illustrated in Example 4.2.
Definition 4.3 (pi@c,ρi ) pi@
c,ρ
i = pi@
c,ρ
i,0 , where i ≥ 0 and pi@c,ρi,0 is defined by
pi@c,ρi,n =

⊥ (if pi = )
(n, c′) (if ∃pi′ : pi = cρc′.pi′ ∧ i = 0)
pi′@c,ρi−1,n+1 (if ∃c′ : pi = cρc′.pi′ ∧ i 6= 0)
pi′@c,ρi,n+1 (if ∃c′′, ρ′′, c′′′ : pi = c′′ρ′′c′′′.pi′ ∧ (c′′ 6= c ∨ ρ′′ 6= ρ))
Example 4.2 Consider the trace pi = cLL!d.c′′LL?d4 left by the environment
from Example 4.1. We have pi@c
′′
LL,?
0 = (1, d) and pi@
c′′LL,?
i = ⊥ whenever i ≥ 1.

We define the trace correspondence relation WE as follows, where |pi| stands
for the length of pi. This definition builds on another relation W l1l2 that is
explained immediately after it. The presence and content of communications in
traces related byWE are supposed to reflect the integrity levels of their channels.
Definition 4.4 (WE) pi1 WE pi2 if and only if pi1 and pi2 are finite, |pi1| = |pi2|,
and ∀i ≥ 0 : ∀c, ρ : pi1@c,ρi W E
◦(c)
E•(c) pi2@
c,ρ
i .
In prose, two traces related byWE are required to have the same finite length,
and the i-th occurrences of communication over channel c, with polarity ρ, are
required to be related by W E
◦(c)
E•(c) , for each c and ρ. The latter relation is in turn
defined as follows, where c′1
.
= c′2 if and only if c′1 = c′2 or c′2 = [ ].
Definition 4.5 (W l1l2 ) (n1, c
′
1) W
l1
l2
(n2, c
′
2) if and only if
(n1, c
′
1) W
l1
l2
(n2, c
′
2) iff (l1 = H ⇒ n1 = n2) ∧ (l2 = H ⇒ c′1 .= c′2)
(n1, c
′
1) W
l1
l2
⊥ iff l1 = L
⊥ W l1l2 (n2, c′2) iff l1 = L
⊥ W l1l2 ⊥ iff true
It can be seen that for a channel c with high presence integrity, the i-th
occurrences of input/output over c need to have the same overall index in their
respective traces. On the other hand, for a channel c with high content integrity,
the i-th occurrences of input/output over c need to have equivalent content.
This corresponds tightly to our description of “presence integrity” and “content
integrity” in Section 4.1. The reason that .= is used for relating content, instead
of =, is the potential existence of holes in traces of the form ...4c?[ ].
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The weak transition introduced in Chapter 3 will not be used directly in our
noninterference property, but encapsulated within the transition α̂
′
=⇒
α
introduced
in Definition 4.6. It boils down to the weak transition α̂
′
=⇒ in case α is a commu-
nication with high presence integrity or a τ ; otherwise to the single transition
α′−→ (where τ ’s are not allowed).
Definition 4.6 ( α̂
′
=⇒
α
) α̂
′
=⇒
α
=

α′−→ (if α =  ∨ ∃c, ρ, c′ : α = cρc′ ∧ E◦(c) = L)
α̂′
=⇒ (otherwise)
We then define the notion of δ-bisimulation, where δ ∈ Strat is a strategy.
Definition 4.7 (δ-Bisimulation) A δ-bisimulation is a symmetric rela-
tion R on configurations such that if 〈P1, pi1〉 R 〈P2, pi2〉, δ ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env,α−−−→
〈P ′1, pi′1〉, δ `〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi20〉, and pi′1WE pi20, then we have
∃P ′2, pi′2, α′ : δ ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α̂
′
=⇒
α
〈P ′2, pi′2〉 ∧
[pi′1]4WE [pi
′
2]4 ∧ 〈P ′1, [pi′1]4〉 R 〈P ′2, [pi′2]4〉.
If two configurations 〈P1, pi1〉 and 〈P2, pi2〉 are related by a δ-bisimulation
R, then after 〈P1, pi1〉 interacts with the environment δ for one step, and the
environment makes an interaction attempt with 〈P2, pi2〉, such that the inter-
action and the attempt meet the integrity classes of their channels (pi′1 WE pi20),
the configuration 〈P2, pi20〉 can simulate the interaction made by 〈P1, pi1〉, in
a way that meets the integrity classes of the channels involved (as required by
[pi′1]4 WE [pi
′
2]4).
The definition of δ-bisimulation introduces two universally quantified transi-
tions, before simulating the first one with an existentially quantified transition.
This pattern, previously adopted in [NN13], is rare in the literature.
We then define δ-bisimilarity (∼
δ
) as the union of all δ-bisimulations (which
is itself a δ-bisimulation). Note that δ-bisimilarity is not reflexive. In fact,
our noninterference condition identifies the δ-security of a process P with the
self-relatedness of 〈P, 4〉 in ∼
δ
, as stated in Definition 4.8.
Definition 4.8 (δ-Security) A process P is δ-secure, denoted by Secδ(P ),
if and only if 〈P, 4〉 ∼
δ
〈P, 4〉.
To arrive at a better understanding of δ-security, we introduce in Defini-
tion 4.9 the notion of kernel δ-bisimulation, which constrains the pairs of obser-
vational histories further than δ-bisimulation does. Proposition 4.10 then says
that kernel δ-bisimulations can be used to characterize δ-security equally well.
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Definition 4.9 (Kernel δ-Bisimulation) A δ-bisimulation R is said
to be a kernel δ-bisimulation if and only if 〈P1, pi1〉R 〈P2, pi2〉 implies knlE(pi1, pi2),
where knlE(pi1, pi2) represents pi1 WE pi2, [pi1]4 = pi1, and [pi2]4 = pi2.
Thus the relatedness of some pi1 and some pi2 in a kernel δ-bisimulation
provides the further information that pi1 and pi2 are purely observational histories
and related by WE . Note that knlE( , ) is symmetric because the position of 4
in the related histories implies that the .= used to define WE boils down to plain
equality.
Proposition 4.10 There is a δ-bisimulation R such that 〈P, 4〉 R 〈P, 4〉,
if and only if there is a kernel δ-bisimulation R′ such that 〈P, 4〉 R′ 〈P, 4〉.
Proof. By Definition 4.9, we directly know that if there is a kernel δ-
bisimulation R′ such that 〈P, 4〉 R′ 〈P, 4〉, then there is a δ-bisimulation
R = R′ relating 〈P, 4〉 to itself.
For the other direction, suppose there is δ-bisimulation R in which 〈P, 4〉
is related to itself. We simply construct
R′ = {(〈P1, pi1〉, 〈P2, pi2〉) | (〈P1, pi1〉, 〈P2, pi2〉) ∈ R ∧ knlE(pi1, pi2)}.
It is not difficult to show that R′ is a kernel δ-bisimulation relating 〈P, 4〉 to
itself. 
For a δ-secure process P , the implications of the existence of a kernel δ-
bisimulation R such that 〈P, 4〉 R 〈P, 4〉 are:
1. A communication α with high presence integrity needs to be simulated
by a communication over the same channel, possibly together with τ ’s.
In case the channel also has high content integrity, the content of the
simulating communication should be the same as that of α. If the channel
has low content integrity, on the other hand, then the bisimulation should
continue under all contents possibly attempted by the environment, that
are not necessarily the same as that of α.
2. A communication α with low presence integrity, or a -transition, is sim-
ulated by a communication over a channel also of low presence integrity,
or by a -transition. If the channel of α, say c, has high content integrity,
and it is being used for the i-th time with polarity ρ, then the content
of α needs to agree with the content of the communication occurring on
c with polarity ρ for the i-th time in the second execution, in case that
communication exists. A similar requirement is imposed on the simulating
communication, when its channel has high content integrity.
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〈M, 4〉 R? 〈M, 4〉
〈M, 4cLL!d2〉
〈c′LH !d1.M, cLH !d14〉 R? 〈c′′LL!d2.M, cLL!d24〉
〈c′′LL!d2.M, cLL!d24c′′LL?x〉
〈M, cLH !d1.c′LH?d14〉 R? 〈M, cLL!d2.c′′LL?d24〉
〈M, cLL!d2.c′′LL?d24cLH !d1〉
〈M, cLH !d1.c′LH?d1.4〉 R? 〈c′LH !d1.M, cLL!d2.c′′LL?d2.cLH !d14〉
〈c′LH !d1.M, cLL!d2.c′′LL?d2.cLH !d14c′LH?x〉
〈c′′LL!d′1.M, cLH !d1.c′LH?d1..cLL!d′14〉 R? 〈M, cLL!d2.c′′LL?d2.cLH !d1.c′LH?d14〉
env,
cLH?d1
1
env,
c′LH !d1
4
env,
 7
env,
cLL?d
′
1
10
env2
cLL?d23
env5
c′′LL!d26
env8
cLH?d19
env11
c′LH !d112
Figure 4.5: Partial Unfolding of the Kernel Bisimulation for Multiplexer
3. A τ can only be simulated by a (possibly empty) sequence of τ ’s. This
is because when a τ -transition is made from a configuration 〈Pi, pii〉 (i ∈
{1, 2}), the 4 in pi does not move, which is not the case with observable
communications. By Definition 4.7 and 4.9, it is obvious that |pi′1| = |pi20|.
Hence if a τ is not simulated only by τ ’s, [pi′1]4 and [pi′2]4 will not have
the same length and [pi′1]4WE [pi
′
2]4 will not hold.
The δALL-security/insecurity of processes 1-6 in Figure 4.1 of Section 4.1
agrees with the claims based on intuition in the same section, with an uncon-
strained environment. And process 7 is δALT-secure, where δALT characterizes
an environment that provides content over at least one of cLL and c′LL whenever
the process is ready for input from these two alternative channels and attempts
interaction on any legitimate abstract binder otherwise:
δALT(pi) =
{
{c1!d | c1 ∈ {cLL, c′LL} ∧ d ∈ Dt} (if pi = 4 ∨ ∃pi′, d′ : pi = pi′.cHL?d′4)
AB \ {c?c′ | c ∈ Ch ∧ c′ ∈ Dt} (otherwise)
We demonstrate in Example 4.3 that some of the requirements imposed by
〈M, 4〉 R? 〈M, 4〉 are fullfilled, to aid in the reader’s intuition.
Example 4.3 Figure 4.5 contains a partial unfolding of 〈M, 4〉 R? 〈M, 4〉
where R? is a kernel δALL-bisimulation. For each pair 〈P1, pi1〉 and 〈P2, pi2〉
related by R? in Figure 4.5, pi1 WE pi2 holds. After transitions 1 and 2, the
environment has made the attempt to interact with the process on two differ-
ent channels cLH and cLL. This is allowed since cLH !d14 WE 4cLL!d2 holds.
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The process M can indeed perform an input over cLH , resulting in transition
1. This transition needs to be simulated by either an input over cLL, or a -
transition in case such an input cannot be performed. We are in the former
situation and transition 1 is thus simulated by transition 3. Note that according
to Definition 4.6, the simulation of low presence communications should be done
without using τ ’s. This is because such simulation is actually used to introduce
interference, rather than to demonstrate resilience to it. And τ -transitions are
conventionally used to weaken the requirement for a process to be resilient to
interference. We then direct our attention to transitions 7, 8 and 9. The en-
vironment intentionally resists communication with the process in transition 7.
On the other hand, it attempts to feed some content over cLH to the process
through transition 8. That content is restricted to d1 since only then it holds
that cLH !d1.c′LH?d1.4 WE cLL!d2.c′′LL?d24cLH !d1. Intuitively, the input over cLH
is blocked for a while in the second execution, but it needs to happen with the
same content d1 since the channel has high content integrity. For transitions 10,
11 and 12, the attempt of the environment to input from the process over channel
c′LH in transition 11 is satisfied with the content d1, resulting in transition 12.
The latter transition is a legitimate simulation of transition 10 since the content
d1 is the same as that of transition 4 — the corresponding communication over
c′LH in the first execution. 
We now formally prove that the process M is δALL-secure.
Example 4.4 Let φ(pi1, pi2) stand for the condition
knlE(pi1, pi2) ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ca, cb :
(cLH !ca is followed immediately by c′LHρcb in pii ↓ {cLH , c′LH}
=⇒ ρ =? ∧ ca = cb).
In addition, let Cs(e1, e2) be the process
case e1 of some(y1) :
c′LH !y1.M
else case e2 of some(y2) :
c′′LL!y2.M
else 0
We then construct the binary relation Rsym that is the symmetric closure of the
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following relation R?.
R? = {(〈M, pi1〉, 〈M, pi2〉) | φ(pi1, pi2)} ∪
{(〈Cs(some(c′a), none), pi1〉, 〈M, pi2〉) | pi1 = ...cLH !c′a4 ∧ φ(pi1, pi2)} ∪
{(〈Cs(none, some(c′a)), pi1〉, 〈M, pi2〉) | pi1 = ...cLL!c′a4 ∧ φ(pi1, pi2)} ∪
{(〈Cs(some(c′a), none), pi1〉, 〈Cs(some(c′b), none), pi2〉) |
pi1 = ...cLH !c
′
a4 ∧ pi2 = ...cLH !c′b4 ∧ φ(pi1, pi2)} ∪
{(〈Cs(none, some(c′a)), pi1〉, 〈Cs(none, some(c′b)), pi2〉) |
pi1 = ...cLL!c
′
a4 ∧ pi2 = ...cLL!c′b4 ∧ φ(pi1, pi2)} ∪
{(〈Cs(some(c′a), none), pi1〉, 〈Cs(none, some(c′b)), pi2〉) |
pi1 = ...cLH !c
′
a4 ∧ pi2 = ...cLL!c′b4 ∧ φ(pi1, pi2)}
It can be shown that Rsym is a (kernel) δALL-bisimulation relating 〈M, 4〉 to
itself, which implies the δALL-security of M . 
A partial order can be built on the set Strat of environment strategies, char-
acterizing their relative aggressiveness (Definition 4.11), which has its impact
on the strength of the security condition (Theorem 4.12).
Definition 4.11 (Aggressiveness of Environment) Environment
δ2 is said to be more aggressive than δ1, denoted δ1 ≤ δ2, if ∀pi ∈ Π4 : δ1(pi) ⊆
δ2(pi).
Proposition 4.12 (Monotonicity) δ-bisimilarity is anti-monotonic in
δ, i.e., for all δ1, δ2 such that δ1 ≤ δ2, it holds that ∼
δ2
⊆∼
δ1
.
Proof. Given δ1 and δ2 such that δ1 ≤ δ2 holds, it is not difficult to show that
each δ2-bisimulation also qualifies as a δ1-bisimulation. 
This monotonicity result may look counter-intuitive since δ appears to be
used both positively and negatively in Definition 4.7. However, δ ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α̂
′
=⇒
α
〈P ′2, pi′2〉 if and only if δ′ ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α̂
′
=⇒
α
〈P ′2, pi′2〉 for all δ′ ∈ Strat. In other words,
δ is not actually used in the derivation of the transition sequence from 〈P2, pi20〉.
Corollary 4.13 The permissiveness of δ-security is anti-monotonic in δ,
i.e.,
∀δ1, δ2 ∈ Strat : δ1 ≤ δ2 ∧ Secδ2(P ) ⇒ Secδ1(P ).
Reducing the possibilities of alternative behaviors of an entity under the
same situation can be viewed as a form of refinement (called “horizontal” in
[RG01, BPR04]). Then Corollary 4.13 can be interpreted as: δ-security is robust
under the horizontal refinement of δ.
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We will discuss deeper theoretical properties of our security condition in
Section 4.4, focusing on δALL-security. It will be seen that the most pessimistic
assumption about the environment, captured by its most aggressive strategy
δALL, is in line with classical process-algebraic conditions like SBNDC, and also
facilitates the compositional verification of the security property.
4.4 Theoretical Properties of δ-Security
We establish a connection between δ-security and the security property SB-
NDC [FG01] that we have recast in the form of self-bisimilarity in Section 3.4.
We then discuss the compositionality of δ-security.
4.4.1 Degeneration to SBNDC
We show that δALL-security coincides with the classical process-algebraic prop-
erty SBNDC when channels always have the same integrity levels for “presence”
and “content”, that are taken to be their integrity levels. This result indicates
that our security property is a generalization of an existing, mature line of work.
Based on Corollary 3.15, for all processes P , P ∼ P can be used to char-
acterize P ∈ SBNDC . Now the gap between P ∼ P and 〈P, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P, 4〉
lies in the following aspects:
1. the former is expressed with respect to one holistic integrity environment
I, while the latter with respect to the presence environment E◦ and the
content environment E•, and
2. the former is expressed in a process-centered way, whereas the latter
through the environment strategy.
We formulate the assumptions that the integrity of a channel is either its
presence integrity or its content integrity, wherever they agree, with the following
characterization of I. Using E◦ instead of E• in the first case below would
obviously have the same effect.
I(c) =
{
E◦(c) if E◦(c) = E•(c)
⊥ otherwise
We then have Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.15, which are the key lemmas
establishing our degeneration result, by bridging the gap between the process-
centered ∼ and the environment-aware ∼
δALL
.
Lemma 4.14 Suppose process P satisfies ∀c, ρ s.t. (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P ) : E◦(c) =
E•(c). Then P ∼ P ⇒ 〈P, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P, 4〉.
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Proof. Assume that P ∼ P holds. We construct the following binary
relation on configurations:
R? , {(〈P1, pi1〉, 〈P2, pi2〉) | P1 ∼ P2 ∧ P →∗ P1 ∧ P →∗ P2 ∧ knlE(pi1, pi2)}
This relation is shown to be a (kernel) δALL-bisimulation as follows. First, R? is
symmetric, which follows from the symmetry of ∼ and knlE( , ). Second,
take arbitrary pi′1, α, pi20 such that
δALL ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env,α−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉 (4.1)
δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi20〉
pi′1 WE pi20
By Lemma 4.1, P1
α−→ P ′1. According to the precondition, there are the follow-
ing cases about α.
• α = cρc′ for some c, ρ, c′ such that E◦(c) = L∧E•(c) = L. By Lemma 4.2,
we have pi′1 = pi1.cρ˜c′4. By P1 ∼ P2, there exists some P ′2 such that
P ′2 ≡ P2 and P ′1 ∼ P ′2.
– If pi20 = pi2., then by Lemma 4.2, it is not difficult to see that
〈P2, pi20〉 cannot perform an output or input. Hence there exists the
transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 −→ 〈P ′2, pi2.4〉.
By pi′1 WE pi20, we have pi
′
1 WE pi2.4, and thus knlE(pi′1, pi2.4) and
(〈P ′1, pi′1〉, 〈P ′2, pi2.4〉) ∈ R?.
– On the other hand, suppose pi20 = pi2.c′′ρ′c′′′ for some c′′, ρ′ and c′′′.
∗ If 〈P2, pi20〉 cannot perform any output or input, then there exists
the transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 −→ 〈P ′′2 , pi2.4〉
for some P ′′2 ≡ P2, and the subsequent reasoning is similar to the
case where pi20 = pi2..
∗ If there exists transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 c
′′ρ˜′c′′′′−→ 〈P ′′′2 , pi′2〉 (4.2)
for some P ′′′2 and c′′′′, then by pi′1 WE pi20 we have E◦(c′′) = L.
By the precondition of this lemma we then have E•(c′′) = L. By
Lemma 4.1, P2
c′′ρ˜′c′′′′−→ P ′′′2 . Then P ′2 c
′′ρ˜′c′′′′−→ P ′′′2 since P ′2 ≡ P2.
Since P ′1 ∼ P ′2, we have P ′2 ∼ P ′1 by the symmetry of ∼. We
thus have P ′′′2 ∼ P ′′1 for some P ′′1 ≡ P ′1. Therefore P ′′1 ∼ P ′′′2 ,
and P ′1 ∼ P ′′′2 by Lemma 3.13. It is not difficult to see that
pi′1 WE pi
′
2 and furthermore knlE(pi′1, pi′2). Therefore we have
(〈P ′1, pi′1〉, 〈P ′′′2 , pi′2〉) ∈ R?.
Hence transition (4.1) can be simulated by transition (4.2).
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• α = cρc′ for some c, ρ, c′ such that E◦(c) = H∧E•(c) = H. By Lemma 4.2,
pi′1 = pi1.cρ˜c
′
4. By P1 ∼ P2, there exists P2 α̂=⇒ P ′2 as simulation of the
transition P1
α−→ P ′1. Since pi′1 WE pi20, we have pi20 = pi2.α˜. Hence by
Lemma 4.1, we have
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α̂=⇒ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉
for some pi′2. It is not difficult to see that pi′1 WE pi
′
2 and furthermore
knlE(pi′1, pi
′
2). Therefore we have
(〈P ′1, pi′1〉, 〈P ′2, pi′2〉) ∈ R?.
• α = τ . By P1 ∼ P2, there exists P2 τ̂=⇒ P ′2 as simulation of the transition
P1
α−→ P ′1. By Lemma 4.1, we have
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 τ̂=⇒ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉
as simulation of transition (4.1) in R?. It is not difficult to see that [pi′1]4 =
pi1, [pi′2]4 = pi2, and thus knlE([pi′1]4, [pi′2]4) holds. Therefore we have
(〈P ′1, [pi′1]4〉, 〈P ′2, [pi′2]4〉) ∈ R?.
• α = . We have pi′1 = pi1.4 and P ′1 ≡ P1. Then for pi′1 WE pi20 to hold,
either pi20 = pi2. or pi20 = pi2.cρc′ for some c, ρ and c′, where E◦(c) = L.
– If pi20 = pi2., then there exists the transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 −→ 〈P2, pi2.4〉.
We have P ′1 ∼ P2 by P ′1 ≡ P1 and Lemma 3.13. We also have
pi′1 WE pi2.4, pi′1 = [pi′1]4 and pi2.4 = [pi2.4]4. We therefore
have knlE(pi′1, pi2.4) and
(〈P ′1, pi′1〉, 〈P2, pi2.4〉) ∈ R?.
– If pi20 = pi2.cρc′ with E◦(c) = L, depending on whether 〈P2, pi20〉 can
perform communication on c, we have the following cases.
∗ If 〈P2, pi20〉 cannot perform communication on c, then the rea-
soning is similar to the case where pi20 = pi2..
∗ If 〈P2, pi20〉 can perform communication on c, then there exists
transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α
′−→ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉. (4.3)
By Lemma 4.2, α˜′ = cρc′, and pi′2 = pi2.cρdt(α′)4. By Lemma 4.1,
we have P2
α′−→ P ′2. Hence there exists P ′′1 ≡ P1 such that
P ′′1 ∼ P ′2. Therefore we have P1 ∼ P ′2 by Lemma 3.13. By
P ′1 ≡ P1, we obtain P ′1 ∼ P ′2. Since pi′1 = [pi′1]4, pi2.cρdt(α′)4 =
[pi2.cρdt(α
′)4]4 and pi′1 WE pi2.cρdt(α
′)4 hold, we have
(〈P ′1, pi′1〉, 〈P ′2, pi′2〉) ∈ R?.
Hence transition 4.1 can be simulated by transition 4.3.
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Finally, it is not difficult to see that (〈P, 4〉, 〈P, 4〉) ∈ R?. Hence we have
〈P, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P, 4〉. 
Lemma 4.15 Suppose process P satisfies ∀c, ρ s.t. (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P ) : E◦(c) =
E•(c). Then 〈P, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P, 4〉 ⇒ P ∼ P .
Proof. Assume that 〈P, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P, 4〉 holds. Construct the following binary
relation on processes:
R? , {(P1, P2) | 〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉 ∧ P →∗ P1 ∧ P →∗ P2 ∧ knlE(pi1, pi2)}
This relation is shown to be a -bisimulation as follows. First, R? is symmetric,
which follows from the symmetry of ∼
δALL
and knlE( , ). Second, suppose
we have the following transition:
P1
α−→ P ′1 (4.4)
We know by Lemma 4.1 that there exists some pi10 such that δALL ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env−→
〈P1, pi10〉 and δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 α−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉. The following case analysis is
performed on α.
• Case I(ch(α)) = L. By Lemma 4.2, we have pi10 = pi1.α˜, and pi′1 =
pi1.ch(α)ρ˜(α)dt(α). By the definition of I and the precondition, we have
E◦(ch(α)) = L and E•(ch(α)) = L. Take pi20 = pi2.. Since  ∈
δALL([pi2]4), there exists the transition δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi20〉.
By pi1 WE pi2, and the structure of pi
′
1 and pi20, we have pi′1 WE pi20. By〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉, the transition from 〈P1, pi10〉 can be simulated
from 〈P2, pi20〉. This simulation must be with
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 −→ 〈P2, pi′2〉,
resulting in 〈P ′1, pi′1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2.4〉 and pi′1 WE pi2.4. We thus have
knlE(pi′1,4). It is obvious that P2 ≡ P2 and (P ′1, P2) ∈ R?. Hence the
transition (4.4) can be simulated by inaction of P2 in R?.
• Case I(ch(α)) = H. By Lemma 4.2, we have pi10 = pi1.α˜, and pi′1 =
pi1.ch(α)ρ˜(α)dt(α). By the definition of I and the precondition, we have
E◦(ch(α)) = H and E•(ch(α)) = H. We have δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→
〈P2, pi2.α˜〉 since α˜ ∈ δALL([pi2]4). Take pi20 = pi2.α˜, we have pi′1 WE pi20.
By 〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉, the transition from 〈P1, pi10〉 can be simulated
from 〈P2, pi20〉. Suppose this simulation is
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 α̂
′
=⇒ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉,
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resulting in pi′2 such that pi′1 WE pi
′
2. By Lemma 4.2, pi20 = pi2.α˜′, and pi′2 =
ch(α′)ρ˜(α′)dt(α′). Hence pi1 WE pi2 and pi
′
1 WE pi
′
2 give ch(α) = ch(α′),
ρ(α) = ρ(α′) and dt(α) = dt(α′), which implies α′ = α. By Lemma 4.1,
there exists some P ′2 such that
P2
α̂
=⇒ P ′2 (4.5)
It is not difficult to see that (P ′1, P ′2) ∈ R?. Hence the transition (4.4) can
be simulated by transition (4.5) in R?.
• Case α = τ . Take arbitrary pi20 such that δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi20〉
and pi′1 WE pi20. By 〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉, there exists the transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 τ̂=⇒ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉 such that 〈P ′1, [pi′1]4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′2, [pi′2]4〉, and
[pi′1]4 WE [pi
′
2]4. It is not difficult to see that [pi′1]4 = pi1 and [pi′2]4 = pi2.
Hence we have (P ′1, P ′2) ∈ R?. By Lemma 4.1, we also have
P2
τ̂
=⇒ P ′2,
which qualifies as a simulation of transition (4.4) in R?.
Now since (P, P ) ∈ R?, we have P ∼ P . 
Using Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.15 above, and Corollary 3.15, the main
theorem of this section can finally be obtained.
Theorem 4.16 Suppose process P satisfies ∀c, ρ s.t. (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P ) : E◦(c) =
E•(c). Then P ∈ SBNDC ⇐⇒ SecδALL(P ).
The degeneration result presented above demonstrates that SBNDC, as one
of the classical process-algebraic noninterference properties, actually has the
implicit (pessimistic) assumption of the most aggressive environment.
4.4.2 Compositionality
We study the compositionality of δALL-security under restriction and parallel
composition.
Restriction In the case of (νc)·, we have the following theorem saying that
the δALL-security of P implies the δALL-security of (νc)P as long as the channel
c cannot itself be communicated as data.
Theorem 4.17 If SecδALL(P ), and c 6∈ Dt, then SecδALL((νc)P ).
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Proof. For convenience in naming, we rename the channel in the theorem
statement into c0. Construct the following relation, where Ch(pi) is the set of
all channels appearing in pi:
R? = {(〈P ′1, pi1〉, 〈P ′2, pi2〉) |
δALL ` 〈P, 4〉 →∗ 〈P1, pi1〉 ∧ δALL ` 〈P, 4〉 →∗ 〈P2, pi2〉 ∧
〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉 ∧ knlE(pi1, pi2) ∧
c0 6∈ Ch(pi1) ∪ Ch(pi2) ∧ P ′1 ≡ (νc0)P1 ∧ P ′2 ≡ (νc0)P2}.
It is obvious that (〈(νc0)P, 4〉, 〈(νc0)P, 4〉) ∈ R?. We next show that R? is
a δALL-bisimulation. Take an arbitrary pair (〈P ◦1 , pi1〉, 〈P ◦2 , pi2〉) from R?. We
have P ◦1 ≡ (νc0)P1 and P ◦2 ≡ (νc0)P2 for some P1 and P2, such that
〈P1, pi1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P2, pi2〉 (4.6)
knlE(pi1, pi2) (4.7)
c0 6∈ Ch(pi1) ∪ Ch(pi2) (4.8)
Suppose
δALL ` 〈P ◦1 , pi1〉 env,α−−−→ 〈P ′′1 , pi′1〉, (4.9)
pi20 = pi2.α
′, and pi′1 WE pi20. Then there exists some P
′
1 such that P ′′1 ≡ (νc0)P ′1,
and
δALL ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env,α−−−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉. (4.10)
We distinguish between three cases for α.
• α = cρc1 where E◦(c) = H. We have pi′1 = pi1.cρ˜c14; hence pi20 = pi2.cρ˜c′2
for some c′2. By (4.6), there exists the transition
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 ĉρc2=⇒ 〈P ′2, pi2.cρ˜c24〉, (4.11)
for some c2 and P ′2, such that
〈P ′1, pi′1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′2, pi2.cρ˜c24〉,
and
knlE(pi
′
1, pi2.cρ˜c24).
From transition (4.9) we know that c 6= c0 and c1 6= c0. From c0 6∈ Dt, we
know that c2 6= c0. Hence c0 6∈ Ch(pi′1)∪Ch(pi2.cρ˜c24). And we also have
δALL ` 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 ĉρc2=⇒ 〈(νc0)P ′2, pi2.cρ˜c24〉, (4.12)
and
(〈P ′′1 , pi′1〉, 〈(νc0)P ′2, pi2.cρ˜c24〉) ∈ R?.
• α = cρc1 where E◦(c) = L. We have pi′1 = pi1.cρ˜c14; hence pi20 = pi2.c′ρ′c′2
for some c′, ρ′ and c′2 (that can be [ ]) or pi20 = pi2.. In the first case, by
pi′1 WE pi20, we have E◦(c′) = L.
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– Suppose δALL ` 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉
c′ρ′c′′2−→ 〈P ′′2 , pi′2〉 for some c′′2 , P ′′2 and pi′2.
We have c′ 6= c0, P ′′2 ≡ (νc0)P ′2 for some P ′2, such that δALL `
〈P2, pi20〉 c
′ρ′c′′2−→ 〈P ′2, pi′2〉. We also have pi′2 = pi2.c′ρ˜′c′′24. By (4.6),
there exists a transition from 〈P2, pi20〉 as simulation of (4.10). Since
the communication action c′ρ′c′′2 can be performed from 〈P2, pi20〉,
the simulation must be of the form
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 c
′ρ′c2−→ 〈P ′′′2 , pi2.c′ρ˜′c24〉 (4.13)
for some c2 and P ′′′2 . We have
〈P ′1, pi′1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′′′2 , pi2.c′ρ˜′c24〉,
and
knlE(pi
′
1, pi2.c
′ρ˜′c24).
By transition (4.9) we have c0 6= c and c0 6= c1. By c0 6∈ Dt,
we have c2 6= c0. Considering c′ 6= c0 obtained earlier, we have
c0 6∈ Ch(pi′1) ∪ Ch(pi2.c′ρ˜′c24). There also exists the transition
δALL ` 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 c
′ρ′c2−→ 〈(νc0)P ′′′2 , pi2.c′ρ˜′c24〉,
which qualifies as the simulation of transition (4.9), with
(〈P ′′1 , pi′1〉, 〈(νc0)P ′′′2 , pi2.c′ρ˜′c24〉) ∈ R?.
– Suppose
δALL ` 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 −→ 〈P ′′2 , pi2.4〉 (4.14)
for some P ′′2 . We have P ′′2 ≡ P ◦2 ≡ (νc0)P2. There exists the tran-
sition δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi2.〉. It holds that pi′1 WE pi2..
Hence by (4.6), there exists a transition from 〈P2, pi2.〉 that simu-
lates transition (4.10). This transition must be of the form
δALL ` 〈P2, pi2.〉 −→ 〈P ′′′2 , pi2.4〉,
where P ′′′2 ≡ P2. We have 〈P ′1, pi′1〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′′′2 , pi2.4〉, knlE(pi′1, pi2.4)
and c0 6∈ Ch(pi′1) ∪ Ch(pi2.4). It also holds that P ′′2 ≡ (νc0)P ′′′2 .
Hence transition (4.14) qualifies as the simulation of transition (4.9),
with
(〈P ′′1 , pi′1〉, 〈P ′′2 , pi2.4〉) ∈ R?.
• α = τ . Trivial.
• α = . We have P ′′1 ≡ (νc0)P1. We also have
δALL ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env−→ 〈P1, pi1.〉 −→ 〈P1, pi1.4〉. (4.15)
4.4 Theoretical Properties of δ-Security 51
– Suppose 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 cannot perform any communication, which means
there exists the transition
δALL ` 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 −→ 〈(νc0)P2, pi2.4〉. (4.16)
Since  ∈ δALL(pi2), we have δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi′20〉, where
pi′20 = pi2.. By (4.6), and pi1.4 WE pi′20, the transition sequence
(4.15) can be simulated. The simulation must be of the form
δALL ` 〈P2, pi2.〉 −→ 〈P ′2, pi2.4〉,
where P ′2 ≡ P2. We have
〈P1, pi1.4〉 WE 〈P ′2, pi2.4〉,
knlE(pi1.4, pi2.4), and c 6∈ Ch(pi1.4)∪Ch(pi2.4). It also holds
that (νc0)P2 ≡ (νc0)P ′2.
Therefore we have
(〈P ′′1 , pi1.4〉, 〈(νc0)P2, pi2.4〉) ∈ R?,
which means transition (4.9) can be simulated by (4.16) in R?.
– Suppose 〈P ◦2 , pi20〉 can perform a communication. The reasoning
needed is analogous to the first sub-case of α = cρc1 with E◦(c) = L.
This completes the proof. 
To see the relevance of the condition c 6∈ Dt of Theorem 4.17, consider the
following example.
Example 4.5 Suppose c0 ∈ Dt. The process (νc0)(cHL?x) is δALL-insecure,
despite the δALL-security of the process cHL?x. Intuitively, the presence of the
input over cHL is interfered with by whether the low integrity input content is
c0.
Formally, assume per absurdum that 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4〉.
We then have
δALL ` 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4〉 env,cHL?d0−−−−−−−→ 〈(νc0)(0), cHL!d04〉 (4.17)
δALL ` 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4〉 env−→ 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4cHL!c0〉
cHL!d04 WE 4cHL!c0
However, the only possible transition from 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4cHL!c0〉 is of the
form
δALL ` 〈(νc0)(cHL?x), 4cHL!c0〉 −→ 〈P ′, 4〉,
where P ′ ≡ (νc0)(cHL?x), which cannot be a proper simulation of transition
(4.17). 
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The condition c 6∈ Dt of Theorem 4.17 is by no means a necessary condi-
tion. For instance, when c0 ∈ Dt, despite the δALL-insecurity of the process
(νc0)(cHL?x) of Example 4.5, the process (νc0)(cLL?x) is still δALL-secure.
Parallel Composition The notion of δALL-security is not fully compositional
under · | ·. Nevertheless, this is key to spotting the insecurity of the example
process 4,
cLH?x[y].c
′
LH !y | c′LH !d,
given in Section 4.1, since the processes cLH?x[y].c′LH !y and c
′
LH !d are them-
selves δALL-secure. We give formal arguments for the insecurity of this parallel
composition below.
Example 4.6 Assume per absurdum that SecδALL(cLH?x[y].c′LH !y | c′LH !d)
holds, that is, there exists a δALL-bisimulation relation R? such that
〈cLH?x[y].c′LH !y|c′LH !d, 4〉 R 〈cLH?x[y].c′LH !y|c′LH !d, 4〉
Given the existence of the transition
δALL ` 〈cLH?x[y].c′LH !y|c′LH !d, 4〉 env,cLH?d
′
−−−−−−−→ 〈c′LH !d′|c′LH !d, cLH !d′4〉,
and the fact that cLH !d′4 WE 4, it is required that
〈c′LH !d′|c′LH !d, cLH !d′4〉 R? 〈cLH?x[y].c′LH !y|c′LH !d,4〉.
Now given the existence of the transition
δALL ` 〈c′LH !d′|c′LH !d, cLH !d′4〉
env,c′LH !d
′
−−−−−−−→ 〈c′LH !d, cLH !d′.c′LH?d′4〉,
and the fact that cLH !d′.c′LH?d
′
4 WE 4c′LH?[ ], the communication behaviour
c′LH !d
′ of the left-hand process needs to be simulated by the right-hand process,
resulting in environment histories still related by WE . However, this is impossi-
ble. The process cLH?x[y].c′LH !y | c′LH !d is therefore δALL-insecure. 
We then discuss sufficient conditions for δALL-security to be compositional
under · | ·.
A process P is deterministic with respect to output over a channel c, denoted
by det(P, c), if
δALL ` 〈P, 4〉 →∗ 〈P ′, pi′〉 ∧ (∀i ∈ {1, 2} : δALL ` 〈P ′, pi′〉 c!c
′
i−→ 〈P ′i , pi′i〉)
⇓
c′1 = c
′
2
We then have the following theorem for the compositionality of δALL-security.
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Theorem 4.18 (Compositionality) Suppose {~c′}∩Dt = ∅, SecδALL(P1),
and SecδALL(P2). Then we have SecδALL((ν~c′)(P1|P2)), provided
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, cLH ∈ Ch :
(cLH , ρ1) ∈ rch(Pi) ∧ (cLH , ρ2) ∈ rch(P3−i)
⇓
ρ1 6= ρ2 ∧ det(Pi, cLH) ∧ cLH ∈ {~c′}
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In prose, given two processes P1 and P2 that are both δALL-secure, the
process (ν~c′)(P1|P2) is δALL-secure under the following conditions:
1. No LH-channels are used by both P1 and P2 with the same polarity (note
that the process 4 given in Section 4.1 does not meet this requirement).
2. For each LH-channel c used by P1 and P2 with different polarities, P1
and P2 must be deterministic with respect to output on c, and c must be
among the set {~c′} of channels over which there is a top-level restriction;
thus the input side always sources from the output side, never from the
environment.
3. No channel in ~c′ can be communicated as data.
The “top-level restriction” required in Definition 2 is motivated by the ex-
ample below.
Example 4.7 Consider the process P?, which is
cLL?x.cLH !d1 | cLH?x1[y1].c′LH !y1.
In P?, no LH-channel is used by both parallel components with the same polarity,
and determinacy with respect to output is also enjoyed. However, there is no top-
level restriction over cLH , which is used in both parallel processes with opposite
polarities. It is not difficult to see that cLL?x.cLH !d1 and cLH?x[y].c′LH !y are
themselves δALL-secure. However, we can show by contradiction that P? is not
δALL-secure.
Assume per absurdum that SecδALL(P?) holds; that is, 〈P?, 4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P?, 4〉.
We have
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 env,cLL?d−−−−−−→ 〈cLH !d1 | cLH?x1[y1].c′LH !y1, cLL!d4〉
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 env−→ 〈P?, 4〉
c!d4 WE 4
54 Presence and Content, Independently
and the only possible simulation is2
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 −→ 〈P?, 4〉,
resulting in 〈cLH !d1 | cLH?x1[y1].c′LH !y1, cLL!d4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P?, 4〉.
We then have
δALL ` 〈cLH !d1 | cLH?x1[y1].c′LH !y1, cLL!d4〉 env,τ−−−→ 〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d4〉
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 env−→ 〈P?, 4〉
cLL!d4 WE 4
and the only possible simulation is ( ∈ τ∗)
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 −→ 〈P?, 4〉,
resulting in 〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P?, 4〉.
We also have
δALL ` 〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d4〉 env,−−−−→ 〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d.4〉
δALL ` 〈P?, 4〉 env−→ 〈P?, 4cLH !d2〉
cLL!d.4 WE 4cLH !d2
and the only possible simulation is
δALL ` 〈P?, 4cLH !d2〉 cLH?d2−→ 〈cLL?x.cLH !d1 | c′LH !d2, .cLH !d24〉,
resulting in
〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d.4〉 ∼
δALL
〈cLL?x.cLH !d1 | c′LH !d2, .cLH !d24〉.
We now have
δALL ` 〈c′LH !d1, cLL!d.4〉
env,c′LH !d1−−−−−−−→ 〈0, cLL!d..c′LH?d14〉
δALL ` 〈cLL?x.cLH !d1 | c′LH !d2, .cLH !d24〉 env−→
〈cLL?x.cLH !d1 | c′LH !d2, .cLH !d24c′LH?[ ]〉
cLL!d..c′LH?d14 WE .cLH !d24c′LH?[ ]
The only “simulation” allowed by the semantics leads to the observational his-
tory .cLH !d2.c′LH?d24. But cLL!d..c′LH?d14 and .cLH !d2.c′LH?d24 are not
related by WE . This contradiction disproves the δALL-security of P?. 
A consequence of Theorem 4.18 is: if no channel having low presence integrity
and high content integrity is reachable, then δALL-security is fully parallel-
compositional.
2Strictly speaking all P ′? such that P ′? ≡ P? can be resulted. Since P ′? allows exactly the
same behaviors as P? does, we avoid this verbosity without sacrificing the validity of our
argumentation.
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SINK , &2(cLL?x1, cHH?x2[y2]).
(νcf)(ci!(y2, cf).cf?xf .
case x1 of some(y1) :
(νce, cr)(cp!(ce, cr).cr?x3[y3].
&2(cLH !y3{x′3}, c′HH?xt).
case x′3 of some(y
′
3) :
(νc′e, c
′
r)(cd!(c
′
e, c
′
r).c
′
r?x4[y4].SINK )
else SINK )
else c′HH?xt.SINK )
Figure 4.6: The “Realization” of Sink Channels with Low Presence Integrity
and High Content Integrity
Corollary 4.19 Suppose ∀c, ρ : (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P1) ∪ rch(P2)⇒ E◦(c) w E•(c).
Then SecδALL(P1|P2) can be deduced from SecδALL(P1) and SecδALL(P2).
In summary, the results presented above help elucidate the points below.
1. If δ-security had been fully compositional, it would not have uncovered
certain insecure dependencies of high integrity content on low integrity
presence.
2. The notion of δ-security is fully compositional for processes that do not
make use of LH-channels.
Remark 4.2 Trace-based properties are more often non-compositional in com-
parison to bisimulation-based properties [MS03]. It is not surprising that the
compositionality of δALL-security is conditional, since the histories of the ob-
servation of the environment are considered, and “out-of-sync” correspondence
within the two histories may be needed when channels with LH-integrity are
involved.
4.5 Some Examples, and Discussion
On LH-Channels
We illustrate that LH-channels can be induced from channels that are LL and
HH by a concrete process. The procedure SINK in Fig. 4.6 mimics the potential
congestion of the high integrity data source cHH using a queue: output of the
oldest element suspended in the queue is attempted through the sink channel
cLH only when the low integrity switch cLL is on. Recall that the &2( , ) can
be passed if and only if the second communication is successful.
The channels ci, cd, and cp are interfaces for the operations “insert” (“en-
que”), “delete” (“deque”), and “peek” (the non-destructive inspection of the oldest
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QUE(xi, xd, xp) , (νcg)(E(xi, xd, xp, some(cg)) | G(some(cg)))
G(xg[cg]) , cg?(xi, xd, xp).E(xi, xd, xp, xg) | G(xg)
E(xi[ci], xd[cd], xp[cp], xg[cg]) ,
ci?(x, xf)[ , cf ].
(νc′i, c
′
d, c
′
p)(cg!(c
′
i, c
′
d, c
′
p).cf !X.F (xi, xd, xp, x, some(c′i), some(c′d), some(c′p), xg))
+ cd?(xe, xr)[ce, ].ce!X.E(xi, xd, xp, xg)
+ cp?(x
′
e, x
′
r)[c
′
e, ].c
′
e!X.E(xi, xd, xp, xg)
F (xi[ci], xd[cd], xp[cp], xk[ck], x
′
i[c
′
i], x
′
d[c
′
d], x
′
p[c
′
p], xg) ,
ci?(x, xf)[y, cf ].
(νc′f)(c
′
i!(y, c
′
f) | c′f?x′.cf !X.F (xi, xd, xp, xk, x′i, x′d, x′p, xg)) +
cd?(xe, xr)[ , cr].
(νc′e, c
′
r)(c
′
d!(c
′
e, c
′
r) |
(c′e?x
′′.cr!ck.E(xi, xd, xp, xg) + c′r?x
′′′.cr!ck.F (xi, xd, xp, x′′′, x′i, x
′
d, x
′
p, xg))) +
cp?(x
′′
e , x
′′
r )[ , c
′′
r ].c
′′
r !ck.F (xi, xd, xp, xk, x
′
i, x
′
d, x
′
p, xg)
Figure 4.7: Specification of FIFO Queue
element) of the queue specified by the procedure QUE in Figure 4.7. The
procedure SINK waits on the input over cHH for the composite binder on the
first line to be passed. When that happens, the input data over cHH is enqued,
with the completion of the “enque” operation signaled on cf . If the input over
cLL was also successful, then outputting the head of the queue is attempted,
with a high integrity timeout signal that is supposed to arrive over c′HH . If
the output is successful before the timeout, then the data item of the output is
deleted from the queue. In the “peek” and “deque” operations, the channels ce
and c′e are sent to the queue for the latter to signal back whether it is already an
empty queue when the operations are invoked. In our case the non-emptiness of
the queue is an invariant and hence neither ce nor c′e is subsequently used. The
process (νci, cd, cp)(SINK | QUE (some(ci), some(cd), some(cp))) is δALL-secure
but we elide the detailed arguments.
Remark 4.3 Disregarding recursion, the construction becomes as succinct as
the following process:
&2(cLL?x1, cHH?x2[y2]). case x1 of some(y1) : cLH !y2 else 0
The output over cLH may never happen. But given its presence the content
integrity of the output content is high.
Further Information on the FIFO Queue The implementation detail
of the queue is irrelevant for our example in Figure 4.6 to work. In fact, all
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the communications with the queue are τ -actions produced by a derivative of
(νci, cd, cp)(SINK | QUE(some(ci), some(cd), some(cp))). However, we provide an
example implementation in Figure 4.7, to demonstrate that such a FIFO queue
is realizable in our calculus. This FIFO queue is adapted from the priority
queue discussed in [SW01]. A peek operation that returns but does not remove
the head of the queue is added. A call to the procedure E represents the
tail of the queue, while each call to F as a parallel component stands for an
ordinary cell, where xk contains the content stored in that cell. For the other
parameters of F , xi, xd and xp correspond to the interfaces of the current cell,
and x′i, x
′
d and x
′
p correspond to the interfaces of the oldest of all cells newer
than the current one, or of the tail (a call to E) if no newer cell exists. For
QUE (some(ci), some(cd), some(cp)), ci, cd and cp are invariably the interfaces to
the oldest cell, or to the tail if the queue is empty. Finally, the procedure G is
a replicator that produces new tails after insertion operations.
Secure Composition
We now consider making the multiplexer process (process 6 in Fig. 4.1) source
from the channel cLH in Figure 4.6.
Let
SRC , (νci, cd, cp)(SINK |QUE(some(ci), some(cd), some(cp))).
The process under consideration is (νcLH)(SRC |M). It is not difficult to see
that det(SRC, cLH) and det(M, cLH) hold. Hence we can deduce the validity of
SecδALL((νcLH)(SRC |M)) by Theorem 4.18 and the δALL-security of SRC and
M , as long as cLH 6∈ Dt.
Message Authentication Codes
We provide a solid example on how the use of Message Authentication Codes
gives rise to LH-channels, which was briefly mentioned in the beginning of this
chapter.
The process MAC (some(k∗)) in Figure 4.8 verifies the MAC of the input
before it proceeds with outputting it on channel cLH . Suppose there is a data
stream ~c∗ = c0, c1, ..., and the strategy δMAC is such that
∀pi s.t. pi contains i inputs over c′LH (i ≥ 0) :
δMAC(pi) = {cLL!(ci, f(k∗, ci))} ∪
{cLL!(catt, c′att) | catt, c′att ∈ Dt ∧ c′att 6= f(k∗, catt)} ∪
{cLH?[ ], c′LH?[ ],}.
The constraint c′att 6= f(k∗, catt) expresses that it is impossible3 for the attacker
to provide the appropriate catt and c′att that can pass the MAC check, since
3This is an approximative argument without using probabilities.
58 Presence and Content, Independently
it does not know k∗. The process MAC (some(k∗)) is δMAC-secure: each time
an output is performed on cLH , the output content must be the next item on
the data stream ~c∗. The LH-classification of the sink channel cLH displays the
improvement in the integrity of the content delivered to the end user due to the
use of Message Authentication Codes, despite the fact that this content can still
be delayed by the attacker.
MAC (K) , cLL?(x1, x2)[y1, y2].
case K of some(k) :
if y2 = f(k, y1) then
cLH !y1.c
′
LH !X.MAC (K)
else MAC (K)
else 0
Figure 4.8: Message Authentication Codes Boost Content Integrity
Although it is not the main purpose of this example, the procedure MAC
also illustrates a form of endorsement (upgrade of integrity level by additional
trust, e.g., [SS09]) in the content dimension, that is supported by the use of
cryptography.
4.5.1 On Confidentiality
We are in a position to further explain having developed our theory for integrity,
rather than confidentiality. It has been illustrated by the example in Figure 4.6
that a concrete process can influence the presence of communication over a sink
channel, without influencing the communication content. This is depicted by
the sub-figure on the left of Figure 4.9. For confidentiality, a channel cSP with
secret presence and public content would correspond to our channel with LH-
integrity. Assuming the existence of cSP and developing the same theory (our
δ-bisimulation and its related properties) would not be problematic. However,
it is difficult to come up with a possibilistic process that leaks the content of cSP
properly, without leaking the presence of communication over it, unless other
channels also with confidential presence and public content are used. This can
be informally explained as follows. The proper leakage of the input content over
cSP can only be achieved via cPP rather than cSS . However, the inspection of
this input content leads to a context with confidential presence, in which cPP
cannot be placed. Going back to Figure 4.9, the situation on the right might
not exist for possibilistic processes. Hence the meaning of “confidential presence,
public content” would be harder to justify as opposed to “low integrity presence,
high integrity content”.
Moving to a probabilistic setting, a process corresponding to the right sub-
figure of Figure 4.9 can be formulated much more easily. An example is shown
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P
cHH
cLL
cLH
P’
cSP cSS
cPP
Figure 4.9: Sink Channel cLH versus Source Channel cSP
below.
&2(cSP ?x1, c
′
PP ?x2).
case x1 of some(y1) :
cPP ! y1
else
cPP ! rand()
The function rand() above generates a random number. Suppose the random
number generated by rand() has the same distribution as that of the input
content over cSP . Then the secrete presence of the input over cSP will be
properly concealed by the public input c′PP , whereas the content over cSP will
be properly revealed through the public output cPP .
Remark 4.4 In a possibilistic setting, we have given intuitive reasons that the
confidentiality counterpart of LH-integrity labels may not exist for possibilistic
processes and environments. No formal arguments have been developed. This is
not a serious problem since the results of this chapter would be directly applicable
to confidentiality if such labels should exist.
4.6 Related Work
In a number of existing developments (e.g., [OCC06, CH08, RHS12, MC12]),
strategies are used to express noninterference-style secuirty properties. This
goes back to Wittbold and Johnson’s “nondeducibility on strategies” [WJ90], a
re-interpretation of Sutherland’s “nondeducibility” [Sut86]. It was remarked in
[WJ90] that strategies make possible a “hook-up” (compositionality) result.
In our case, the use of strategies allows for a clear distinction between the
environment attempting to introduce perturbation (∀pi20 s.t. δ ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→
〈P2, pi20〉) on the presence/content of communications over channels with low
integrity, and the process striving to stay unaffected in terms of the presence/-
content of behaviors with high integrity, under such perturbation (∃α′ : δ `
〈P2,pi20〉 α̂
′
=⇒
...
...). In addition, as is the case for [WJ90], the power of the strategy
δALL is also a key enabler of the compositionality of δALL-security.
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All the aforementioned works discuss trace-based noninterference proper-
ties, and [RHS12], in particular, establishes the connection of proposed security
properties with existing trace-based properties for interactive programs. On the
other hand, we use environment strategies together with a bisimulation-based
property, whose connection with the bisimulation-based process-algebraic prop-
erty SBNDC is established.
The distinction between the presence and content of communication is con-
sidered in several existing developments on confidentiality [SM02, RHS12, RS14].
Thus the case where presence is more sensitive than content is not dealt with in
the security properties proposed. Sabelfeld and Mantel [SM02] gave a bisimul-
ation-based, timing-sensitive notion of security, without employing environment
strategies. Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [RS14] studied bisimulation-based security
properties for interactive programs, modeling strategies as part of systems, and
elaborating on the compositional proof of security.
Chapter 5
Content-Dependent Flow
Policies
In this chapter, we focus on the content of communication and storage, and de-
velop an information flow analysis dealing with security policies that are depen-
dent on such content. It is important what information flow security amounts
to in this setting; hence a good part of this chapter will be concerned with
the discussion of content-dependent noninterference, which is enforced by our
type-based analysis.
In the classical setting, a channel/variable is globally always confidential or
always public. In flow-sensitive security [HS06], a variable can have different
security levels at different program points (essentially the security level depends
on the content of the program counter). With the use of our content-dependent
security policies, a channel/variable can have different security levels depending
on its content. That is to say, the association between content and security level
is made explicit in the security types.
Content-dependent information flow is not new; however, the bulk of ex-
isting work [BS06, BS10, ADZ+12, LC13, LC15] in this direction deals with
sequential languages. As we will demonstrate shortly in Section 5.1, enforcing
content-dependent policies in a concurrent language with communicating pro-
cesses is practically meaningful. However, this is not a trivial task: for instance,
the security property needs to be concerned with not only the memory, but also
communication actions, and the contents of both the memory and the commu-
nications should be involved in the selection of policies at different points of
execution.
In this chapter, we will focus on interpreting and enforcing content-dependent
policies and correspondingly certain features potentially inducing complexity
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will be avoided in the development. First of all, we will work in a less ex-
pressive, simple concurrent programming language, compared with the Quality
Calculus used in the previous chapters. As previously mentioned, simple pro-
gramming languages have also been the setting for the study of other existing
theories [BS06, BS10, ADZ+12, LC13, LC15] on content-dependency. Techni-
cally, the distinguishing feature of our language is the admittance of concurrent
processes that communicate synchronously with each other. Concerning commu-
nication, the distinction between “presence” and “content” is still a key element.
However, we dispense with tackling the case where “presence” is more sensitive
than content, and accordingly perform our development for confidentiality (as
opposed to integrity). This simplification also enables us to shift back to a
process-centered (as opposed to an environment-aware) style in the formulation
of our semantics and security properties.
In Section 5.1, we give a motivating example for the use of content-dependent
flow policies in concurrent, communicating systems. In Section 5.2, we present
the syntax and semantics of our language. In Section 5.3, we formalize our poli-
cies. In Section 5.4, we introduce the reader to a bisimulation-based, progress-
sensitive noninterference property that underpins content-dependent informa-
tion flow security, and show that this property is compositional. In Section 5.5,
we present our information flow type system, and prove its soundness with re-
spect to the noninterference property just introduced. The use of a specific
scheduler can incur “refinement attacks”, just like in the content-independent
scenario; hence we extend our work to deal with deterministic schedulers in
Section 5.7.
A proof-of-concept type checker is implemented1 in the OCaml language [OL].
Since our type system is concerned with assertions about the contents of mem-
ory, logical formulas that correspond to the negation of these assertions are
emitted. Their unsatisfiability (which can be directly obtained from the SMT
solver Z3 [DMB08]) implies well-typedness.
5.1 Motivating Example
In this chapter, we will consider a different multiplexer example than that of
Process 6 in Section 4.1. This example involves two partitions — hosting a mul-
tiplexer process and a demultiplexer process, respectively — that communicate
with each other over a shared channel.
In Figure 5.1, the multiplexer process (SM) wraps up the source data in x1 or
x2, along with tags 1 and 2 respectively, and forwards it over the dyadic channel
c to the demultiplexer process (SD). The demultiplexer will then unwrap the
1The implementation is accessible at
http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/123041336/phd388 Li X cpchecker.zip
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data and forward it to the sinks z1 or z2, depending on the tag value.
Multiplexer (SM) : while tt do
c!(1, x1);
c!(2, x2)
Demultiplexer (SD) : while tt do
c?(y, z);
if y = 1
then z1 := z
else z2 := z
Figure 5.1: The Code for the Multiplexer and the Demultiplexer
Suppose the variable x1 is confidential, whereas x2 is public. The information
flow analysis should then reveal that z1 needs to be confidential, while z2 can
be public.
For modularity reasons, a type-based analysis needs to assign a confiden-
tiality level to the channel c for SM and SD to be analyzed separately. In the
demultiplexer process SD, both z1 and z2 obtain data from c, depending on
whether the tag is 1 or not. It would then be desirable for the type system
to have the knowledge that either c is confidential and communicating (1, ),
or c is public and communicating (2, ). This is precisely what our disjunctive
policies aim to capture, in the setting of concurrent systems.
Moreover, when it is said that “c is confidential”, what is actually meant is
that it communicates confidential content. The observation of the mere presence
of any communication action over c, without observing the communicated con-
tent, does not jeopardize the confidentiality of x1. We thus distinguish between
the presence and content of channel communication (e.g., [SM02, RS14, LNN15])
as in Chapter 4, for a more fine-grained, permissive enforcement of our dis-
junctive policies. In a confidentiality setting, we follow the usually assumed
constraint that presence can be no more confidential than content.
The modern IT systems onboard airplanes are divided into domains that
provide different functionalities ranging from aircraft control to passenger en-
tertainment. Domains are further sub-divided into partitions that can each
host a different runtime, which is enabled by virtualization techniques. Each
communication path between two partitions belonging to different domains is
required to go through a common “security gateway” that sanitizes data traf-
fic [MPTB12]. The shared channel c of Figure 5.1 essentially models a gateway
that directs data from x1 in one source partition to z1 in one destination par-
tition, and directs data from x2 in another source partition to z2 in another
destination partition. Correspondingly, the tags 1 and 2 represent the addresses
of the destinations, which are needed for the gateway to properly maintain the
different data paths.
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Table 5.2: The Simple Concurrent Language with Communication
a ::= n | x | a1 op a2
b ::= tt | a1 rel a2
S ::= skip | nil | x := a | S1;S2 | if b then S1 else S2 | while b doS | c?~x | c!~a
Σ ::= i : Si | Σ1||Σ2 | Σ \ Ω
5.2 A Simple Concurrent Language
In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of a simple concurrent
language that we will use throughout our development of this chapter.
5.2.1 Syntax
A system Σ consists of a fixed number of concurrent processes. All variables
are local to their own processes, and information sharing is achieved by means
of communication.
All processes are assumed to have distinct identifiers in {1, 2, ...}. For a
system Σ with the set Pid(Σ) of process identifiers, its set of variables can thus
be denoted by VarΣ =
⊎
i∈Pid(Σ)Vari, where the process with identifier i can
only use variables from Vari. For communication, the set of polyadic channels
is PCh and the set of component channels is
Ch = {c.1, · · · , c.m | c ∈ PCh, and c has arity m}.
The use of polyadic channels supports the grouping of multiple fields of a mes-
sage, such that each field is communicated via a different component channel
belonging to the same polyadic channel.
The syntax of our language is given in Table 5.2. We write x, y, z for vari-
ables,X for sets of variables, c for either a polyadic channel name or a component
channel name (it will always be clear from the context which is the case), n for
unspecified constants, op for unspecified arithmetic operators, rel for unspecified
relational operators, and tt for the boolean constant denoting truth. The set of
variables contained in an arithmetic expression a (resp. boolean expression b)
is fv(a) (resp. fv(b)). When it is unambiguous from the context, we may also
use the term “channel” to refer to polyadic channels.
A sequential process S can be an empty operation skip, a terminated pro-
cess nil, an assignment x := a, a sequential composition S1;S2, a conditional
branch if b then S1 else S2, a loop while b doS, or a communication binder. In
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particular, the binder c!~a outputs the vector ~a of arithmetic expressions over
the polyadic channel c, and the binder c?~x inputs from the polyadic channel c
into the vector ~x of variables. Note that the process nil is not in the surface
syntax and cannot be used directly by the programmer. It serves as a hint in
the semantic rule for sequential composition S1;S2 that the execution of S1 has
terminated and that of S2 can begin, which helps ensure the uniformity of the
semantic configurations. This will become clear in the next subsection.
Systems Σ are composed of concurrent, communicating processes. The con-
struct i : Si represents a process running the statement Si, with process identifier
i. The construct Σ1||Σ2 represents two systems running concurrently. We re-
quire Pid(Σ1) ∩ Pid(Σ2) = ∅ for the well-formedness of Σ1||Σ2. Finally the
construct Σ \ Ω is the system that can perform all the input/output actions of
Σ provided that those actions are not over the polyadic channels in Ω. This last
construct is similar to the restriction operator [Mil89] of CCS, whose introduc-
tion allows one to specify whether each channel used by a process is shared with
another process or with the environment.
5.2.2 Semantics
The structural operational semantics of our language is presented in Table 5.3.
The transitions are annotated with the actions being performed, including com-
munications. At the current stage, an action α takes one of three forms: c!~v
(for output over c), c?~v (for input over c) or τ (for the remaining cases) where
~v ∈ Val? denotes the value vector being communicated over the polyadic chan-
nel. We tacitly assume that arities match without having explicitly to require
this in the semantics for output and input.
The general form of the transitions for processes is `i 〈S;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′;σ′〉,
where i is the identifier of the process being executed, and σ, σ′ ∈ Vari → Val.
We make use of two semantic functions A and B that give the results of the
evaluation of the expressions as their first arguments in the memories as their
second arguments. The transition rules are fairly standard. Note that we no
longer make explicit use of an environment strategy as in Chapter 4, and the
rule for input suggests that any value vector can potentially be received from
the environment.
Lifting the semantics to systems, the configurations take the form C = 〈Σ;σ〉,
where we tacitly assume that σ ∈ StΣ, and StΣ isVarΣ → Val. The transitions
are of the form 〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′〉 where η is a non-empty list of identifiers for
the processes executed. For a mapping A, we write DA for its domain. For two
mappings A and B such that DA ∩DB = ∅, we denote by A unionmulti B the mapping
with domain DA unionmultiDB , such that
(A unionmultiB)(i) =
{
A(i) (if i ∈ DA)
B(i) (if i ∈ DB)
.
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Table 5.3: Small-step Semantics of Processes and Systems.
`i 〈skip;σ〉 τ−→ 〈nil;σ〉 `i 〈x := a;σ〉 τ−→ 〈nil;σ[x 7→ A[[a]]σ]〉
`i 〈c!~a;σ〉 c!~v−→ 〈nil;σ〉 if ~v = A[[~a]]σ `i 〈c?~x;σ〉 c?~v−→ 〈nil;σ[~x 7→ ~v]〉
`i 〈S1;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′1;σ′〉
`i 〈S1;S2;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′1;S2;σ′〉
if S′1 6= nil
`i 〈S1;σ〉 α−→ 〈nil;σ′〉
`i 〈S1;S2;σ〉 α−→ 〈S2;σ′〉
`i 〈if b then S1 else S2;σ〉 τ−→ 〈S1;σ〉 if B[[b]]σ = tt
`i 〈if b then S1 else S2;σ〉 τ−→ 〈S2;σ〉 if B[[b]]σ = ff
`i 〈while b doS;σ〉 τ−→ 〈(S;while b doS);σ〉 if B[[b]]σ = tt
`i 〈while b doS;σ〉 τ−→ 〈nil;σ〉 if B[[b]]σ = ff
`i 〈Si;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′i;σ′〉
〈i : Si;σ〉 α−→i 〈i : S′i;σ′〉
〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′〉
〈Σ \ Ω;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′ \ Ω;σ′〉
if ch(α) 6∈ Ω
〈Σ1;σ1〉 cρ~v−→i 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉 〈Σ2;σ2〉 cρ˜~v−→j 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉
〈Σ1||Σ2;σ1 unionmulti σ2〉 τ−→i,j 〈Σ′1||Σ′2;σ′1 unionmulti σ′2〉
where ρ ∈ {!, ?}
〈Σ1;σ1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉
〈Σ1||Σ2;σ1 unionmulti σ2〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1||Σ2;σ′1 unionmulti σ2〉
〈Σ2;σ2〉 α−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉
〈Σ1||Σ2;σ1 unionmulti σ2〉 α−→η 〈Σ1||Σ′2;σ1 unionmulti σ′2〉
Then the transition rules for systems are mostly self-explanatory. In particular,
the second rule says that 〈Σ \ Ω; σ〉 can perform an action α of 〈Σ;σ〉 if the
channel used by α is not in Ω.
Example 5.1 The combination of the multiplexer and demultiplexer consid-
ered in Section 5.1 can be represented by the system ΣMD = (1 : SM || 2 : SD) \
{c}. 
5.3 Content-Dependent Flow Policies
As demonstrated by our motivating example, the meaningfulness of content-
dependent flow policies is twofold:
1. They add to the permissiveness of the modular enforcement of information
flow policies such as using type systems. And the enforcement is still
justifiable by a properly formulated noninterference property.
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2. The “information paths” inside a system are displayed in more detail,
rendering code more easily understandable and less error-prone.
For systems Σ, we introduce policy environments P such that for each i ∈
Pid(Σ), P(i) is a set of policies for the variables in Vari. Each variable policy
P ∈ P(i) consists of two components2, PS : Vari → {H,L} and PV : LabF,
where PS contains the confidentiality level of each variable in Vari and PV is
a logical formula describing the possible values of these variables. Given a set
X ⊆ Vari, we define PS[X] as
⊔
x∈X PS(x). We denote by P EP the fact that
P ∈ {(⊎i∈DP PiS, ∧i∈DP PiV) | ∀i ∈ DP : Pi ∈ P(i)}.
We also allow the specification of a (global) set Pch of channel policies. The
set Pch has a distinguished member P◦ : PCh → {H,L} that gives the confi-
dentiality level of the “presence” of communications over each polyadic channel
(note that unlike PS and PV, P◦ is not a component of P). Apart from P◦,
there is at least one content policy P• ∈ Pch. Each P• has two components
P•S : Ch → {H,L} and P•V : Ch → LabV, where for each component channel
c, P•S(c) is the confidentiality level of the communication contents over c, and
P•V(c) is the set of values potentially communicated over c.
We will use Pch• to represent {P• | P• ∈ Pch}, i.e., the set of content policies
for channels. Hereafter, the parameterization on Pch in our formulations will
often be elided since Pch is treated as a global constant. The distinguished
presence policy P◦ ∈ Pch will be left implicit for the same reason.
For a variable policy P, PV can capture “relational constraints” between
different variables. For instance, given an output binder c!(x−y), it is legitimate
to have PV = (p(x) = p(y)) where p(−) is the parity function. Correspondingly,
a channel policy P• may come with the set of even numbers for P•V(c.1).
The structure of our policy environments and policies are shown in Fig-
ure 5.4.
Example 5.2 We will use the following policies for the multiplexer example
presented in Section 5.1, where Z is the set of all integers.
PMD(1)= {Pm = (x1 : H; x2 : L, tt) }
PMD(2)= {P1d = (y : L; z : H; z1 : H; z2 : L, y = 1),
P2d = (y : L; z : L; z1 : H; z2 : L, y 6= 1) }
PchMD = {P◦ = (c : L),
P•1 = (c.1 : L; c.2 : H, c.1 : {1}; c.2 : Z),
P•2 = (c.1 : L; c.2 : L, c.1 : {2}; c.2 : Z) }
For convenience of reference, the policies are named. Take the policy Pm ∈
P(1) for example, we have PmV = tt and PmS = [x1 7→ H][x2 7→ L]. The
2The letter P is the Fraktur variant of P , which has itself been taken to represent processes
of the Quality Calculus in previous chapters.
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P = [1 7→ P(1)] unionmulti ... unionmulti [n 7→ P(n)]
P(i) = {P | P = (PS,PV), where PS ∈ Vari → {H,L}, PV ∈ LabF}
Pch = {P◦,P•1,P•2, ...,P•m}
P◦ ∈ PCh→ {H,L}
P•j = (P
•
jS,P
•
jV), where P
•
jS = Ch→ {H,L}, and P•jV = Ch→ LabV
Figure 5.4: The Structure of Policy Environments and Policies
syntax with colons and semi-colons is used for confidentiality policy components
such as PmS for conciseness.
The policies P1d and P
2
d clearly associate the condition y = 1 with z being
confidential (z : H), and the condition y 6= 1 with z being public (z : L). The
policies P•1 and P•2 relate the content communicated over the first component
of the polyadic channel c with the different confidentiality levels of the second
component of c. 
We next define the satisfaction of variable policies by states (σ |= P), and
the satisfaction of channel policies by actions (α |=ρ P•). Our concern here is
what policies are relevant according to the memory content or communication
content.
Definition 5.1 (Satisfaction)
σ |= P , σ |= PV (σ is a model of the formula PV)
α |=ρ P• , P• ∈ Pch ∧ ∀c, ~v : α = cρ~v ⇒ ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ |~v| : vj ∈ P•V(c.j)
For channel policies, the satisfaction relation |=ρ is parameterized with a polarity
ρ. The intuition is that the check on content is turned on only when the polarity
of α is ρ. In this case it is required that the j-th value communicated over the
polyadic channel of α should indeed be described by the value component of P•
for the component channel c.j. If α does not have the polarity ρ, then nothing
is required. This mechanism for switching on/off the content-check is key to
making the formulation of our communication-aware bisimulation (Section 5.4)
compact.
It is desirable to require that the selection of policies cannot be decided by
the confidential information contained in states and communication content.
This is because confidentiality levels have access control implications. In more
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detail, if confidential information had interference on the policies in use, a public
observer would be able to deduce information about confidential variables based
on changes in its access rights to certain variables.
We define the predicate nip( ) (which will be used in our type system in
Section 5.5) to express this requirement, with the help of the notations σ1
K
= σ2
and cρ′~v1
K
=
ρ
cρ′~v2. The notation σ1
K
= σ2 represents that σ1 and σ2 have the
same domain and map each variable that is low with respect to every policy in
K to the same value. Similarly, cρ′~v1 K=
ρ
cρ′~v2 says that if ρ is the same as ρ′,
then the component channels of c that are low with respect to every policy in K
should communicate the same values.
Definition 5.2 (Low-Equivalence over Sets)
σ1
K
= σ2 , Dσ1 = Dσ2 ∧ ∀x ∈ Dσ1 : (∀P ∈ K : PS(x) = L)⇒ σ1(x) = σ2(x)
cρ′~v1
K
=
ρ
cρ′~v2 , ∀j : (ρ = ρ′ ∧ ∀P• ∈ K : P•S(c.j) = L)⇒ v1j = v2j
Definition 5.3 (nip( ))
nip(K) , ∀σ1, σ2 : σ1 K= σ2 ⇒ (∀P ∈ K : σ1 |= P⇔ σ2 |= P) ∧
∀c, ~v, ~v′ : c!~v P
ch
•=
!
c!~v′ ⇒ (∀P• : c!~v |=! P• ⇔ c!~v′ |=! P•).
Solid semantic underpinnings of our content-dependent flow policies will be
provided by the noninterference properties to be developed in the next section
and Section 5.6.
5.4 Concurrent, Content-Dependent Noninterfer-
ence
We introduce a bisimulation-based, compositional noninterference property that
accounts for both the communications performed by a system and the modifi-
cation of memory content. Building on Definition 5.1 and Definition 5.2 from
the previous section, some auxiliary concepts and notations are first introduced
in Figure 5.5.
We extend our transition labels α with inaction  and suspension . We
also introduce action schemas β where the inputs come with holes rather than
data. The idea is analogous to that of the abstract binders used in Chapter 4:
the data to be received is under the environment’s control. The difference is:
action schemas represent possibly incomplete actions of systems, while abstract
binders are possibly unfulfilled communication attempts of the environment. For
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Actions and action schemas:
α ::= c!~v | c?~v | τ |  | 
β ::= c!~v | c?[ ] | τ |  | 
γ ::= α | β
Decorated transitions:
C
αη C′ , C α−→η C′ ∨
α =  ∧ C′ = C ∨
(∀α′ : C α′−→ ⇒ h prc(α′)) ∧ α =  ∧ C′ = C
h prc(α′) , ∃c, ρ, ~v : α′ = cρ~v ∧P◦(c) = H
Low equivalence of configurations:
〈Σ1;σ1〉 P=P 〈Σ2;σ2〉 , P EP ∧ Pid(Σ1) = Pid(Σ2) = DP ∧
σ1 |= P ∧ σ2 |= P ∧ σ1 {P}= σ2
Low equivalence of actions and actions/action schemas (α P
•
∼
ρ
γ):
cρ′~v
P•∼
ρ
 if P◦(c) = H ∧ cρ′~v |=ρ P•
cρ′~v1
P•∼
ρ
cρ′~v2 if P◦(c) = L ∧ cρ′~v1 |=ρ P• ∧ cρ′~v2 |=ρ P• ∧ cρ′~v1 {P
•}
=
ρ
cρ′~v2
τ
P•∼
ρ
τ
τ
P•∼
ρ

Hole filling (β(~v′)):
c!~v(~v′) = c!~v c?[ ](~v′) = c?~v′ β(~v′) = β, if β ∈ {τ, ,}
Figure 5.5: Auxiliary Definitions for Content-Dependent Noninterference
transitions, we write C
αη C ′ to represent that there may be a transition made
by processes listed in η from the configuration C to the configuration C ′. In more
detail, there are three cases — where there is indeed a transition performing
the action α, where there is a zero-step transition performing the action , and
where there is suspension by blocked communications with confidential presence,
represented by .
Low-equivalence of configurations are defined with respect to particular poli-
cies P EP in Figure 5.5. The main constraints are that P should be satisfied
by the states of the two configurations, and that the values of variables that are
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low under PS should be equal.
To be able to relate the communications performed in the two executions in
our bisimulation-based property, we introduce a notion of low equivalence (P
•
∼
ρ
)
between actions α and actions/action schemas γ. The relation P
•
∼
ρ
is the smallest
one satisfying the rules in Figure 5.5. Concerning the “presence” of communi-
cation, α P
•
∼
ρ
γ requires that a communication with confidential presence should
correspond to inaction (), which implies among others the absence of commu-
nication on the same channel. This follows the pattern of our -bisimulation
presented in Chapter 3. It is worth pointing out that the ~v2 in the same defini-
tion can be the unary vector [ ]. Although Definition 5.1 has not been explicitly
extended to take care of holes, the bisimulation to be given in Definition 5.5 will
use α P
•
∼
ρ
γ in such a way that the check [ ] ∈ P•V(c.1) can never be reached.
It is perhaps most reasonable for a τ to (be simulated by) correspond to a
τ . This is described by the third line in the definition of α P
•
∼
ρ
γ. However, not
all intuitively secure programs adhere to this strict pattern, as demonstrated by
the following example.
Example 5.3 Consider degenerate policy environments P0 and Pch0 such that
P0(1) = {(h : H, tt)}
P0(2) = {(h′ : H, tt)}
Pch0 = {(c : H; c′ : H), (c.1 : H; c′.1 : H, c.1 : Z; c′.1 : Z)}
The following system is then intuitively secure under P0 and Pch0 , since no
security class is public. However, considering different branches of the if being
taken due to different initial values of h, the τ action arising out of skip should
correspond to the confidential communication c!2, rather than another τ .
1 : if h > 1 then skip else c!2
Similarly, the following system is intuitively secure. However, the τ action pro-
duced by synchronization over c corresponds to suspension of execution, since
c′!2 cannot synchronize with any communication binder.
(1 : if h > 1 then c!2 else c′!2 || 2 : c?h′) \ {c, c′}
This thus motivates the inclusion of τ P
•
∼
ρ
 in the defining rules for α P
•
∼
ρ
γ. 
We are now in a position to define our noninterference property, termed
“communication-aware security” (CA-security). In Definition 5.4, − com∼
P
− is
the union of all communication-aware bisimulations (CA-bisimulations) that
are in turn characterized in Definition 5.5.
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Definition 5.4 (CA-Security) Seccom(Σ,P) if and only if for all σ1, σ2,
and P, if 〈Σ;σ1〉 P=P 〈Σ;σ2〉, then (〈Σ;σ1〉,P)
com∼
P
(〈Σ;σ2〉,P).
Definition 5.5 (CA-Bisimulation)
A CA-bisimulation RP is a symmetric relation such that
(C1,P) RP (C2,P) implies C1
P
=
P
C2 and the following:
∀α, η, C′1 s.t. C1 α−→η C′1 :
∃P•! , β : α
P•!∼
!
β ∧
∀P•? , ~v s.t. α
P•?∼
?
β(~v) :
∃C′2,P′ : C2
β(~v)
η C′2 ∧ (C′1,P′)RP (C′2,P′).
In prose, a symmetric relation RP qualifies as a CA-bisimulation if for a
pair (C1,P) and (C2,P) related by RP , and a transition performing action
α from C1, involving processes in η, there exists a policy P•! and an action
schema β low-equivalent to α concerning output, and for all value vectors ~v and
policies P•? such that β(~v) is low-equivalent to α concerning input, there exists
a simulation of α−→η by
β(~v)
 η from C2, and a policy P′ whose pairings with the
configurations reached are still related under RP . The universal quantification
over ~v introduces variation on any input content that is constrained by − P
•
?∼
?
−
to be over the component channels that are confidential according to P•?. Note
that the ! and ? in P•! and P
•
? merely serve to signify that the two policies are
respectively concerned with regulating output and input (removing them and
using P• at both places does not change the definition), while the use of ! and
? below the ∼ is a parameterization.
Example 5.4 To aid the reader’s intuition, we provide a partial unfolding
of a CA-bisimulation for the system 2 : SD. Note that a proof of the CA-
security of 2 : SD is not the aim here. We represent by σv1v2v3v4 the local
state [y 7→ v1][z 7→ v2][z1 7→ v3][z2 7→ v4], and by PD the policy environment
[2 7→ PMD(2)].
We have 〈2 : SD;σ2070〉 P
2
d=
PD
〈2 : SD;σ2080〉. Hence one of the conditions that
Seccom(2 : SD,PD) calls for is the existence of CA-bisimulation R? such that
(〈2 : SD;σ2070〉,P2d) R? (〈2 : SD;σ2080〉,P2d).
Suppose
〈2 : SD;σ2070〉 τ−→2 〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2070〉 (5.1)
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There exist P•1 and τ , such that τ
P•1∼
!
τ . Pick for instance P•? = P
•
1 and
~v = (0, 0), for which τ
P•1∼
?
τ(0, 0). Simulation of (5.1) is required with the action
τ(0, 0) = τ . The only possibility is 〈2 : SD;σ2080〉 τ−→2 〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2080〉.
Since σ2070 |= P2d but σ2070 6|= P1d, the following is required:
(〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2070〉,P2d) R? (〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2080〉,P2d).
This further necessitates the condition below, which can be verified easily:
〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2070〉 P
2
d=
PD
〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2080〉.
Suppose
〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2070〉 c?(1,k1)−→ 2 〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k170〉, (5.2)
where k1 is an integer. There should exist some P•! and β such that c?(1, k1)
P•!∼
!
β. Since P◦(c) = L, β = c?[ ]. Pick for instance P•? = P
•
1, and ~v, c?(1, k1)
P•1∼
?
c?[ ](~v) implies v1 = 1 since P•1(c.1) = L. Hence a simulation of (5.2) with
action c?[ ](1, k2) is required for all k2 ∈ Z (P•1(c.2) = H). It can only be of the
form 〈2 : c?(y, z); if ;wh;σ2080〉 c?(1,k2)−→ 2 〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k280〉. And the following is
required
(〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k170〉,P1d) R? (〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k280〉,P1d).
This further requires 〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k170〉
P1d=
PD
〈2 : if ;wh;σ1k280〉, which holds.
Going through two more “lock steps”, the following is required.
(〈2 : z1 := z;wh;σ1k170〉,P1d) R? (〈2 : z1 := z;wh;σ1k280〉,P1d)
(〈2 : SD;σ1k1k10〉,P1d) R? (〈2 : SD;σ1k2k20〉,P1d) (5.3)
And we still have 〈2 : SD;σ1k1k10〉
P1d=
PD
〈2 : SD;σ1k2k20〉 as required by (5.3).
We stop this demonstration here. 
In Example 5.4, the systems are always the same on both sides of R?, which
is a special case due partly to E◦(c) = L in PchMD.
In CA-bisimulation, the treatment of output and input is given separately
in the two lines in the middle of the formulation.
...
∃P•! , β : α
P•!∼
!
β ∧
∀P•? , ~v s.t. α
P•?∼
?
β(~v) :
...
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The channel policies (P•! and P
•
?) used to related the communication action-
s/schemas are not kept along with the configurations, since communications are
instantaneous behaviors. The pattern that there should exist a channel policy
for the output content, and that the simulation can be performed under all po-
tential channel policies for the input content, resembles that of rely-guarantee
reasoning [Jon81], and leads to the preservation of security under || — the sec-
ond compositionality result given below. Note that since P•? does not occur in
the last line of Definition 5.5, the second last line of the definition can also be
written as “∀~v s.t. (∃P•? : α
P•?∼
?
β(~v)) :”.
Compositionality of CA-Security CA-security is compositional with re-
spect to the two non-trivial constructors, · \ Ω and ·||·, of systems.
Theorem 5.6 (Compositionality) For Σ1 with policy environment P1,
and Σ2 with policy environment P2, such that DP1 ∩DP2 = ∅,
1. Seccom(Σ1,P1) =⇒ ∀Ω ⊆ PCh : Seccom(Σ1 \ Ω,P1), and
2. Seccom(Σ1,P1) ∧ Seccom(Σ2,P2) =⇒ Seccom(Σ1||Σ2,P1 unionmulti P2).
Given the information flow type system developed in Section 5.5, a composi-
tionality result of the security property appears to play a weaker role in directly
supporting compositional security analyses. However, this result is a key ele-
ment in proving the soundness of our information flow type system. Aside from
this, it opens up new possibilities for establishing the security of individual com-
ponents using alternative approaches, and obtaining the security of the whole
system “for free”.
5.5 Typing Information Flow
We specify a type system for ensuring that a system Σ respects the information
flow policies given by P (such that DP = Pid(Σ)) and Pch. To deal with the
value components PV of policies P, the type system is integrated with a Hoare
logic for reasoning about the values of variables [Apt81, Apt84]. The typing
rules for processes and systems are specified in Table 5.6 in order.
5.5.1 The Typing of Processes
The judgements of the type system for processes take the form
X, l1 `K {φ}S {φ′} : Y, l2.
Here X is a set of variables that may incur implicit flows [DD77], Y is a set
of variables whose information can be leaked through progress, K is the set
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Table 5.6: Information Flow Type System for Processes and Systems.
X, l `K {φ} nil {φ} : ∅, L
X, l `K {φ} skip {φ} : ∅, L
X, l `K {φ[a/x]}x := a {φ} : ∅, L
if ∀P ∈ K : PV ∧ φ[a/x]⇒ ∃P′ ∈ K : P[x 7→ l unionsqPS[fv(a) ∪X]]S  P′[a/x]V
X, l `K {φ}S1 {ρ} : Y1, l1 X ∪ Y1, l unionsq l1 `K {ρ}S2 {ψ} : Y2, l2
X, l `K {φ}S1;S2 {ψ} : Y1 ∪ Y2, l1 unionsq l2
X ∪ fv(b), l `K {φ ∧ b}S1 {ψ} : Y1, l1 X ∪ fv(b), l `K {φ ∧ ¬b}S2 {ψ} : Y2, l2
X, l `K {φ} if b then S1 else S2 {ψ} : Y1 ∪ Y2 ∪ fv(b), l1 unionsq l2
Y, l `K {φ ∧ b}S {φ} : Y, l
X, l `K {φ}while b doS {φ ∧ ¬b} : Y, l
if X ∪ fv(b) ⊆ Y
X, l `K {φ} c!~a {φ} : ∅, l′ if l v P◦(c) v l′ and
∀P ∈ K : PV ∧ φ⇒ (PS[X] v P◦(c) ∧ ∃P′ ∈ K,P• ∈ Pch :
P[(c.j 7→ PS(aj))j ]S  (P′S unionmultiP•S , P′V ∧
∧
j aj ∈P•V(c.j)))
X, l `K {∀~x : φ} c?~x {φ} : ∅, l′ if l v P◦(c) v l′ and
∀P ∈ K : PV ∧ (∀~x : φ)⇒ (PS[X] v P◦(c) ∧ ∀P• ∈ Pch : ∀~v s.t.
∧
j vj ∈ P•V(c.j) :
∃P′ ∈ K : P[(xj 7→ P•S(c.j) unionsqP◦(c))j ]S  P′[(vj/xj)j ]V)
X ′, l′1 `K {φ′}S {ψ′} : Y ′, l′2
X, l1 `K {φ}S {ψ} : Y, l2
if (φ⇒ φ′) ∧ (ψ′ ⇒ ψ) ∧
X ⊆ X ′ ∧ Y ′ ⊆ Y ∧ l1 v l′1 ∧ l′2 v l2
∅, L `K {φ}Si {ψ} : Y, l′
[i 7→ K] ` {[i 7→ φ]} i : Si {[i 7→ ψ]}
ifnip(K)
P ` {Φ}Σ {Ψ}
P ` {Φ}Σ \ Ω {Ψ}
P1 ` {Φ1}Σ1 {Ψ1} P2 ` {Φ2}Σ2 {Ψ2}
P1 unionmulti P2 ` {Φ1 unionmulti Φ2}Σ1||Σ2 {Ψ1 unionmultiΨ2}
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of variable policies for the process S, and φ and φ′ are the pre- and post-
conditions of S in the form of logical formulae over the variables local to S.
In addition, l1 and l2 are the levels of information that can be leaked through
blocked communication attempts (due to inability of synchronization), before
reaching S, and within S, respectively. The levels l1 and l2 become H when
encountering communication channels whose presence levels are H.
In Table 5.6, P  P′ represents PS v P′S ∧ PV ⇒ P′V, where PS v P′S
if and only if ∀u ∈ DPS∩ DP′S : PS(u) v P′S(u). We write P[x 7→ l]S for
(PS[x 7→ l],PV), which is an update if x ∈ DPS and an extension otherwise,
P[u/x]V for (PS,PV[u/x]) where u is an arithmetic expression or a component
channel, P ∧ f for (PS,PV ∧ f) where f is a logical formula, and v for the
numeral of the value v.
The Hoare logic used is not very different from a standard one for sequential
programs, because our variables are local. Most typing rules strengthen a pre-
condition φ to the formula φ∧PV that allows one to select the relevant variable
policies P using their content information PV. We elaborate on the rules for
assignment, output and input.
As mentioned earlier, the nil construct is not part of the surface syntax, but
a semantic cue. Still a trivial typing rule is devised for nil in order to have a
subject reduction result.
The typing rule for assignment requires the existence of a post-policy P′ for
each selected pre-policy P. This policy P′ should satisfy l unionsq PS[fv(a) ∪ X] v
P′S(x), and for all variables y different than x, PS(y) v P′S(y) should hold.
Requiring l v P′S(x) and PS[X] v P′S(x) is to capture implicit flows [DD77].
On the other hand, under the pre-condition PV ∧ φ[a/x], it is required that
PV ⇒ P′V[a/x]. In other words, PV ∧ φ[a/x] ⇒ P′V[a/x] should hold. This
guarantees that for a state σ satisfying P and the precondition φ[a/x], the post
state derived from σ after the assignment satisfies the post policy P′.
Example 5.5 For the assignment z1 := z in the demultiplexer process SD of
Figure 5.1, we have {y}, L `PMD(2) {y = 1} z1 := z {y = 1} : ∅, L. Essentially,
it needs to be shown that no matter if P is instantiated with P1d or P
2
d, we can
find an appropriate policy in PMD(2) for the instantiation of P′, satisfying the
side conditions of the typing rule for assignment. First instantiate P with P1d.
We still use P1d for P
′, and the side condition specializes to y = 1 ⇒ P1d[z1 7→
L unionsq P1dS[{y, z}]]  P1d[z/z1]V. This condition further expands to the following,
which holds.
y = 1 ⇒ ((y : L; z : H; z1 : H; z2 : L)[z1 7→ H], y = 1)
 ((y : L; z : H; z1 : H; z2 : L), (y = 1)[z/z1]).
Next instantiate P with P2d. The side condition specializes to y = 1∧y 6= 1⇒ ...,
which vacuously holds. 
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The typing rule for output imposes the constraint l v P◦(c) v l′. Here
P◦(c) v l′ takes care of the possibility for the output to be blocked by the
environment (in line with the use of synchronous communication the treatment
of output is “symmetric” to that of input; hence the possiblity of blocked output
is also considered). In more detail, the presence/absence of the output can leak
information if the subsequent computation is not kept confidential. This kind
of leakage is in a sense analogous to the leakage created by looping. On the
other hand, l v P◦(c) takes care of the possibility that a previously blocked
communication can be revealed through the indirect blockage (absence) of the
current output. Next, the constraint PS[X] v P◦(c) is concerned with the
implicit flows from conditionals having variables in X to the presence of the
output. Finally, the seemingly involved constraint P[(c.j 7→ PS(aj))j ]S  (P′S unionmulti
P•S ,P
′
V ∧
∧
j aj ∈P•V(c.j)) can be understood by comparing the output c!~a to the
assignment c := ~a.
The typing rule for input uses constraints about the presence label P◦(c) of
the channel c in a way similar to the rule for output does. Its last constraint
P[(xj 7→ P•S(c.j) unionsq P◦(c))j ]S  P′[(vj/xj)j ]V, requires P◦(c) v P ′S(xj) for all j ∈
{1, 2, ..., |~x|}, because the presence of the input leads to the modification of
the variable xj . The remaining part of this constraint can be understood by
comparing the input c?~x to the assignment ~x := c.
We remark on the typing rule for if, where the set fv(b) is unioned into the
“progress set”, resulting in fv(b) ∪ Y1 ∪ Y2. This guarantees a noninterference
condition where two systems advance in a manner close to “lock-step” execution,
thereby facilitating the articulation of the security guarantees under scheduling.
Similar treatment of the “termination effects” of if can be found in [BC02, Smi06].
5.5.2 The Typing of Systems
The typing judgements for systems are of the form
P ` {Φ}Σ {Ψ}.
Here P is a policy environment for the system Σ, and for each i ∈ Pid(Σ), Φ(i)
and Ψ(i) are the pre-condition and post-condition, respectively, for the process
with identifier i in Σ. We denote by TΣ the mapping such that DTΣ = Pid(Σ)
and ∀i ∈ DTΣ : TΣ(i) = tt. The typing rules follow patterns that are fairly
straightforward. Recall that the purpose of nip( ) introduced in Definition 5.3
is to rule out undesirable policy-level interference.
Example 5.6 The system ΣMD of Example 5.1 can be typed using the poli-
cies given in Example 5.2. It is not difficult to verify that nip(PMD(1)) and
nip(PMD(2)) hold, and that PMD ` {TΣMD} ΣMD {TΣMD} can be established.
The reason that nip(PMD(2)) holds is as follows. Pick two arbitrary states σ1
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and σ2 for process 2, σ1
PMD(2)
= σ2 means that σ1 and σ2 agrees on the values
of variables that are low according to both policies in PMD(2). This implies
σ1(y) = σ2(y), which further implies that σ1 |= P1d ⇔ σ2 |= P1d, and that
σ1 |= P2d ⇔ σ2 |= P2d. It can be verified that the other condition required about
PchMD is also satisfied. 
5.5.3 Theoretical Properties
The safety of our type system is demonstrated by a subject reduction [Pie02]
result — well-typedness is preserved under transition. In the statement of The-
orem 5.7 below, σ |= Φ represents ∀i ∈ DΦ : σ |= Φ(i) and all un-quantified
symbols are implicitly universally quantified. When an input is performed, the
existence of channel policies describing the values received are relied on to en-
sure the satisfaction of the pre-condition Φ′ of the derived system Σ′, by the
resulting state σ′. It is not difficult to see that the subject reduction result
also indicates that the Hoare logic component of the type system gives a partial
correctness interpretation of well-typed systems.
Theorem 5.7 (Subject Reduction) If P ` {Φ}Σ{Ψ}, 〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′〉,
σ |= Φ, P EP and σ |= P, then
1. ∃P• : α |=! P•, and
2. if ∃P• : α |=? P•, then ∃P′ EP,Φ′ : P ` {Φ′}Σ′ {Ψ} ∧ σ′ |= Φ′ ∧ σ′ |= P′.
The key result of this chapter, that well-typedness guarantees CA-security,
is formally stated in Theorem 5.8. This soundness result means that our moti-
vating example is noninterfering (Example 5.7).
Theorem 5.8 (Soundness) For all systems Σ with policy environments
P, if P ` {TΣ}Σ {TΣ}, then Seccom(Σ,P).
Example 5.7 Going back to the multiplexer example, by Theorem 5.8, the
well-typedness of the system ΣMD of Example 5.1 guarantees Seccom(ΣMD,PMD).

The proof of Theorem 5.8 is sketched below, where the role played by the
compositionality result will also be elucidated (Theorem 5.6). All details of this
proof can be found in the Coq development.
We define high/low processes with the help of the type system, following the
approach initiated in [VIS96, SV98]. To take care of content-dependent policies,
the memory state σ and policy P satisfied by σ are made explicit in the defined
predicates.
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Table 5.7: The Low Equivalence Relation on Singleton Systems
(LOEQ)
∃φ : loKφ (〈S;σ1〉,P) ∧ loKφ (〈S;σ2〉,P) σ1 {P}= σ2 nip(K)
(〈i : S; σ1〉,P) [i 7→K]' (〈i : S; σ2〉,P)
(HIEQ)
hiKφ1(〈S1;σ1〉,P) ∧ hiKφ2(〈S2;σ2〉,P) σ1
{P}
= σ2 nip(K)
(〈i : S1; σ1〉,P) [i 7→K]' (〈i : S2; σ2〉,P)
Definition 5.9 A process S with set K of variable policies is high at state
σ, under precondition φ and with policy P, written hiKφ (〈S;σ〉,P), if
σ |= P ∧ σ |= φ ∧
∃X, l,X ′, l′, ψ : X, l `K {φ}S {ψ} : X ′, l′ ∧ (l = H ∨ ∃x ∈ X : PS(x) = H)
Definition 5.10 A process S with set K of variable policies is low at state
σ, under precondition φ and with policy P, written loKφ (〈S;σ〉,P), if
σ |= P ∧ σ |= φ ∧
(∃X, l,X ′, l′, ψ : X, l `K {φ}S {ψ} : X ′, l′) ∧
(∀X, l,X ′, l′, ψ : X, l `K {φ}S {ψ} : X ′, l′ ⇒ (l = L ∧ ∀x ∈ X : PS(x) = L))
We then define a low-equivalence relation
[i7→K]' concerned with systems of
the form i : S in Table 5.7. For two singleton systems with low processes to
be related, the processes they execute need to be the same, and the precon-
ditions used should be identical. The policies used on both sides of
[i 7→K]' are
always the same (say P), and the memory states used always need to be low-
equivalent under P. The two rules (LOEQ) and (HIEQ) correspond to the two
constructors LEQ LO and LEQ HI of the parameterized relation low eq in the
Coq formalization in Appendix B.5.
We next build up to the following results:
• [i 7→K]' is a CA-bisimulation, and
• if [i 7→ K] ` {[i 7→ tt]}i : S{[i 7→ tt]} holds, and 〈i : S;σ1〉 P=
[i 7→K]
〈i : S;σ2〉,
then (〈i : S; σ1〉,P)
[i 7→K]' (〈i : S; σ2〉,P) holds.
In other words, if [i 7→ K] ` {[i 7→ tt]} i : S {[i 7→ tt]} can be established, then
Seccom(i : S, [i 7→ K]) holds. Suppose a sysmtem Σ? has the form Σ1||Σ2 or
Σ′ \ Ω, and the policy environment P?. By the typing rule for systems, and
the compositionality theorem (Theorem 5.6), we can then inductively show that
P? ` {TΣ?}Σ? {TΣ?} implies Seccom(Σ?,P?).
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Definition 5.11 UpdNext(S) represents the set of variables that the process
S attempts to update immediately. Formally, UpdNext(S) = ∅ except for the
following cases.
UpdNext(x := a) = {x}
UpdNext(c?~x) = {x1, ..., xk} where ~x = (x1, ..., xk)
UpdNext(S1;S2) = UpdNext(S1)
Lemma 5.12 If x ∈ Vari \ UpdNext(S), and `i 〈S;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′;σ′〉, then we
have σ(x) = σ′(x).
The Coq formalization of Lemma 5.12 is Lemma n upd same in Appendix B.5.
The main part of the proof that
[i 7→K]' is a CA-bisimulation is performed
by a case analysis according to the rules (LOEQ) and (HIEQ) in Table 5.7. The
reasoning for the case (HIEQ) is aided by the following lemma (Lemma high step
in Appendix B.5), whose statement uses the UpdNext( ) just defined.
Lemma 5.13 If hiKφ (〈S;σ〉,P), and `i 〈S;σ〉 α−→ 〈S′;σ′〉, then
• ∀c, ρ, ~v : α = cρ~v ⇒ P◦(c) = H,
• ∃P• : α |=! P•, and
• if ∃P• : α |=? P•, then
∃P′ : (∀x ∈ Vari : (x ∈ UpdNext(S)⇒ P′S(x) = H) ∧
(x 6∈ UpdNext(S)⇒ PS(x) v P′S(x))) ∧
∃ψ : hiKψ (〈S′;σ′〉,P′).
5.6 Deterministic Schedulers
Up till now, the execution of parallel processes is resolved in a fully non-
deterministic manner: at any point in time, any process can execute. Corre-
spondingly, in the previously formulated bisimulations for security, any process
can be picked to fire the simulating transition. In practice, the execution is
controlled by a scheduler. The security of a system executing freely, does not
necessarily imply its security under scheduling. This is actually in line with the
fact that information flow security is not usually preserved under refinement —
one type of refinement is that of reducing nondeterminacy, and reducing the
non-determinacy of a fully-nondeterministic scheduler does not preserve the se-
curity of the scheduler-system composite. Starting from this section we study
the security of a system under the control of a deterministic scheduler.
We formalize deterministic schedulers ∆ for systems Σ as Mealy automata
(e.g., [Bab00]) (Q, q0,StΣ, 2Pid , δ, o) where Q is its finite set of states, q0 the
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Table 5.8: Transition Rules for Systems under Scheduling
〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′〉
〈Σ;σ; q〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′; δ(q, σ)〉
if o(q, σ) = {η}
¬(∃α : 〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η)
〈Σ;σ; q〉 −→η 〈Σ;σ; δ(q, σ)〉
if o(q, σ) = {η}
initial state, StΣ (the memory states of Σ) is the alphabet, 2Pid is the alphabet
used for output, δ : Q× StΣ → Q is the transition function and o : Q× StΣ →
2Pid is the output function. For each state q and memory σ, o(q, σ) is a set of
one or two process identifiers, signaling the process(es) scheduled for the next
step.
The semantics at the system level is adapted to execute the process(es)
picked by the scheduler, and the transition rules are given in Table 5.8. The
extended configurations Ĉ = 〈Σ;σ; q〉 now contain the current state q of the
scheduler.
It is desirable to constrain the observational power of the scheduler to the
parts of the states that are low with respect to all policies. This is achieved
with the concept of H-obliviousness. The term is borrowed from [MZ08], but
the intuition also underlies other scheduler formalizations such as that in [SS00].
Definition 5.14 (H-Oblivious Schedulers) For a deterministic sched-
uler ∆ = (Q, q0,StΣ, 2Pid , δ, o), we have OblP(∆) if q0
∆≈
P
q0, where
∆≈
P
is the
largest relation s.t. q1
∆≈
P
q2 implies
∀σ1, σ2 : σ1{P |P EP}= σ2 ⇒ o(q1, σ1) = o(q2, σ2) ∧ δ(q1, σ1) ∆≈P δ(q2, σ2).
The general necessity of considering a scheduler has been illustrated in Sec-
tion 2.3.3, with a concurrent program using shared variables. We now give a
similar example that is tailored to the setting of the current chapter. This ex-
ample also justifies the use of fv(b)∪Y1∪Y2, rather than Y1∪Y2 as the “progress
set” in the typing of if statements.
Example 5.8 Consider the degenerate policy environment P0 and Pch0 such
that
P0(1) = {(h : H, tt)}
P0(2) = {}
P0(3) = {(l : L, tt)}
Pch0 = {(c : L), (c.1 : L, c.1 : Z)},
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and the following system
Σ? = (1 : if h = 1 then skip; skip else skip; c!1 || 2 : c!2 || 3 : c?l) \ {c}.
For all scheduled executions reaching a synchronization involving c?l, there ex-
ists a schedule under a different evaluation of the conditional h = 1, reaching the
same synchronization. However, consider a scheduler depicted as follows, where
transitions do not depend on observation of the memory state (as signaled by the
wildcard used to the left of “/” on each edge), and the lists of process identifiers
chosen are specified to the right of the “/” on the edges.
qastart
qb
qd
qc
/1 /1
/13/23
It turns out that the eventual content of l will again depend on the evaluation
of h = 1 due to the race between the outputs. In fact this kind of leakage is
well understood as “internal timing leaks” [SV98], where memory dependency is
exposed via differences in execution times.
The system Σ? does not type check — for its well-typedness, the presence
level of c, as well as the level of l, needs to be lower-bounded by the level of
h, which is not the case with P0 and Pch0 . It is also not difficult to verify that
Seccom(Σ?,P0) does not hold, due to the strong lockstep requirement imposed by
α
P•∼
ρ
γ in Figure 5.5. Indeed, we will show in the next section that CA-security
implies security under a class of schedulers including the aforementioned one.

It is not difficult to come up with sensible H-oblivious schedulers for the
system ΣMD considered in our motivating example. Simple examples of such
schedulers do not base the scheduling decision on the memory at all, as in
Example 5.8.
Remark 5.1 Although the run-time environments of many systems exhibit
probabilistic behaviors, the usefulness of deterministic scheduling cannot be un-
derestimated. In many safety-critical systems, such as industrial control sys-
tems, avionics systems, etc., the exact scheduling needs to be predictable for
their functionality and safety to be guaranteed. A differently formulated deter-
ministic scheduler model is also used for concurrent program security in the
recent work [MC12].
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5.7 Noninterference under Deterministic Schedul-
ing
In this section, we formulate a noninterference property for systems executing
under the control of deterministic schedulers. The property rejects system-
scheduler composites with internal timing leaks. We then show that CA-security
implies security under every such scheduler whose behavior is only influenced
by its observation of the public memory (and its internal state).
In the following definition, we extend the notion of “low equivalence” (P=
P
)
introduced in Section 5.4 to a relation P,∆=
P
on our extended configurations. In
fact, an alternative interpretation of this new relation is P,∆=
P
=
P
=
P
× ∆≈
P
.
Definition 5.15 (Low Eq. of Extended Configurations)
〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 P,∆=P 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 if and only if 〈Σ1;σ1〉
P
=
P
〈Σ2;σ2〉 and q1 ∆≈P q2.
We are in a position to state the security criterion for scheduled systems. In
Definition 5.16, − ∆∼
P
− is the union of all bisimulations on scheduled systems
characterized in Definition 5.17, where we omit all transition labels by abbrevi-
ating Ĉ α−→η Ĉ ′ as Ĉ −→ Ĉ ′. Hence Ĉ −→ Ĉ ′ represents a scheduled step from
the extended configuration Ĉ to the extended configuration Ĉ ′, that executes a
communication action, a τ , or is “blank” because no action from the scheduled
process(es) can be performed.
Definition 5.16 (Security of Scheduled Systems) A system Σ is
secure under the scheduling of ∆, denoted Sec∆(Σ,P), if and only if for all σ1,
σ2, and P, if 〈Σ;σ1; q0〉 P=P 〈Σ;σ2; q0〉, then (〈Σ;σ1; q0〉,P)
∆∼
P
(〈Σ;σ2; q0〉,P).
Definition 5.17 (Bisimulation for Scheduled Systems)
A bisimulation R∆P for scheduled systems is a symmetric relation such that
(Ĉ1,P) R
∆
P (Ĉ2,P) implies Ĉ1
P,∆
=
P
Ĉ2 and the following:
∀Ĉ′1 s.t. Ĉ1 −→ Ĉ′1 : ∃Ĉ′2 : Ĉ2 −→ Ĉ′2 ∧ ∃P′ : (Ĉ′1,P′)R∆P (Ĉ′2,P′).
Our final result (Theorem 5.19) is that the CA-security of a system guaran-
tees its security under the control of any H-oblivious scheduler. However, the
bisimulation for scheduled systems defined above dispensed with reliance upon
certain channel policies for an input to be simulated; hence we need to impose
the following condition of input completeness on the set Pch of channel policies
for the link between the two noninterference conditions to be finally established.
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Definition 5.18 (Input-Completeness) Pch is input complete for Σ,
denoted IC (Pch,Σ), if the following holds:
∀σ,Σ′, σ′, c, ~v : 〈Σ;σ〉 →∗ 〈Σ′;σ′〉 c?~v−→ ⇒ ∃P• ∈ Pch : c?~v |=? P•.
This condition essentially requires that each input (from the environment)
that can be performed by a system Σ is satisfied by some content policy in
Pch. Note that it is vacuously met by all systems that can only commu-
nicate internally (with τ -actions). This notion of input-completeness differs
from the more common notions of input-completeness [TLHL11] and input-
enabledness [EGP08] in the literature, in that the existing notions are a property
of the system, while ours is a property of both the system and, more importantly,
the set of channel policies in use.
Theorem 5.19 For all systems Σ, policy environments P for variables, and
schedulers ∆, if Seccom(Σ,P), IC (Pch,Σ) and OblP(∆), then Sec∆(Σ,P).
To build up to a proof of Theorem 5.19, we establish the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.20 For all Σ, σ, Σ′1, σ′1, Σ′2, σ′2, c1, ρ1, ~v1, c2, ρ2, ~v2, and i, if
〈Σ;σ〉 c1ρ1~v1−→ i 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉, then
1. 〈Σ;σ〉 c2ρ2~v2−→ i 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉 ⇒ c1 = c2 ∧ ρ1 = ρ2, and
2. 〈Σ;σ〉 6 τ−→i.
This lemma simply formalizes the observation that there is no intra-process
non-determinism with respect to the channel and polarity of actions (although
there is with input data).
Lemma 5.21 For all Σ1, σ1, Σ′1, σ′1, Σ2, σ2, α′, Σ′2, σ′2, η and P, if we
have (〈Σ1;σ1〉,P) com∼P (〈Σ2;σ2〉,P), 〈Σ1;σ1〉
η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉, and 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η
〈Σ′2;σ′2〉, then α′ = τ or P◦(ch(α′)) = H.
Proof. This lemma can be shown using Lemma 5.20 and the symmetry of
− com∼
P
−. Note that all possible cases for α′ are α′ = τ , P◦(ch(α′)) = H and
P◦(ch(α′)) = L. Hence we just need to show that P◦(ch(α′)) = L is impossible.
Assume per absurdum that P◦(ch(α′)) = L. By symmetry of − com∼
P
− we have
(〈Σ2;σ2〉,P) com∼P (〈Σ1;σ1〉,P).
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By 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉, there exist P•! , β′ such that α′
P•!∼
!
β′, and for all P•?,
~v′ such that α′
P•?∼
?
β′(~v′), there exist Σ′1, σ′1, and P′ such that
〈Σ1;σ1〉
β′(~v′)
 η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉 (5.4)
(〈Σ′2;σ′2〉,P′) com∼P (〈Σ
′
1;σ
′
1〉,P′) (5.5)
Since P◦(ch(α′)) = L, by α′
P•!∼
!
β′ we have the following cases:
1. α′ = c!~v and β′ = c!~v′′ for some c, ~v and ~v′′ such that vj = v′′j whenever
P•(c.j) = L,
2. α′ = c?~v and β′ = c?[ ] for some c and ~v.
In both cases, the universally quantified P•? and ~v
′ can be instantiated with P•!
and ~v, for α′
P•?∼
?
β′(~v′) to be satisfied. We thus obtain (5.4) un-guarded. In
more detail, we have
〈Σ1;σ1〉 β
′(~v)−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉 (5.6)
However, we also have 〈Σ1;σ1〉
η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉 from the pre-conditions. This is
impossible due to Lemma 5.20, and this contradiction completes the proof. 
The proof of Theorem 5.19 can now be given as follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.19
We rephrase Seccom(Σ,P) as
∀σ1, σ2,P s.t. 〈Σ;σ1〉 P=P 〈Σ;σ2〉 : (〈Σ;σ1〉,P)
com∼
P
(〈Σ;σ2〉,P) (5.7)
Given ∆ such that OblP(∆) holds, we construct the following relation R∆,
R∆ = {((〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉,P1), (〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉,P2)) |
q1
∆≈
P
q2 ∧
(〈Σ1;σ1〉,P1) com∼P (〈Σ2;σ2〉,P2) ∧
∃σ : 〈Σ;σ〉 −→∗ 〈Σ1;σ1〉 ∧ ∃σ : 〈Σ;σ〉 −→∗ 〈Σ2;σ2〉}.
Using (5.7), it is not difficult to show that for all σ1, σ2, and P such that
〈Σ;σ1; q0〉 P=P 〈Σ;σ2; q0〉, the pair ((〈Σ;σ1; q0〉,P), (〈Σ;σ2; q0〉,P)) is in R∆.
We next show that R∆ is a bisimulation for scheduled systems. The sym-
metry of R∆ is obvious by construction.
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Take pair ((〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉,P), (〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉,P)) from R∆. We have
q1
∆≈
P
q2 (5.8)
(〈Σ1;σ1〉,P) com∼P (〈Σ2;σ2〉,P) (5.9)
∃σ : 〈Σ;σ〉 −→∗ 〈Σ1;σ1〉 (5.10)
∃σ : 〈Σ;σ〉 −→∗ 〈Σ2;σ2〉 (5.11)
We thus have 〈Σ1;σ1〉 P=P 〈Σ2;σ2〉. Hence 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉
P,∆
=
P
〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 holds.
Take some arbitrary Σ′1, σ′1 and q′1 such that 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 −→ 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉.
By (5.9), we have σ1
{P}
= σ2, thus σ1
{P′|P′ EP}
= σ2. By OblP(∆), we have
o(q2, σ2) = o(q1, σ1) = {η}, and q′1
∆≈
P
q′2, where q′2 = δ(q2, σ2) (and we know
that q′1 = δ(q1, σ1)).
With a case analysis on whether this transition is a −→, we show that there
is always a one-step simulation.
1. 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉 where α 6= . We have
〈Σ1;σ1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉 (5.12)
By (5.9), there exist some P•! and β such that α
P•!∼
!
β, and for all P•?, ~v
such that α
P•?∼
?
β(~v), there exist Σ′2, σ′2, and P′ such that
〈Σ2;σ2〉
β(~v)
 η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉 (5.13)
(〈Σ′1;σ′1〉,P′) com∼P (〈Σ
′
2;σ
′
2〉,P′) (5.14)
(a) Suppose α is not an input. Then all P•? in Pch• , and all ~v will satisfy
α
P•?∼
?
β(~v).
(b) Suppose α = c?~v1 and P◦(c) = H. By α
P•!∼
!
β, β = . By IC (Pch,Σ)
and 5.10, there exists some P•2 such that for all ~v2, α
P•2∼
?
(~v2).
(c) Suppose α = c?~v1 and P◦(c) = L. By α
P•!∼
!
β, β = c?[ ]. By
IC (Pch,Σ) and ∃σ : 〈Σ;σ〉 −→∗ 〈Σ1;σ1〉, there exists some P•2, and
~v2 = ~v1, such that α
P•2∼
?
c?[ ](~v2).
Hence in all cases we can instantiate the universally quantified P•? and ~v,
and obtain the transition (5.13) such that (5.14) holds. We next make a
case split on whether β = .
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(a) β 6= .
i. β 6= . We have 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 −→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2; q′2〉. Combining q′1
∆≈
P
q′2 and (5.14), we have
(〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉,P′) R∆ (〈Σ′2;σ′2; q′2〉,P′).
ii. β = . We have 〈Σ2;σ2〉
η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉. We know that (∀α′ :
〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→⇒ P◦(ch(α′)) = H)∧Σ′2 = Σ2∧σ′2 = σ2. There are
two possibilities concerning the transtion that can be performed
from 〈Σ2;σ2〉.
Suppose no transition can be performed from 〈Σ2;σ2〉. In this
case we have 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 −→η 〈Σ2;σ′2; q′2〉. This transition qual-
ifies as the simulation of 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉 in R∆, by
reasoning similar to the case 1(a)i.
Suppose a transition 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉 exists for some Σ′′2 ,
σ′′2 and α′, where α′ is a communication such that P◦(ch(α′)) =
H. By the symmetry of − com∼
P
−, (5.14), Σ′2 = Σ2 and σ′2 = σ2,
we have
(〈Σ2;σ2〉,P′) com∼P (〈Σ
′
1;σ
′
1〉,P′). (5.15)
Hence there exist α′, β′, P•!2 such that α
′ P
•
!2∼
!
β′, and for all ~v′
and P•?2 such that α
′ P
•
?2∼
?
β′(~v′), there exist Σ′′1 , σ′′1 , and P′′, such
that
〈Σ′1;σ′1〉
β′(~v′)
 η 〈Σ′′1 ;σ′′1 〉 (5.16)
(〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉,P′′) com∼P (〈Σ
′′
1 ;σ
′′
1 〉,P′′) (5.17)
Note that α′
P•!2∼
!
β′ indicates that β′ = . Hence the universally
quantified P•?2 can be instantiated by any policy in Pch (which
is assumed to be non-empty), and ~v′ by any value vector of the
appropriate length, in order for α′
P•?2∼
?
β′(~v′) to hold, thereby
obtaining (5.16) and (5.17). By (5.16) and β′ = , we have
Σ′′1 = Σ
′
1 and σ′′1 = σ′1. By the symmetry of − com∼P −, we have
(〈Σ′1;σ′1〉,P′′) com∼P (〈Σ
′′
2 ;σ
′′
2 〉,P′′). (5.18)
Building on the transition 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉, we have
〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 α
′−→η 〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 ; q′2〉.
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It is not difficult to see that the transition above qualifies as a
simulation of 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉 in R∆, since the pair
((〈Σ′1, σ′1〉,P′′), (〈Σ′′2 , σ′′2 〉,P′′)) is in R∆.
(b) β = .
i. Suppose ¬(∃α′ : 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η). Then it is not difficult to see
that 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 −→η 〈Σ2;σ2; q′2〉 qualifies as a simulation of the
transition 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉.
ii. Suppose there exists the transition
〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′−→η 〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉, (5.19)
for some α′, Σ′′2 and σ′′2 . We know from α
P•!∼
!
 that α is a
communication such that P◦(ch(α)) = H. By Lemma 5.21,
α′ = τ or P◦(ch(α′)) = H.
Suppose P◦(ch(α′)) = H. The proof is similar to the case 1(a)ii,
where there is a high communication from 〈Σ2;σ2〉.
Suppose α′ = τ . By symmetry of − com∼
P
−, and (5.9), we have
(〈Σ2;σ2〉,P) com∼P (〈Σ1;σ1〉,P).
By (5.19), there exist P•!2 and β
′ such that τ
P•!2∼
!
β′, and for all
P•?2 and ~v
′ such that τ
P•?2∼
?
β′(~v′), there exist Σ′′1 , σ′′1 and P′,
such that
〈Σ1;σ1〉
β′(~v′)
 η 〈Σ′′1 ;σ′′1 〉 (5.20)
(〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉,P′′) com∼P (〈Σ
′′
1 ;σ
′′
1 〉,P′′) (5.21)
By τ
P•!2∼
!
β′, we have β′ = τ or β′ = . The universally quantified
P•?2 can be instantiated with any policy in the non-empty Pch,
and ~v′ with any value vector of the appropriate length, for τ
P•?2∼
?
β′(~v′) to be satisfied. We thus obtain (5.20) and (5.21). By β = ,
and α P
•
∼
!
β, α is a communication such that P◦(ch(α)) = H.
Hence by Lemma 5.20, and (5.20), β′ cannot be τ . Hence β′ = ,
and Σ′′1 = Σ1 and σ′′1 = σ1.
By symmetry of − com∼
P
−, and (5.21), we have
(〈Σ1;σ1〉,P′′) com∼P (〈Σ
′′
2 ;σ
′′
2 〉,P′′).
5.7 Noninterference under Deterministic Scheduling 89
By transition (5.12), there exist P•!3 and β
′′ such that α
P•!3∼
!
β′′,
and for all P•?3 and ~v
′′ satisfying α
P•?3∼
?
β′′(~v′′), there exist Σ′′′2 ,
σ′′′2 and P′′′ such that
〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 〉
β′′(~v′′)
 η 〈Σ′′′2 ;σ′′′2 〉 (5.22)
(〈Σ′1;σ′1〉,P′′′) com∼P (〈Σ
′′′
2 ;σ
′′′
2 〉,P′′′) (5.23)
Since α is a high presence communication, β′′ = , and Σ′′′2 = Σ′′2
and σ′′′2 = σ′′2 . Hence the transition 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 α−→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉
can be simulated by 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 τ−→η 〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 ; q′2〉 in R∆, result-
ing in ((〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉,P′′′), (〈Σ′′2 ;σ′′2 ; q′2〉,P′′′)) ∈ R∆.
2. 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 −→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉. We have Σ′1 = Σ1, σ′1 = σ1, and
¬(∃α′ : 〈Σ1;σ1〉 α
′−→). (5.24)
Compared with case 1, we argue more briefly, since no new intuition is
needed. A case split is made on the transition that can happen from
〈Σ2;σ2〉, over the processes in η. By (5.24) we have 〈Σ1;σ1〉
η 〈Σ′1;σ′1〉.
By Lemma 5.21, the only possible cases are the following.
(a) There is transition 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉 for some Σ′2, σ′2 and α′
such that P◦(ch(α′)) = H. It can be deduced that (〈Σ1;σ1〉,P′) com∼P
(〈Σ′2;σ′2〉,P′) for some P′. Hence the transition 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 −→η
〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉 can be simulated by 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2; q′2〉 in R∆.
(b) There is transition 〈Σ2;σ2〉 τ−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2〉 for some Σ′2 and σ′2. We
can still deduce (〈Σ1;σ1〉,P′) com∼P (〈Σ
′
2;σ
′
2〉,P′) for some P′. The
simulation in R∆ is by the transition 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 α
′
−→η 〈Σ′2;σ′2; q′2〉.
(c) ¬(∃α′ : 〈Σ2;σ2〉 α
′
−→). The transition 〈Σ1;σ1; q1〉 −→η 〈Σ′1;σ′1; q′1〉
(note that Σ′1 = Σ1 and σ′1 = σ1) can be simulated by 〈Σ2;σ2; q2〉 −→η
〈Σ2;σ2; q′2〉, resulting in ((〈Σ1;σ1; q′1〉,P), (〈Σ2;σ2; q′2〉,P)) ∈ R∆.
The cases above are exhaustive and the proof is complete. 
The ΣMD of our motivating example only communicates internally. Hence
continuing with Example 5.7, we can finally conclude Sec∆(ΣMD,PMD) for all
schedulers ∆ such that OblPMD(∆) holds.
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5.8 Developing Proofs in Coq
In this section, we elaborate on certain key elements of our Coq formalization
of the theory presented in this Chapter. In doing so, we make the complete
formalization given in Appendix B accessible to the reader.
The Coq Proof Assistant
We briefly introduce the reader to the Coq proof assistant [CPA]. This is an
interactive theorem prover based on type theory. The ability to use dependent
types facilitates the formalization of programming language theory [Chl13]. The
Curry-Howard correspondence (e.g., [Pie02]) that bridges logical inference and
type inference is relied on in making and verifying formal logical statements. We
elaborate slightly on this last statement with an example. For logical inference,
we have the Modus ponens rule below on the left. For type inference in functional
programs, on the other hand, we have the rule for function applications on the
right.
A→ B A
B
f : A→ B a : A
f(a) : B
The usual reading of the second rule is: if the term (function) f has the arrow
type A→ B, and the term a has type A, then the term f(a) has type B. But an
alternative reading can be: if f is an evidence of the claim “if A then B”, and
a is an evidence of A, then f(a) is an evidence of B. The latter can thus be
seen as an evidence-carrying version of the modus ponens rule. In fact, proving
in Coq boils to a great extent down to applying “tactics” that help create “proof
terms” (such as the f(a) above).
Theory aside, understanding the formulations to be presented in this section
corresponds mostly to understanding the types (such as the A → B, A and
B in the example above), thus to understanding logical formulas. Note that
in Coq formalizations, when we have A1, A2, ..., An (n ≥ 2), and B, it is
customary to write A1 → A2 → ... → An → B, for A1 ∧ A2 ∧ ... ∧ An → B.
This can be understood intuitively by noting that → is right-associative, and
thus A1 → A2 → ... → An → B is equivalent to A1 ∧ A2 ∧ ... ∧ An → B when
both are seen as logical formulas. In the terms of functional programming,
A1 → A2 → ...→ An → B works by currying [Pie02].
Outline of the Proof
We define mappings with explicit domains as follows.
1 Section Mappings.
2
3 Variable A: Type.
4 Definition Dec (A: Type) := ∀ a1 a2: A, {a1=a2} + {a1<>a2}.
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5 Variable dec: Dec A.
6
7 Record Mapping (A B: Type) (dec_A: Dec A) :=
8 mkMapping {
9 il: list A;
10 mp: A→ B
11 }.
12 ...
13 End Mappings.
14
15 Notation "## A" := (il _ _ _ A) (at level 10).
16 Notation "&& A" := (mp _ _ _ A) (at level 10).
We define a mapping as a record having two fields (lines 7-11): il is its
domain represented by a list, and mp a function keeping record of which element
in the domain is mapped to which element in the range. The Dec A on line 4
says that equality of type A should be decidable. An evidence of the decidability
of equality on the domain is needed to create a mapping, since the comparison
of domain elements is unavoidable when using it. As suggested by lines 15 and
16, notations are defined for referencing the il field and mp field, respectively,
of a mapping A. The wildcards “ ” are used for types that can be inferred by
the Coq system.
The disjoint union between two mappings is then defined as follows.
1 Definition m_union {B: Type} (m1 m2: Mapping A B dec) :
2 option (Mapping A B dec) :=
3 if (common _ dec (il A B _ m1) (il A B _ m2)) then
4 None
5 else
6 Some (mkMapping A B dec
7 (( il A B _ m1) ++ (il A B _ m2))
8 (u_map (il A B _ m1) (mp A B _ m1) (mp A B _ m2))
9 ).
We make use of optional datatypes of Gallina (the specification language of
Coq), and the disjoint union is None when the domains of both mappings have
common elements. When the two mappings have disjoint domains, we then
combine their domains (line 7) and their bodies (line 8). The function u map
essentially produces the function that maps all elements in (il A B m1) ac-
cording to (mp A B m1), and maps all elements elsewhere according to (mp A
B m2).
The setting of Section 5.2 is one in which the process-local memories are
of the same type as that of global memories. Somewhat different than this, in
our Coq formalization, global memories are mappings from process identifiers
to process-local memories. Process-local memories are in turn mappings from
process-local variables to their values.
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Definition Mem := Mapping id nat eq_id_dec.
Definition SysMem := Mapping pid Mem eq_pid_dec.
This approach is adopted because keeping the boundaries between different
processes explicit makes subsequent formalization and proof tasks more conve-
nient. On the other hand, for a concise presentation on paper, the homogeneity
of local and global memories is more desirable. It is expected that this difference
will not render the Coq formalization unfaithful to the technical development
since both memory models correspond to the view of different processes having
disjoint local memories.
We define actions that can be τ ’s, outputs, inputs, ’s or ’s, as follows.
Inductive action : Type :=
| Act_LTau : action
| Act_LOt : pch → list nat → action
| Act_LIn : pch → list nat → action
| Act_Eps : action /∗  ∗/
| Act_Suspd : action /∗  ∗/
.
Related to the formalization of memories, the semantic rule for synchronous
communication in systems is exhibited next.
1 Inductive sys_step : conf → list pid → action → conf → Prop :=
2 ...
3 | Sys_Step_Sync :
4 ∀ sys1 sys1’ sys2 sys2’ m1 m1’ m2 m2’
5 i j c vl alpha1 alpha2 sysm,
6 sys1//m1 ===> [[i], alpha1] sys1’// m1’ →
7 sys2//m2 ===> [[j], alpha2] sys2’// m2’ →
8 (common _ eq_pid_dec (##m1) (##m2) = false) →
9 eq_sysmem sysm (u_sysmem m1 m2) →
10 (alpha1 = Act_LOt c vl ∧ alpha2 = Act_LIn c vl ∨
11 alpha1 = Act_LIn c vl ∧ alpha2 = Act_LOt c vl) →
12 (sys1 | P| sys2)//sysm ===> [[i;j], Act_LTau]
13 (sys1’ | P| sys2’)//( upd_sysmem (upd_sysmem sysm i m1’) j m2’)
14 ...
15 where "sys ’//’ m ’===>’ ’[’ pidlst ’,’ alpha ’]’ sys’ ’//’ m’" :=
16 (sys_step (sys, m) pidlst alpha (sys’, m’)) : sem_scope.
Line 1 says that a transition step of the system is a judgement (represented
by the type Prop of Gallina, for propositions) on two configurations, a list of
process identifiers, and an action. A piece of notation has been introduced such
that a transition of the form 〈Σ;σ〉 α−→η 〈Σ′;σ′〉 is represented as sys//m ===>
[pidlst, alpha] sys’//m’. Here sys corresponds to Σ, m to σ, pidlst to η,
alpha to α, sys’ to Σ′ and m’ to σ′. In addition, sys1 |P| sys2 represents the
parallel composition of sys1 and sys2.
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We explicitly require that the domains of the memories used by the two sys-
tems in parallel (i.e., the sets of process identifiers used in the two systems)
should be disjoint. This reflects the “background” assumption on the well-
formedness of systems. It is also worth mentioning that we use the self-made
binary relation eq sysmem, rather than Coq’s built-in equality =, to express that
two system memories are the same (e.g., line 9 of the rule Sys Step Sync). In
prose, the requirements of eq sysmem are
1. two memories should have the same domain, and
2. they map each element in the domain to the same value.
We move on to discuss the setup for our information flow type system.
1 Definition Assertion := Mem → Prop.
2 Definition AsnEnv := Mapping pid Assertion eq_pid_dec.
3 Definition PVarVal := Assertion.
4 Definition PVarSec := Mapping id SecLev eq_id_dec.
5 Definition PVar := prod PVarSec PVarVal.
6 Definition PVarEnv := Mapping pid (Ensemble PVar) eq_pid_dec.
7 Definition PChP := pch → SecLev.
8 Definition PChCVal := ch → (Ensemble nat).
9 Definition PChCSec := ch → SecLev.
10 Definition PChC := prod PChCSec PChCVal.
11 Definition PChEnv := sig (fun (CE: Ensemble PChC) =>
12 ∃ PcC, PcC from CE).
Our Hoare logic assertions are of the type Mem -> Prop, i.e., they are functions
for process-local memories to propositions. This follows the approach taken in
[PCG+]. An assertion environment is a mapping from process identifiers to
process-local assertions. Confidentiality policies for memories have the product
type prod PVarSec PVarVal, where PVarSec is the type for their confidentiality
components and PVarVal the type for their value components. The latter type
is but a synonym of the type for assertions. We then formalize a policy environ-
ment (P in the technical development) as a mapping from process identifiers to
sets of process-local variable policies (line 6). Concerning channels, the distin-
guished policy on “presence” has the arrow type from polyadic channels (pch)
to confidentiality levels (SecLev). On the other hand, each content policy has
the product type prod PChCSec PChCVal, where the component types PChCSec
and PChCVal are self-explanatory. In our technical development, the set Pch• of
content policies for channels is required to be non-empty. This non-emptiness
constraint is imposed using subset types [BC04] (or refinement types). In more
detail, a channel policy environment is a set of content policies Ensemble PChC
such that there exists a content policy in it (exists PcC, PcC from CE).
We define two global variables, PcP of type PChP and PChCSet of type PChEnv.
This allows us to omit the distinguished presence policy and the set of content
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policies for channels as the parameters of various definitions that follow.
Variable PcP : PChP.
Variable PChCSet : PChEnv.
Analogous to the two-level structure in process-local memories and system
memories, for variable policies we introduce the system-level. A system-level
variable policy (also called a composed policy hereafter) has the product type
prod CompPSec CompPVal. Here CompPSec is the type of the confidentiality
component, which is a mapping from process identifiers to process-local con-
fidentiality policies. On the other hand, CompPVal is the type of the value
component, which is a mapping from process identifiers to process-local asser-
tions.
Definition CompPSec := Mapping pid PVarSec eq_pid_dec.
Definition CompPVal := AsnEnv.
Definition CompP := prod CompPSec CompPVal.
Then the fact P EP, that a variable policy is composed according to the
policy environment P, is expressed as:
Definition comp_from (CP: CompP) (PE: PVarEnv) :=
(##(fst CP) = ##PE) ∧ (##(snd CP) = ##PE) ∧
(∀ i, List. In i (##PE) →
∃ P, (P from (&&PE i) ∧ pair (&&(fst CP) i) (&&(snd CP) i) = P)).
For comp from CP PE to hold, both components of the system-level variable
policy CP should have the same domain as the policy environment PE. More
importantly, for each process identifier i in the domain of PE, there should exist
a variable policy P from the set of all variable policies for process i, such that
the confidentiality component of CP maps i to the confidentiality component of
P, and the value component of CP maps i to the value component of P.
For the type system at the process-level, the notation K,i,X,l \- phi,S,psi
-: X’,l’ is introduced to represent typing judgements. Compared with the
X, l `K {φ}S {ψ} : X ′, l′ used in the presentation on paper, the only small
difference is that the process identifier i of S is made explicit.
We elaborate on the rule for input — this rule is the lengthiest in all the
formalized typing rules.
1 Inductive well_typed (K: Ensemble PVar) (i: pid) :
2 (Ensemble id) → SecLev → Assertion → com → Assertion →
3 (Ensemble id) → SecLev → Prop :=
4 ...
5 | TP_IN : ∀ X l phi xl c l’,
6 contained in X (pid ids i) →
7 (( Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧ (Ordr (PcP c) l’) ∧
8 (∀ P m, ##m = pid ids i →
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9 P from K → (snd P m ∧ all_assn xl phi m) →
10 (( ∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧
11 ∀ PcC vl, PcC from (proj1_sig PChCSet) →
12 |vl| = |xl| → vl_sat vl c PcC →
13 ∃ Q, Q from K ∧
14 (∀ x’, x’ ido P ∧ ~(List. In x’ xl) →
15 (Ordr (secL P x’) (secL Q x’))) ∧
16 (∀ j, 1<=j<=|xl| →
17 (Ordr (lub (fst PcC (Chan c j)) (PcP c))
18 (secL Q (xl x@ (j−1))))) ∧
19 (val_sat_sub_n m Q xl (num vl))
20 )
21 )
22 ) →
23 K, i, X, l \− (all_assn xl phi), (c ?? xl), phi −:
24 (Empty_set _), l’
25 ...
26 where " K ’,’ i ’,’ X ’,’ l ’\-’ phi ’,’ S ’,’ psi ’-:’ X’ ’,’ l’ "
27 := (well_typed K i X l phi S psi X’ l’) : hoare_spec_scope.
We re-display the typing rule for input in Table 5.6 below, for ease of comparison.
X, l `K {∀~x : φ} c?~x {φ} : ∅, l′ if l v P◦(c) v l′ and
∀P ∈ K : PV ∧ (∀~x : φ)⇒ (PS[X] v P◦(c) ∧ ∀P• ∈ Pch : ∀~v s.t.
∧
j vj ∈ P•(c.j) :
∃P′ ∈ K : P[(xj 7→ P•S(c.j) unionsqP◦(c))j ]S  P′[(vj/xj)j ]V)
The reason for the Coq formalization to be lengthier is twofold. First of all,
a few “healthiness constraints” are made explicit (the grey parts in lines 6, 8
and 12). The first such constraint says that each variable in X is an identifier
local to process i. The second such constraint says that only local memories
having the set of identifiers of process i as their domains are considered as local
states. The third such constraint says that only value vectors having the same
number of components as ~x does are considered as proper input values. Second
of all, the condensed formulation P[(xj 7→ P•S(c.j)unionsqP◦(c))j ]S  P′[(vj/xj)j ]V)
is spelled out into the three separate constraints in lines 14 to 19.
We dispense with explaining all the user-defined notations needed to com-
pletely understand the rule TP IN, but point out the following facts. Starting
from line 14, the first constraint expresses ∀x′, (x′ ∈ DPS∧x′ 6∈ {~x})⇒ PS(x′) v
P′S(x
′). The second constraint expresses ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ |~x| : P•S(c.j) unionsqP◦(c) v
P′(xj). The third constraint says that P′[(vj/xj)j ]V should hold on the process-
local memory m assumed from the beginning, satisfying PV and ∀~x : φ (line 9).
Unlike its presentation on paper, the formalized rule TP IN uses process-
local memories m explicitly. This stated-oriented approach to the formalization
of Hoare logic has previously been taken in [PCG+]. The logic and theory
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supported by the assertions are essentially “borrowed” from Gallina, and there
is no need for the user to provide extra machinery in their interpretation.
The typing rules for systems are no more perplexing; hence we omit their
explanation and direct our attention now to the formalization of CA-security.
The satisfaction of an assertion environment by a system memory (σ |= Φ
introduced in the beginning of Section 5.5.3) has the following, self-explanatory
formalization.
Definition comp_sat (m: SysMem) (AE: AsnEnv) :=
(##m = ##AE) ∧ (∀ i, List.In i (##m) → (&&AE i (&&m i))).
The low-equivalence relation on states in Figure 5.5 is then formulated as
follows.
1 Definition state_eq (P: CompP) (PE: PVarEnv) sys1 m1 sys2 m2 :=
2 comp_from P PE ∧
3 get_pids sys1 = ##PE ∧ get_pids sys2 = ##PE ∧
4 ##(fst P ) = ##(snd P ) ∧
5 comp_sat m1 (snd P) ∧ comp_sat m2 (snd P) ∧
6 ∀ i, List. In i (##PE) →
7 ##(&&(fst P ) i) = pid ids i ∧
8 ##(&&m1 i) = pid ids i ∧ ##(&&m2 i) = pid ids i ∧
9 ∀ x, List. In x (pid_ids i) →
10 (&&(&&(fst P) i) x = L) →
11 &&(&&m1 i) x = &&(&&m2 i) x.
The parts in grey are again healthiness constraints on the domains of certain
mappings, that are taken for granted in the pen-and-paper formulation. Since
the value component of a composed policy essentially has the type Asn Env, just
like the pre-conditions and post-conditions in the typing rules for systems, the
newly introduced comp sat can be used to express the satisfaction of composed
policies by memory states (line 5). The core of state eq is the part saying
that low variables have the same value in both memories, spanning lines 9-11.
Due to the two-level structure used in our memories and policies, double “de-
referencing” of system memories and composed policies are needed. Essentially,
we focus on the process i first (line 6), and then on each variable x local to that
process (line 9).
Action schemas have the following formalization, which is similar to that of
actions. Note that it takes only a polyadic channel for an input action schema
to be formed.
Inductive action_sk : Type :=
| ActSk_LTau : action_sk
| ActSk_LOt : pch → list nat → action_sk
| ActSk_LIn : pch → action_sk
| ActSk_Eps : action_sk
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| ActSk_Suspd : action_sk
.
Since actions and action schemas have different types, it becomes convenient to
make separate formalizations of low equivalence between two actions, and low
equivalence between an action and an action schema. The two versions (called
act eq and act sk eq, in Sec.v) parallel each other, but make use of different
utility functions due to the difference in type. We elide the details of the two
definitions here and Appendix B can be consulted for a clear view.
We are now in a position to exhibit the formulation of CA-bisimulation. The
elements in the following snippet correspond to the pen-and-paper formulation
exactly, although lengthier notations are used.
Program Definition ca_bisim (PE: PVarEnv) (R: relation (prod conf CompP))
:=
symmetric _ R ∧
∀ C1 C2 CP,
R (pair C1 CP) (pair C2 CP) →
state_eq CP PE (fst C1) (snd C1) (fst C2) (snd C2) ∧
∀ alpha pidlst C1’,
sys_step C1 pidlst alpha C1’ →
∃ PcCOt bta,
PcCOt from PChCSet ∧ act_sk_eq alpha bta PcCOt Pol_Ot ∧
∀ PcCIn vl,
PcCIn from PChCSet →
act_eq alpha (fill bta vl) PcCIn Pol_In →
∃ C2’ CP’,
may_step C2 pidlst (fill bta vl) C2’ ∧
R (pair C1’ CP’) (pair C2’ CP’).
The PChCSet used in the definition above has type PChEnv, which is declared to
be a subset type, indicating that PChCSet is a set and that it is non-empty. To
express that a policy PcCOt is a member of the underlying set of PChCSet, we
would need to write PcCOt from (proj1 sig PChCSet) [BC04]. The keyword
Program has been used to enable us to write the simpler PcCOt from PChCSet
instead — the Program mechanism of Coq allows one to deal with subset types
as their underlying types.
We now end our description with the formalization of CA-security. There
is again a precise correspondence with the pen-and-paper formulation, which
renders verbal explanation unnecessary.
Definition ca_sec sys PE :=
∀ sysm1 sysm2 CP,
state_eq CP PE sys sysm1 sys sysm2 →
∃ R, ca_bisim PE R ∧
R (pair (pair sys sysm1) CP) (pair (pair sys sysm2) CP).
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Level of Automation
It is advocated in [Chl13] that proof automation should be pushed to the ex-
treme. This is largely done via user-defined tactics — analogous to programming
automated theorem provers inside Coq. On the other hand, several existing
proof developments [BBJ13, MPP13, CHRS14] in Coq are performed mostly
through manual application of mostly elementary tactics.
Robustness
Repairability
High Low
Low High
Au Ma
Figure 5.9: The Respective Merits of Automated and Manual Proofs
When developing proofs in a proof assistant, the workflow rarely goes linearly
from formulation to proving. This is because small deficiencies in the formula-
tion can often be spotted during the proof process. Hence cycling through the
two tasks is often unavoidable. Taking into consideration the changes that are
often needed in the formulation, and the possibility that existing proofs can be
broken, we summarize the respective merits of crafting tactics for automation
and manually applying elementary tactics in Figure 5.9.
In short, the automated style of proof tends to be more robust under for-
mulational adjustments. On the other hand, once a highly automated proof is
broken, it is more difficult to locate the problem and repair it. On the contrary,
proofs composed of tactics involving less automation tend to be more easily
broken, but more easily adapted/repaired at the same time.
Apart from formulational changes, another relevant factor is the “purpose”
of proofs. One typical purpose is program verification (e.g., [BJSB11]), where
automation is often desirable. Since the problem domain is relatively narrow
and well-defined (verifying method contracts, etc.), extensive automation can be
feasible. Another typical purpose is verifying the theoretical results of research
papers (e.g., [BBJ13, MPP13]), where the level of automation cannot be pushed
as high. This is because the results are typically “deeper” (in the extreme,
consider the four-color theorem or the odd order theorem whose proofs have
been completed in Coq [Gon07, GAA+13] within the last decade), which calls
for human intuition to be exercised. In addition, the reasoning involved can
be drastically different from paper to paper, which makes it difficult to reuse
automation.
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Benefits and Perils of Using a Proof Assistant
Apart from the obvious effect of obtaining higher correctness assurance, some
convenience is in fact gained by using a proof assistant. Since the names of
variables, as well as the effective hypotheses, are maintained automatically at
any point of the proving process, naming clashes cease to be a worry, and there
is no need to look back on the part of the proof already written to gather
information on what is known (or to keep this in mind). Another advantage is
related to changes of formulation, under which it is often difficult to manually
re-certify the correctness of a modified proof, while re-certification accomplished
in a proof assistant results immediately in great confidence in the new proof.
This is especially (comparably) effective when the changes needed in the old
proof are in fact not many, but it is difficult or/and time-consuming to see with
the human eye that no more changes are required.
One of the perils in performing formalization in a proof assistant is simply
the mis-understanding of the associativity between connectives. For instance
∀x : A→ B ∧ ∀y : C→ D could be written where (∀x : A→ B) ∧ (∀y : C→ D) is
actually intended. This is more likely to happen when the formulas involved are
large. It might not be difficult to spot this issue when performing proofs related
to this formulation: inversion H where H is of the form ∀x : A→ B ∧ ∀y : C→ D,
will not work, whereas the parenthesized version can be successfully broken
into the two conjuncts. Besides, certain details can render the development
process time-consuming. Such details are often below the abstraction level of
the formulations presented on paper, and have little to do with intuition, but
are nevertheless indispensable for mechanized certification. Since deviation from
the paper-formulation also adds to the difficulty in understanding, keeping such
low-level machinery minimal in the formalization is desirable.
5.9 Related Work
Broberg and Sands [BS06, BS10] enforce information flow policies that depend
on the states of “locks”. A basic example is the policy that only allows a bidder
to view others’ bids after the auction has been completed (signaled, e.g., by the
fact that all the bidders have submitted their bids). Here whether a bidder has
submitted a bid can be captured by the state of a “lock”. The approach in [BS10],
in particular, allows parameterized locks to be used, with the typical purpose
of expressing that an actor assumes a role. An encoding of the Decentralized
Label Model [ML97] is performed in the label model of this latter work, where
parameterized locks are used to encode the principal hierarchy.
Amtoft et al. [ADZ+12] employ a relational Hoare logic for the expression
of content-dependent information flow policies. An example policy that can
be expressed in their framework is “for the values of variable y to be equal at
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program point `′, the values of x1 should be equal at program point ` under
condition φ1, while the values of x2 should be equal at program point ` under
condition φ2”. Their language corresponds to the sequential While language
augmented with for-loops and arrays.
Lourenço and Caires [LC13, LC15] develop dependent information flow types
that also allow for content-dependency. In [LC13], they work with a core func-
tional language extended with database primitives. The basic goal is to use
security labels that apply not for whole relations (tables), but for individual
records. Suppose Pt denotes readership of patients. Then the label Pt(j) means
that information can only flow to a particular patient, which corresponds to a
record whose identifier is j. The subsequent work [LC15] generalizes this to
support a wide class of dependencies of security labels on run-time data values,
in a general purpose λ-calculus.
The early work [AR80] by Andrews and Reitman discusses a program logic
(bearing resemblance to Hoare logic) that enforces information flow policies
depending on the security classes and values of variables; however, their analysis
is not justified by a semantic property of security.
Barthe et al [BFG+14] develop relational refinement types for a higher-order
functional language, thereby gaining the ability to verify a broad range of safe-
ty/security properties, including termination-insensitive information flow secu-
rity. In more detail, the combination of data type a and security class public can
be expressed as type eq a = x : a {|L x = R x|}, with the literal interpretation
“x has type a, and is subject to the constraint that it has the same value in a
related pair of executions”. Their relational types take the flavor of the relation
Hoare logic of [ADZ+12], and refinement types can be understood as a fragment
of dependent types (such as those of [LC15]) amenable to automation; hence it
is likely that their technique can apply to content-dependent information flow,
although no example is provided in this direction.
Our CA-bisimulation does not universally quantify over states, but rather
carries the states along with the executions. This has the flavor of the “flat bisim-
ulation” considered in [Dam06] that further goes back to [BC02] in the setting of
shared memory. “Flat bisimulations” do not give rise to a compositional notion
of security when shared-memory is used, since memory modifications by other
concurrent processes are not captured. Mantel et al recovers compositionality
in the same setting by requiring the bisimulation relation to be “closed under
globally consistent changes” [MSS11].
Known formalizations of information flow type systems include Barthe and
Nieto’s formalization [BN04] of Boudol and Castellani’s work [BC02] in Is-
abelle [IPA], a type system for Java bytecode by Barthe et al [BPR07] formalized
in Coq, and a series of other formalizations [GLMS14a, GLMS14b, GMS14] by
Grewe et al, performed in Isabelle.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that noninterference properties and information flow
analyses can support fine-grained policies, for concurrent, communicating sys-
tems.
First of all, the presence of communication actions and their content can be
treated as separate dimensions. Moreover, all combinations of sensitivity levels
in the two dimensions are practically meaningful for integrity. These combina-
tions are interpreted using a notion of δ-security where δ is the strategy of the
environment. When no mixed combination is in use, δALL-security degenerates
to the classical condition SBNDC, where δALL is the most powerful (aggressive)
environment. A compositionality result is also given about δALL-security, to
facilitate structural security analysis of concurrent systems.
Second of all, the security levels of variables and channels can be adjusted
according to different contents of the memory and communications. A compo-
sitional notion of CA-security is proposed, taking into consideration both the
presence and content of communications and content-dependent policies. It is
shown that the CA-security of a system implies its security under deterministic
schedulers whose behaviors can only be affected by their public observation. A
security type system sound with respect to CA-security is devised, incorporat-
ing a Hoare logic component that provides approximative information about
the local memory contents at different program points. The compositionality of
CA-security, and the safety and soundness of the type system, are verified using
the Coq proof assistant.
The benefits of the development on concurrent program security are two
fold: the policies are more expressive/informative and the analysis can be made
more permissive/precise. This is demonstrated by the security of a multiplexer
pattern (a recurring pattern in the MILS security architecture) that separates
traffics at two different protection levels. The presence integrity of the communi-
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cations can be easily corrupted, while the content integrity of the traffics at the
sources and sinks still enjoy a clear correspondence. When the pattern is decom-
posed into a multiplexer and a demultiplexer sharing a communication channel,
the content-dependent policy of the shared channel gives out rich information
on the correspondence between the protection level of the messages and their
tagging. This enables the modular typing of the multiplexer and demultiplexer
processes in our Hoare logic equipped security type system.
6.1 Discussion, and Future Work
Relativity of Two-run Security Our bisimulation-based security proper-
ties belong to the so-called class of “two-run security” (e.g., [vDHS15]). When
the only security classes are H and L, each interpreted relative to the other,
this two-run perspective is fairly sensible. However, in a principal-based label
model (e.g., DLM [ML97]), two-run security mandates that the principals al-
lowed as readers/writers in different labels are properly related to each other,
without requiring directly that each reader/writer is indeed an (explicit or im-
plicit) reader/writer. Take for example the simple assignment x := y, and a
label model where each label is the set of allowed readers. Suppose the label of
x is {A}, and the label of y is {A,B}. This assignment is typically considered
secure. The intuition is the flow from y to x does not result in more principals
than A and B (in the label of the source) to learn the information in y. The
explanation in terms of two-run security is: {A} indicates higher confidentiality
than {A,B} does — {A} can be thought of as H and {A,B} as L, and variation
in the H-variable x certainly does not cause any variation in the L-variable y
through the assignment (in fact the opposite is the case). However, two-run
security does not really say that A is (resp. A and B are) the only allowed
reader for x (resp. readers for y), since it is not broken by labeling x instead
with {A, pl} and labeling y instead with {A,B, pl} where pl is an arbitrary list
of principals. Likewise, two-run security does not really distinguish whether
a label like this represents the set of readers, or the set of non-writers. This
problem is spotted in [NNL15a]: with the use of principal-based labels, two-run
security only demands the absence of ill-dependency — the same core shared
between both confidentiality and integrity. This can lead to the thinking that
confidentiality and integrity are the same, which is not always desirable.
Relation with Fault-Tolerance In fault tolerance, failures of a system can
be divided in two classes: stopping failures and byzantine failures. A system
admitting stopping failures can either stop functioning or function flawlessly,
whereas a system admitting byzantine failures can function arbitrarily (e.g.,
[Lyn96]). Concerning the provision of data on channels, stopping failures thus
correspond to either the suspension of data or the provision of correct data. On
the other hand, byzantine failures correspond to the suspension or corruption of
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data. In the sense above there is thus some connection between stopping failures
and channels with LH-integrity, and between byzantine failures and channels
with LL-integrity.
Refinement The preservation of security under refinement [DNH84, AH89]
is an important issue for process calculi [Ros95, BFPR03b] and event-based
systems [Man01, vdM12, VDMZ13]. We have only shown that our notion of
δ-security is preserved under the restriction of environment strategies that is
in a sense “horizontal refinement” [RG01, BPR04] of the environment. But the
the problem of dealing with the refinement of the system specification is not
addressed. However, this does not defeat the purpose of the security condition
proposed in Chapter 4, and the relevant issues about it studied there, since the
modeling of systems, in itself, can already uncover places where information
leakage/corruption can happen (e.g., [KT09]). Moreover, when dealing with
concurrent programming languages involving communication, the problem of
distinguishing between the presence and content of communication recurs, and
can be studied similarly. Nonetheless, identifying the conditions/operators un-
der which δ-security is preserved under refinement is an important issue, which
we leave for future work.
Nondeterminism Our language used in Chapter 5 does not have an operator
for non-deterministic choice. Introducing nondeterministic choice, however, is
not completely trivial, since the compositionality proof of CA-security leverages
intra-thread determinacy on the use of channels and polarities. We leave further
study on the impact of nondeterministic/probabilistic choice to future work.
Probabilistic Schedulers For multithreaded programs, the scheduling prob-
lem is an important and active area of research in its own [SS00, Sab03, MZ08,
MS10, BRRS10, PHN13, VDMZ13]. It is interesting to investigate the use of
probabilistic strategies and schedulers to express our top-level notion of content-
dependent security. Analogous to the use of non-deterministic strategies in
Chapter 4, we could use probabilistic strategies to capture the variations on the
channels over which the environment is ready to interact with the system, as
well as on the potential contents that the environment can potentially provide
to the system. Going beyond the use of deterministic schedulers in Chapter 5,
the use of probabilistic schedulers would enable us to frame our property as:
1. the resulting distributions over the potential public memories reached
(resp. contents of communications performed) are the same after (resp.
within) the next steps of the related pair of executions, and
2. the distributions over the channels with public presence levels over which
communications can be performed are the same in the next steps of the
related pair of executions.
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Presence-Dependency Consider the following process where the subscripts
are integrity levels. The input over cLH is of high content integrity but with
weaker guarantee in its presence; thus when it cannot happen in time, the other
input over cHL with opposite guarantees will be effective. The channel c′HL
has L for its content integrity since it is shared between two outputs, one of
low content integrity. However, it is desirable to allow finer-grained typing on
the content of the output channel. In the sense of flow-sensitivity, the output
content is of low integrity if and only if it is performed from the second branch.
But a more directly intuitive viewpoint is that of presence-dependency — the
content of the output is of low integrity if and only if the input over cLH has
been absent.
&2(cLH?x1, cHL?x2).
case x1 of some(y1) : c
′
HL!y1
else case x2 of some(y2) : c
′
HL!y2
else 0
We leave it to future work to address this problem, in a language equipped with
binders like those in the quality calculus.
Certified Type Checker The type system of Section 5.5 has been imple-
mented from scratch in the OCaml language, rather than extracted from its
specification in Coq. The main obstacles have been twofold:
1. Our specification in Coq is declarative, rather than computational, which
has led to more conciseness but less amenability to program extraction.
2. Type checking needs to interface with an external solver, and it would be
desirable to re-certify the computation performed by the solver in Coq.
Concerning the first issue, it is desirable to specify a type checking algorithm
in the computational fragment of Coq and formally prove that it is sound with
respect to the current specification. Concerning the second, an integration of
Coq with SMT solving that supports the checking of external certificates is
SMTCoq [AFG+11]. An alternative possibility is to implement the automation
required by the type checker directly inside Coq, which is expected to be more
difficult. We leave it to future work to explore these directions.
Asynchronous Communication Another line of future work is dealing with
asynchronous communication, which is meaningful for distributed systems. The
use of message queues (e.g., [HYC08]) or pattern matching (e.g., [DNFP98]) will
be expected in the semantics. The treatment of presence and content of two
well-defined aspects of communication will still be an enabler of finer-grained
security definition and enforcement.
Probabilistic, Timing Channels In process algebraic-security, an existing
line of research deals with probabilistic, timing channels (e.g., [Ald01, FGM00])
in process calculi with probabilistic choices and actions corresponding to the
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ticks of clocks. In language-based security, recent research addresses low-level
external timing channels such as those through cache behaviors [ZAM11]. The
endeavors made in this thesis are, however, not along these directions.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 4
Lemma A.1 The following statements hold for all sequences pi of abstract
binders without holes.
1. b c!c
′
−→ b′ if and only if 〈b, pi4c?[ ]〉 c!c
′
−→ 〈b′, pi.c?c′4〉
2. b c?c
′
−→ b′ if and only if 〈b, pi4c!c′〉 c?c
′
−→ 〈b′, pi.c!c′4〉
Proof. The proof is by a straightforward induction on the semantic derivations.

Lemma A.2 The following statements hold for all sequences pi of abstract
binders without holes.
1. P c!c
′
−→ P ′ if and only if 〈P, pi4c?[ ]〉 c!c
′
−→ 〈P ′, pi.c?c′4〉
2. P c?c
′
−→ P ′ if and only if 〈P, pi4c!c′〉 c?c
′
−→ 〈P ′, pi.c!c′4〉
3. P τ−→ P ′ if and only if 〈P, pi〉 τ−→ 〈P ′, pi〉
Proof. The proof by a straightforward induction on the semantic derivations,
and use of Lemma A.1. 
Lemma A.3 If δ ` 〈P, pi〉 τ−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉, then pi′ = pi, and for all pi1, there
exists pi′1 such that δ ` 〈P, pi1〉 τ−→ 〈P ′, pi′1〉.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward by induction on the derivation of δ `
〈P, pi〉 τ−→ 〈P ′, pi′〉. 
Lemma A.4 If δ ` 〈P, pi〉 τ
n
=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′〉, then pi′ = pi, and for all pi1, there
exists pi′1 such that δ ` 〈P, pi1〉 τ
n
=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′1〉.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n.
• If n = 0 then P ′ = P . Hence there exists pi′1 = pi1 such that δ ` 〈P, pi1〉 =⇒
〈P, pi′1〉 holds.
• We prove the case n = k assuming the statement holds with n = k − 1.
We have δ ` 〈P, pi1〉 τ−→ 〈P ′′, pi′′〉 and δ ` 〈P ′′, pi′′〉 τ
k−1
=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′1〉.
Pick arbitrary pi′′1 . By IH, pi′ = pi′′ and there exists pi′′′1 , such that δ `
〈P ′′, pi′′1 〉 τ
k−1
=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′′′1 〉. Still by IH, we have pi′′′1 = pi′′1 . By Lemma A.3,
we have δ ` 〈P, pi′′1 〉 τ−→ 〈P ′′, pi′′1 〉. Therefore we have δ ` 〈P, pi′′1 〉 τ
k
=⇒
〈P ′, pi′′′1 〉.
This completes the proof. 
We next restate Lemma 4.1 and give its proof.
Lemma 4.1 For all processes P , P ′, actions α1, α2, ..., and αn such that
there is at most one i ∈ {1, ..., n} for which αi 6= τ , and ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} : αi 6= ,
histories pi such that pi = [pi]4, and pi0 such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} : αi 6= τ ⇒ pi0 =
pi.α˜i, the following are equivalent:
1. P α1...αn=⇒ P ′, and
2. δALL ` 〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉 ∧ ∃pi′0 : δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉.
Proof.
1⇒ 2 We proceed with an induction on the length n of the transition sequence
P
α1...αn=⇒ P ′.
– If n = 0, then P = P ′. We have δALL ` 〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉 and there
exists pi′0 = pi0 such that δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 =⇒ 〈P, pi′0〉.
– We next show 1 ⇒ 2 with n = k (k ≥ 1) assuming that it holds
with n = k − 1. We have P α1−→ P ′′ and P ′′ α2...αn=⇒ P ′, where the
latter transition sequence has length k−1. By the induction hypoth-
esis, there exists some pi′0 such that δALL ` 〈P ′′, pi〉 env−→ 〈P ′′, pi0〉
and δALL ` 〈P ′′, pi0〉 α2...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉. Hence we also have δALL `
〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉.
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∗ α1 = τ . By Lemma A.2, we have δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1−→ 〈P ′′, pi0〉.
We therefore have δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉.
∗ α1 6= τ . By Lemma A.2, there exists pi′′0 such that δALL `
〈P, pi0〉 α1−→ 〈P ′′, pi′′0 〉. We know from the precondition that
∀j ≥ 2 : aj = τ . By Lemma A.4, we have δALL ` 〈P ′′, pi′′0 〉 α2...αn=⇒
〈P ′, pi′′0 〉. We therefore have δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′′0 〉.
2⇒ 1 We proceed with an induction on the length n of the transition sequence
δALL ` 〈P, pi0〉 α1...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉.
– If n = 0, then 〈P, pi0〉 = 〈P ′, pi′0〉. Hence P ′ = P and we do have
P

=⇒ P .
– We next show 2⇒ 1 with n = k (k ≥ 1) assuming that it holds with
n = k − 1. There exists pi′0 such that 〈P, pi0〉 α1−→ 〈P ′′, pi′′0 〉, and
〈P ′′, pi′′0 〉 α2...αn=⇒ 〈P ′, pi′0〉, where the latter transition sequence has
length k−1. From 〈P, pi〉 env−→ 〈P, pi0〉 we know 〈P ′′, pi〉 env−→ 〈P ′′, pi′′0 〉.
By the induction hypothesis, we have P ′′ α2...αn=⇒ P ′. By Lemma A.2,
we have P α1−→ P ′′. Hence we have P α1...αn=⇒ P ′.
This completes the proof. 
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Lemma A.5 If for all c ∈ Ch, neither pi1 nor pi2 contains any c?[ ], then
pi1 WE pi2 ⇐⇒ pi2 WE pi1.
Proof. Trivial. 
Theorem 4.18 Suppose {~c′}∩Dt = ∅, SecδALL(P1), and SecδALL(P2). Then we
have SecδALL((ν~c′)(P1|P2)), provided
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, cLH ∈ Ch : (cLH , ρ1) ∈ rch(Pi) ∧ (cLH , ρ2) ∈ rch(P3−i)
⇒ ρ1 6= ρ2 ∧ det(Pi, cLH) ∧ cLH ∈ {~c′}.
Proof. Let pi be the order-preserving sequence of all actions in pi with all
the polarities ρ changed to ρ˜. For convenience we rename the P1 and P2 in the
precondition of Theorem 4.18 into P ◦1 and P ◦2 , and the vector ~c′ into ~c◦.
Construct the binary relation R as:
R = {(〈P1, pi1〉, 〈P2, pi2〉) | ∃P11, P12, P21, P22, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22 :
ψ(P1, P2, P11, P12, P21, P22, pi1, pi2, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22)},
where ψ(P1, P2, P11, P12, P21, P22, pi1, pi2, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22) is the conjunction of
the following clauses:
∀i ∈ {1, 2} : Pi ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P1i|P2i) (A.1)
∀j, i ∈ {1, 2} : ∃pi′ : δALL ` 〈P ◦j , 4〉 −→∗ 〈Pji, pi′〉 (A.2)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} : 〈Pj1, pij1〉 ∼
δALL
〈Pj2, pij2〉 (A.3)
knlE(pi1, pi2) (A.4)
∀j ∈ {1, 2} : knlE(pij1, pij2) (A.5)
∀c s.t. E◦(c) = L ∧ E•(c) = H : ∀i ∈ {1, 2} : (A.6)
((∃ρ : (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P1) ∧ (c, ρ˜) 6∈ rch(P2))⇒ pii ↓ c = pi1i ↓ c ∧ pi2i ↓ c = ) ∧
((∃ρ : (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P2) ∧ (c, ρ˜) 6∈ rch(P1))⇒ pii ↓ c = pi2i ↓ c ∧ pi1i ↓ c = ) ∧
((∃ρ : (c, ρ) ∈ rch(P1) ∧ (c, ρ˜) ∈ rch(P2))⇒ pi2i ↓ c = pi1i ↓ c ∧ pii ↓ c = )
We show thatR qualifies as a δALL-bisimulation. Then SecδALL((ν ~c◦)(P ◦1 |P ◦2 ))
will follow, since it holds that
ψ((ν ~c◦)(P ◦1 |P ◦2 ), (ν ~c◦)(P ◦1 |P ◦2 ), P ◦1 , P ◦1 , P ◦2 , P ◦2 , 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4),
and we thus have 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ◦1 |P ◦2 ), 4〉 R 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ◦1 |P ◦2 ), 4〉.
Take arbitrary (〈P1, pi1〉, 〈P2, pi2〉) ∈ R, α, P ′1, pi′1 and pi20 such that there
exists pi10,
δALL ` 〈P1, pi1〉 env−→ 〈P1, pi10〉
δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 α−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉 (A.7)
δALL ` 〈P2, pi2〉 env−→ 〈P2, pi20〉 (A.8)
pi′1 WE pi20 (A.9)
111
We distinguish between several cases for the transition (A.7) above.
1. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 c1ρc
′
−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, for some c1, ρ, c′,
where P ′1 ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P ′11|P21) for some P ′11. That is to say, (A.7) is built on
top of a local transition from P11. Ite must be the case that pi′1 = pi1.c1ρ˜c′4,
and there exists the following transition
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11〉 env,c1ρc
′
−→ 〈P ′11, pi11.cρ˜c′4〉 (A.10)
(a) E◦(c) = H. By (A.4) and (A.9), pi20 = pi2.c1ρ˜c′′ for some c′′ (which
can be [ ]). By (A.5), it holds that pi11.c1ρ˜c′4 WE pi12.c1ρ˜c
′′. By (A.3)
and (A.10), there exists
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.c1ρ˜c′′〉
̂c1ρc′′′=⇒ 〈P ′12, pi12.c1ρ˜c′′′4〉 (A.11)
for some c′′′ such that
〈P ′11, pi11.c1ρ˜c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′12, pi12.c1ρ˜c′′′4〉,
and
knlE(pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.c1ρ˜c
′′′
4).
It is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, (ν ~c◦)(P
′
12|P22), P ′11, P ′12, P21, P22,
pi1.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi2.c1ρ˜c
′′′
4, pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.c1ρ˜c
′′′
4, pi21, pi22).
By (A.1), transition (A.7), and α = c1ρc′, we have c1 6∈ {~c◦}. Since
c′′′ ∈ Dt by (A.11), we have c′′′ 6∈ {~c◦}. Therefore transition (A.7)
can be simulated by the following transition in R:
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉
̂c1ρc′′′=⇒ 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ′12|P22), pi2.c1ρ˜c′′′4〉.
(b) E◦(c) = L. In this case pi20 = pi2.α′ where α′ = c2ρ˜′c′′ for some c2, ρ′
and c′′ (which can be [ ]), or α′ = . By (A.9), E◦(c2) = L.
i. Suppose 〈P2, pi20〉 can perform a communication (output or in-
put). Then either 〈P12, pi20〉 or 〈P22, pi20〉 can perform the com-
munication.
A. δALL ` 〈P12, pi20〉 c2ρ
′c′′′−→ 〈P ′12, pi2.c2ρ˜′c′′′4〉 for some P ′12 and
c′′′. Using (A.2), (A.5), (A.6) and (A.9) we can deduce
pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4 WE pi12.c2ρ˜′c
′′.
By (A.3), the transition (A.10) can be simulated locally by
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.c2ρ′c′′〉 c2ρ
′c′2−→ 〈P ′′12, pi12.c2ρ˜′c′24〉 (A.12)
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for some c′2 and P ′′12, resulting in
〈P ′11, pi11.c1ρ˜c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′′12, pi12.c2ρ˜′c′24〉,
and
knlE(pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.c2ρ˜′c
′
24).
Using (A.2), (A.4), (A.6), and the precondition of this the-
orem, we can deduce knlE(pi1.c1ρ˜c′4, pi2.c2ρ˜′c
′
24). On this
basis, it is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, (ν ~c◦)(P
′′
12|P22), P ′11, P ′′12, P21, P22,
pi1.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi2.c2ρ˜′c
′
24, pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.c2ρ˜′c
′
24, pi21, pi22).
Since α′ = c2ρ˜′c′′, 〈P2, pi2.α′〉 can perform output/input over
c2. By (A.1) we have c2 6∈ {~c◦}. In addition, since c′2 ∈ Dt
by (A.12), we have c′2 6∈ {~c◦}. Hence the transition (A.7) can
be simulated by the following transition in R:
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 c2ρ
′c′2−→ 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ′′12|P22), pi2.c2ρ˜′c′24〉.
B. δALL ` 〈P22, pi20〉 c2ρ
′c′′′−→ 〈P ′22, pi2.c2ρ˜′c′′′4〉 for some P ′22 and
c′′′. We have the transition
δALL ` 〈P22, pi22〉 env,c2ρ
′c′′′−→ 〈P ′22, pi22.c2ρ˜′c′′′4〉. (A.13)
Using (A.2), (A.5), (A.6) and (A.9) we can deduce
pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4 WE pi12., (A.14)
and
pi22.c2ρ˜′c
′′′
4 WE pi21., (A.15)
since c′′′ 6= [ ].
By (A.3) and (A.14), the transition (A.10) can be simulated
by
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.〉 −→ 〈P12, pi12.4〉,
with
〈P ′11, pi11.c1ρ˜c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P12, pi12.4〉,
and
knlE(pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.4).
By (A.3), the symmetry of ∼
δALL
, and (A.15), the transition
(A.13) can be simulated by
δALL ` 〈P21, pi21.〉 −→ 〈P21, pi21.4〉,
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with
〈P21, pi21.4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′22, pi22.c2ρ˜′c′′′4〉,
and
knlE(pi21.4, pi22.c2ρ˜′c′′′4).
Using (A.2), (A.4), (A.6), and the precondition of this theo-
rem, we can deduce knlE(pi1.c1ρ˜c′4, pi2.c2ρ˜′c
′′′
4). On this basis,
it is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, (ν ~c◦)(P12|P ′22), P ′11, P12, P21, P ′22,
pi1.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi2.c2ρ˜′c
′′′
4, pi11.c1ρ˜c
′
4, pi12.4, pi21.4, pi22.c2ρ˜′c′′′4).
Since α′ = c2ρ˜′c′′, 〈P2, pi2.α′〉 can perform output/input
over c2. By (A.1) we have c2 6∈ {~c◦}. By (A.13) we have
c′′′ ∈ Dt; hence c′′′ 6∈ {~c◦}. Hence the transition (A.7) can
be simulated by the following transition in R:
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 c2ρ
′c′′′−→ 〈(ν ~c◦)(P12|P ′22), pi2.c2ρ˜′c′′′4〉.
ii. Suppose 〈P2, pi20〉 cannot perform any communication (output/in-
put). We have pi11.c1ρ˜c′4 WE pi12.. By (A.5), transition (A.10)
can be simulated by
〈P12, pi12.〉 −→ 〈P12, pi12.4〉,
with pi11.c1ρc′4 WE pi12.4, and
〈P ′11, pi11.c1ρc′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P12, pi12.4〉.
On this basis, we can deduce that knlE(pi1.c1ρc′4, pi2.4), and
ψ(P ′1, P2, P
′
11, P12, P21, P22,
pi1.cρ˜c
′
4, pi2.4, pi11.c1ρ˜c′4, pi12.4, pi21, pi22).
Hence the transition (A.7) can be simulated by the following
transition in R:
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 −→ 〈P2, pi2.4〉.
2. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 c1ρc
′
−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, for some c1, ρ, c′,
where P ′1 ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P11|P ′21) for some P ′21. That is to say, (A.7) is built on
top of a local transition from P21. The reasoning needed is analogous to
that of case 1.
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3. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, for some c1, ρ, c′,
where P ′1 ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P ′11|P21) for some P ′11. That is to say, (A.7) is built on
top of a local τ -step from P11. Since  ∈ δALL(pi11), We also have
〈P11, pi11〉 env,τ−→ 〈P ′11, pi11.〉. (A.16)
From (A.5) we have pi11.WE pi12.. Thus by (A.3), the transition (A.16)
can be simulated locally by
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.〉 τ̂=⇒ 〈P ′12, pi12.〉
for some P ′12, with 〈P ′11, pi11〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′12, pi12〉 and knlE(pi11, pi12).
It is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, (ν ~c◦)(P
′
12|P22), P ′11, P ′12, P21, P22, pi1, pi2, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22).
Hence the transition (A.7) can be simulated by the following transition in
R:
〈P2, pi20〉 τ̂=⇒ 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ′12|P22), pi20〉.
4. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, for some c1, ρ, c′,
where P ′1 ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P11|P ′21) for some P ′21. That is to say, (A.7) is built on
top of a local τ -step from P21. The reasoning is similar to that of case 3.
5. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, for some c1, ρ,
c′, where P ′1 ≡ (ν ~c◦)(P ′11|P ′21) for some P ′11 and P ′21, i.e., the transition is
produced by communication between P11 and P12.
Without loss of generality, suppose
δALL ` 〈P11, 4c?[ ]〉 c!c
′−→ 〈P ′11, c?c′4〉 (A.17)
δALL ` 〈P21, 4c!c′〉 c?c
′−→ 〈P ′21, c!c′4〉 (A.18)
Thus there exists the following transitions:
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11〉 env,c!c
′
−→ 〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′4〉 (A.19)
δALL ` 〈P21, pi21〉 env,c?c
′
−→ 〈P ′21, pi21.c!c′4〉 (A.20)
We distinguish between two cases: E◦(c) = H and E◦(c) = L.
(a) E◦(c) = H.
By (A.5) we have pi11.c?c′4 WE pi12.c?[ ]. We also have δALL `
〈P12, pi12〉 env−→ 〈P12, pi12.c?[ ]〉. By (A.3) and transition (A.19), there
exists P ′12 and c′′ (E•(c) = H ⇒ c′′ = c′) such that
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.c?[ ]〉 ĉ!c
′′
=⇒ 〈P ′12, pi12.c?c′′4〉,
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with 〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′12, pi12.c?c′′4〉 and pi11.c?c′4 WE pi12.c?c′′4.
By (A.5), we have pi21.c!c′4 WE pi22.c!c
′′. We also have δALL `
〈P22, pi22〉 env−→ 〈P22, pi22.c!c′′〉. By (A.3) and transition (A.20), there
exists P ′22 such that
δALL ` 〈P22, pi22.c!c′′〉 ĉ?c
′′
=⇒ 〈P ′22, pi22.c!c′′4〉,
with 〈P ′21, pi21.c!c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′22, pi22.c!c′′4〉 and pi21.c!c′4 WE pi22.c!c′′4.
It is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, (ν ~c◦)(P
′
21|P ′22), P ′11, P ′12, P ′21, P ′22,
pi1, pi2, pi11.c?c
′
4, pi12.c?c
′′
4, pi21.c!c
′′
4, pi22.c!c
′′
4).
Hence the transition (A.7) can be simulated by the following transi-
tion sequence in R:
δALL ` 〈P2, pi20〉 τ̂=⇒ 〈(ν ~c◦)(P ′12|P ′22), pi20〉.
(b) E◦(c) = L.
i. E•(c) = L. By (A.5), we have pi11.c?c′4 WE pi12.. We also have
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12〉 env−→ 〈P12, pi12.〉.
By (A.3), transition (A.19) can be simulated by
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.〉 −→ 〈P12, pi12.4〉,
with 〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P12, pi12.4〉 and pi11.c?c′4WE pi12.4.
For similar reasons transition (A.20) can be simulated by
δALL ` 〈P22, pi22.〉 −→ 〈P22, pi22.4〉,
with 〈P ′21, pi21.c!c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P22, pi22.4〉, and pi21.c!c′4WE pi22.4.
It is not difficult to verify:
ψ(P ′1, P2, P
′
11, P12, P
′
21, P22, pi1, pi2, pi11.c?c
′
4, pi12.4, pi21.c!c′4, pi22.4).
Thus transition (A.7) can be simulated by 0-step (in τ∗) from
〈P2, pi20〉.
ii. E•(c) = H.
By (A.3), and the symmetry of ∼
δALL
, we have
〈P12, pi12〉 ∼
δALL
〈P11, pi11〉.
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By E◦(c) = L and (A.5), we have
pi12.4 WE pi11.c?[ ].
We also have the transition
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12〉 env,−→ 〈P12, pi12.4〉.
Hence there exists some c′′ and P ′11 such that
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11.c?[ ]〉 c!c
′′−→ 〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′′4〉, (A.21)
with 〈P12, pi12.4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′′4〉 and pi12.4WE pi11.c?c′′4.
By the symmetry of ∼
δALL
, we have
〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P12, pi12.4〉.
By Lemma A.5, we have
pi11.c?c
′′
4 WE pi12.4.
By det(P ◦1 , c), (A.19), (A.21) and (A.2), we have c′ = c′′, which
gives
pi11.c?c
′
4 WE pi12.. (A.22)
We also have the following transition based on transition (A.21):
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11〉 env,c!c
′
−→ 〈P ′11, pi11.c?c′4〉.
The transition (A.19) can thus be simulated by
δALL ` 〈P12, pi12.〉 −→ 〈P12, pi12.4〉.
From (A.17), (A.18) and (A.2), we know that (c, !) ∈ rch(P ◦1 )
and (c, ?) ∈ rch(P ◦2 ). Hence by (A.5), (A.6) and (A.22), we have
pi21.c!c
′
4 WE pi22..
By (A.3), the transition (A.20) can be simulated by
δALL ` 〈P22, pi22.〉 −→ 〈P22, pi22.4〉,
with 〈P ′21, pi21.c!c′4〉 ∼
δALL
〈P22, pi22.4〉, and pi21.c!c′4WE pi22.4.
It can now be verified that
ψ(P ′1, P2, P
′
11, P12, P
′
21, P22, pi1, pi2, pi11.c?c
′
4, pi12.4, pi21.c!c′4, pi22.4).
Hence the transition (A.7) can be simulated by zero-step (in τ∗)
from 〈P2, pi20〉.
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6. The transition (A.7) is δALL ` 〈P1, pi10〉 −→ 〈P ′1, pi′1〉, where P ′1 ≡ P1.
By (A.9) we know that pi20 = pi2.c2ρ˜′c′′ with some c2 such that E◦(c2) = L,
and some ρ′ and c′′, or pi20 = pi2..
We have
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11〉 env−→ 〈P11, pi11.〉
δALL ` 〈P21, pi21〉 env−→ 〈P21, pi21.〉
As in Case (1b), we distinguish between a few cases about the action that
can be performed from 〈P2, pi20〉. The reasoning in each case is similar to
that of Case (1b). The symmetry of ∼
δALL
needs to be exploited and “local
simulations” by
δALL ` 〈P11, pi11.〉 −→ 〈P11, pi11.4〉,
and
δALL ` 〈P21, pi21.〉 −→ 〈P21, pi21.4〉
will be used. We do not cover further details.
The discussion above completes the proof. 
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Appendix B
Outline of Coq Proofs for
Chapter 5
B.1 Library Language
Require Export Utils.
Inductive aexp : Type :=
| ANum : nat → aexp
| AId : id → aexp
| APlus : aexp → aexp → aexp
| AMinus : aexp → aexp → aexp
| AMult : aexp → aexp → aexp.
Tactic Notation "aexp cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "ANum" | Case aux c "AId" | Case aux c "APlus"
| Case aux c "AMinus" | Case aux c "AMult" ].
Definition var set : Type := Ensemble id.
Fixpoint fva (a : aexp) : var set :=
match a with
| ANum n ⇒ Empty set id
| AId x ⇒ Singleton id x
| APlus a1 a2 ⇒ Union id (fva a1 ) (fva a2 )
| AMinus a1 a2 ⇒ Union id (fva a1 ) (fva a2 )
| AMult a1 a2 ⇒ Union id (fva a1 ) (fva a2 )
end.
Inductive bexp : Type :=
| BTrue : bexp
| BFalse : bexp
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| BEq : aexp → aexp → bexp
| BLe : aexp → aexp → bexp
| BNot : bexp → bexp
| BAnd : bexp → bexp → bexp.
Tactic Notation "bexp cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "BTrue" | Case aux c "BFalse" | Case aux c "BEq"
| Case aux c "BLe" | Case aux c "BNot" | Case aux c "BAnd" ].
Fixpoint fvb (b : bexp) : var set :=
match b with
| BTrue ⇒ Empty set id
| BFalse ⇒ Empty set id
| BEq a1 a2 ⇒ Union id (fva a1 ) (fva a2 )
| BLe a1 a2 ⇒ Union id (fva a1 ) (fva a2 )
| BNot b ⇒ fvb b
| BAnd b1 b2 ⇒ Union id (fvb b1 ) (fvb b2 )
end.
Definition block : Type := var set.
Inductive pch : Type :=
| PChan : nat → pch.
Definition pch def := PChan 0.
Definition pch set : Type := Ensemble pch.
Inductive ch : Type :=
| Chan : pch → nat → ch.
Inductive com : Type :=
| CSkip : com
| CNil : com
| CAss : id → aexp → com
| COut : pch → list aexp → com
| CIn : pch → list id → com
| CSeq : com → com → com
| CIf : bexp → com → com → com
| CWhile : bexp → com → com.
Tactic Notation "com cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "SKIP" | Case aux c "STOP"
| Case aux c "::=" | Case aux c "!" | Case aux c "?"
| Case aux c ";;" | Case aux c "IF" | Case aux c "WHILE" ].
Notation "’SKIP’" :=
(CSkip) (at level 60).
Notation "’NIL’" :=
(CNil) (at level 60).
Notation "x ’::=’ a" :=
(CAss x a) (at level 60).
Notation "c ’ !’ al" :=
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(COut c al) (at level 60).
Notation "c ’??’ xl" :=
(CIn c xl) (at level 60).
Notation "S1 ;; S2" :=
(CSeq S1 S2 ) (at level 80, right associativity).
Notation "’WHILE’ b ’DO’ S ’END’" :=
(CWhile b S) (at level 80, right associativity).
Notation "’IIF’ b ’THEN’ S1 ’ELSE’ S2 ’FII’" :=
(CIf b S1 S2 ) (at level 80, right associativity).
Fixpoint get vars (S : com) : var set :=
match S with
| CSkip ⇒ Empty set
| CNil ⇒ Empty set
| CAss x a ⇒ Singleton x |U| (fva a)
| COut c al ⇒ Union n (map fva al)
| CIn cl xl ⇒ Union n (map (Singleton ) xl)
| CSeq S1 S2 ⇒ (get vars S1) |U| (get vars S2)
| CWhile b S’ ⇒ (fvb b) |U| (get vars S’)
| CIf b S1 S2 ⇒ (fvb b) |U| (get vars S1 |U| get vars S2)
end.
Lemma nil not nil :
∀ (S : com), S = NIL ∨ S 6= NIL.
Definition pid : Type := nat.
Definition var thread t : Type := id → pid.
Inductive Sys : Type :=
| SysProc : pid → com → Sys
| SysPar : Sys → Sys → Sys
| SysRes : Sys → Ensemble pch → Sys.
Notation "i ’:’ S" :=
(SysProc i S) (at level 70).
Notation "sys1 ’|P|’ sys2" :=
(SysPar sys1 sys2 ) (at level 80).
Notation "sys ’\’ Omg" :=
(SysRes sys Omg) (at level 75).
Tactic Notation "sys cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "PROC" | Case aux c "PAR" | Case aux c "RES" ].
Fixpoint get pchs (S : com) : pch set :=
match S with
| CSkip ⇒ Empty set
| CNil ⇒ Empty set
| CAss x a ⇒ Empty set
| COut c al ⇒ Singleton c
| CIn c xl ⇒ Singleton c
| CSeq S1 S2 ⇒ (get pchs S1) |U| (get pchs S2)
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| CWhile b S’ ⇒ get pchs S’
| CIf b S1 S2 ⇒ (get pchs S1) |U| (get pchs S2)
end.
Fixpoint get pids (sys: Sys) :=
match sys with
| SysProc j ⇒ [j]
| SysPar sys1 sys2 ⇒ get pids sys1 ++ get pids sys2
| SysRes sys ⇒ get pids sys
end.
Lemma pid in par :
∀ sys1 sys2 i,
(List.In i (get pids sys1 ) ∨ List.In i (get pids sys2 )) →
(List.In i (get pids (sys1 |P| sys2 ))).
Hint Resolve pid in par.
Fixpoint in list
(A: Type) (dec: ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2})
(e: A) (l : list A) : bool :=
match l with
| nil ⇒ false
| h :: t ⇒ if (dec h e) then true else in list dec e t
end.
Lemma bool prop :
∀ (A:Type) (dec: ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2}) (a:A) lst,
List.In a lst → in list dec a lst = true.
Lemma prop bool :
∀ (A:Type) (a:A) (dec: ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2}) lst,
¬ List.In a lst → in list dec a lst = false.
Lemma prop bool’ :
∀ (A:Type) (a:A) (dec: ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2}) lst,
in list dec a lst = true → List.In a lst.
Hint Resolve prop bool’.
Theorem eq pid dec : ∀ i j : pid, {i = j} + {i 6= j}.
Fixpoint get com (sys: Sys) i :=
match sys with
| SysProc SS ⇒ SS
| SysPar sys1 sys2 ⇒
if (in list eq pid dec i (get pids sys1 ))
then get com sys1 i
else get com sys2 i
| SysRes sys’ Omg ⇒ get com sys’ i
end.
Eval compute in (get com (1:SKIP |P| 2:((Id 1)::=ANum 0)) 2).
Fixpoint common
(A:Type) (dec: ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2}) (l1 l2 : list A) : bool
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:=
match l1 with
| nil ⇒ false
| h :: t ⇒ (in list dec h l2) || (common dec t l2)
end.
Inductive wf : Sys → Prop :=
| WF Sys One : ∀ i SS, wf (i:SS)
| WF Sys Par :
∀ sys1 sys2,
wf sys1 → wf sys2 →
(common eq pid dec (get pids sys1 ) (get pids sys2 ) = false) →
wf (sys1 |P| sys2 )
| WF Sys Res : ∀ sys’ Omg, wf sys’ → wf (sys’\Omg)
.
B.2 Library Semantics
Require Export Language.
Variable U : Type.
Section Mappings.
Variable A: Type.
Definition Dec (A : Type) := ∀ a1 a2 : A, {a1=a2} + {a1 6=a2}.
Variable dec : Dec A.
Definition Sub (il : list pid) := (sig (fun i :pid ⇒ List.In i il)).
Record Mapping (A B :Type) (dec A : Dec A) :=
mkMapping {
il: list A;
mp: A→B
}.
Definition map def B (b def : B) := mkMapping A B dec [] (fun ⇒ b def ).
Definition Mem := Mapping id nat eq id dec.
Definition m empty : Mem := mkMapping id nat eq id dec [] (fun (x :id) ⇒ 0).
Definition u map {B : Type} (il1 : list A) (m1 m2 : A→B) :=
fun (a : A) ⇒
if (in list dec a il1 ) then (m1 a) else (m2 a).
Lemma u map same :
∀ (B : Type) (il1 : list A) (m : A→ B),
u map il1 m m = m.
Definition m union {B : Type} (m1 m2 : Mapping A B dec) :
option (Mapping A B dec) :=
if (common dec (il A B m1 ) (il A B m2 )) then
None
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else
Some (mkMapping A B dec
((il A B m1) ++ (il A B m2))
(u map (il A B m1 ) (mp A B m1 ) (mp A B m2 ))
).
Definition get val {B : Type} (m: Mapping A B dec) (x :A) : option B :=
if (in list dec x (il dec m))
then Some ((mp dec m) x )
else None.
Definition upd val {B : Type} m (a:A) (v :B) : (Mapping A B dec) :=
if (in list dec a (il dec m))
then (mkMapping A B dec
(il dec m)
(fun (a1 : A) ⇒ if (dec a a1 ) then v else (mp dec m a1 ))
)
else m.
Theorem update eq : ∀ {B : Type} (val : B) a m,
List.In a (il A B m) →
get val (upd val m a val) a = Some val.
Lemma neq a : ∀ {B : Type} a1 a2 (b1 b2 : B), a1 6= a2 →
(if dec a1 a2 then b1 else b2) = b2.
Theorem update neq : ∀ {B : Type} a2 a1 (val : B) m,
a2 6= a1 →
get val (upd val m a2 val) a1 = get val m a1.
Theorem update dom :
∀ {B :Type} m a (v : B), (il dec (upd val m a v)) = (il dec m).
End Mappings.
Notation "## A" := (il A) (at level 10).
Notation "&& A" := (mp A) (at level 10).
Definition val of {B :Type} (def :B) (opt a : option B) :=
match opt a with
| Some a ⇒ a
| None ⇒ def
end.
Lemma sub mp l :
∀ A (dec: Dec A) B b def (m1 m2 : Mapping A B dec) i,
common dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
List.In i (##m1 ) →
(&&(val of (map def A dec B b def ) (m union m1 m2 ))) i = (&&m1 ) i.
Hint Resolve sub mp l.
Lemma in not in :
∀ (A:Type) (dec: Dec A) l1 l2 (i :A),
common dec l1 l2 = false → List.In i l2 → ¬List.In i l1.
Lemma sub mp r :
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∀ A (dec: Dec A) B b def (m1 m2 : Mapping A B dec) i,
common dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
List.In i (##m2 ) →
(&&(val of (map def A dec B b def ) (m union m1 m2 ))) i = (&&m2 ) i.
Hint Resolve sub mp r.
Lemma union dom :
∀ (A B1 B2 : Type)
(decA: Dec A)
(map1 map1’ md1 : Mapping A B1 decA)
(map2 map2’ md2 : Mapping A B2 decA),
##map1 = ##map2 → ##map1’ = ##map2’ →
(common decA (##map1 ) (##map1’ ) = false) →
##(val of md1 (m union decA map1 map1’ )) =
##(val of md2 (m union decA map2 map2’ )).
Hint Resolve union dom.
Definition option bop (A B : Type) (a1 a2 : option A) (op: A→A→B) :=
match a1 with
| Some v1 ⇒ match a2 with
| Some v2 ⇒ Some (op v1 v2 )
| None ⇒ None
end
| None ⇒ None
end.
Fixpoint aeval (m : Mem) (a : aexp) : option nat :=
match a with
| ANum n ⇒ Some n
| AId x ⇒ get val id eq id dec m x
| APlus a1 a2 ⇒ option bop nat nat (aeval m a1 ) (aeval m a2 )
(fun n1 n2 ⇒ n1 + n2 )
| AMinus a1 a2 ⇒ option bop nat nat (aeval m a1 ) (aeval m a2 )
(fun n1 n2 ⇒ n1 - n2 )
| AMult a1 a2 ⇒ option bop nat nat (aeval m a1 ) (aeval m a2 )
(fun n1 n2 ⇒ n1 × n2 )
end.
Fixpoint beval (m : Mem) (b : bexp) : option bool :=
match b with
| BTrue ⇒ Some true
| BFalse ⇒ Some false
| BEq a1 a2 ⇒ option bop nat bool (aeval m a1 ) (aeval m a2 ) beq nat
| BLe a1 a2 ⇒ option bop nat bool (aeval m a1 ) (aeval m a2 ) ble nat
| BNot b1 ⇒ match (beval m b1 ) with
| Some b ⇒ Some (negb b)
| None ⇒ None
end
| BAnd b1 b2 ⇒ option bop bool bool (beval m b1 ) (beval m b2 ) andb
end.
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Fixpoint update n m (xl : list id) (vl : list nat) : Mem :=
if beq nat (length xl) (length vl) then
match xl with
| [] ⇒ m
| h :: t ⇒ upd val id eq id dec (update n m t (tl vl)) h (hd 0 vl)
end
else
m.
Lemma beq nat from eq : ∀ m n, m = n → beq nat m n = true.
Hint Resolve beq nat from eq.
Lemma update n dom :
∀ m xl vl, (length xl = length vl) → ##(update n m xl vl) = ##m.
Definition lst distinct (l : list ) : Prop :=
(∀ i j, 0 ≤ i < length l → 0 ≤ j < length l →
(nth i l (Id 0) = nth j l (Id 0)) → i = j ).
Lemma hd is 0th :
∀ (A:Type) (lst : list A) (def : A), length lst > 0 → (hd def lst) = (nth 0 lst def ).
Hint Resolve hd is 0th.
Lemma skip head :
∀ i h l’, (nth (i+1) (h :: l’ ) (Id 0)) = nth i l’ (Id 0).
Lemma distinct cover :
∀ l’ h, lst distinct (h :: l’ ) → lst distinct l’.
Lemma distinct neq :
∀ l’ h, lst distinct (h::l’ ) →
(∀ i, 0 ≤ i < length l’ → h 6= nth i l’ (Id 0)).
Lemma update n x :
∀ xl,
lst distinct xl →
(∀ m i vl,
length vl = length xl →
0 ≤ i < length xl →
List.In (nth i xl (Id 0)) (il id nat eq id dec m) →
get val id eq id dec (update n m xl vl) (nth i xl (Id 0)) = Some (nth i vl 0)
).
Lemma update n x same :
∀ m x xl vl,
length vl = length xl → ¬ List.In x xl →
get val id eq id dec (update n m xl vl) x = get val id eq id dec m x.
Inductive action : Type :=
| Act LTau : action
| Act LOt : pch → list nat → action
| Act LIn : pch → list nat → action
| Act Eps : action
| Act Suspd : action
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.
Definition get pch alpha : pch :=
match alpha with
| Act LTau ⇒ pch def
| Act LOt c vl ⇒ c
| Act LIn c vl ⇒ c
| ⇒ pch def
end.
Inductive polarity : Type :=
| Pol Ot : polarity
| Pol In : polarity
| Pol Bot : polarity
.
Definition get rho alpha :=
match alpha with
| Act LTau ⇒ Pol Bot
| Act LOt ⇒ Pol Ot
| Act LIn ⇒ Pol In
| ⇒ Pol Bot
end.
Definition get vl alpha :=
match alpha with
| Act LTau ⇒ []
| Act LOt vl ⇒ vl
| Act LIn vl ⇒ vl
| ⇒ []
end.
Inductive all some {A:Type} : list (option A) → Prop :=
| All Some Nil : all some []
| All Some Ext : ∀ h t, h 6= None → all some t → all some (h::t)
.
Variable pid ids : pid → list id.
Fixpoint get ids sys :=
match sys with
| SysProc j ⇒ pid ids j
| SysPar sys1 sys2 ⇒ get ids sys1 ++ get ids sys2
| SysRes sys ⇒ get ids sys
end.
Print f compose.
Reserved Notation "S ’/’ m ’==>’ ’[’ i ’,’ alpha ’]’ S’ ’/’ m’ "
(at level 40, m at level 39, i at level 39,
alpha at level 39, S’ at level 39).
Inductive com step : pid → (prod com Mem) → action →
(prod com Mem) → Prop :=
| S Skip : ∀ i m, ##m = pid ids i →
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(SKIP) / m ==> [i,Act LTau] (NIL) / m
| S Ass : ∀ i m x a val, ##m = pid ids i →
List.In x (##m) → (aeval m a = Some val) →
((x::=a)/m ==> [i,Act LTau] (NIL)/upd val id eq id dec m x val)
| S Out : ∀ i m c (al : list aexp), ##m = pid ids i →
all some (map (aeval m) al) →
(c!al)/m ==>
[i, (Act LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) al))]
(NIL)/m
| S In : ∀ i m c (xl : list id) (vl : list nat), ##m = pid ids i →
lst distinct xl → (∀ x, List.In x xl → List.In x (##m)) →
length vl = length xl →
(c??xl)/m ==> [i,(Act LIn c vl)] (NIL)/ update n m xl vl
| S SeqHalfway : ∀ i m S1 m’ S1’ S2 alpha,
S1 / m ==> [i,alpha] S1’ / m’ → S1’ 6= NIL →
(S1 ;; S2) / m ==> [i,alpha] (S1’ ;; S2) / m’
| S SeqFinished : ∀ i m S1 m’ S2 alpha,
S1 / m ==> [i,alpha] (NIL) / m’ →
(S1 ;; S2) / m ==> [i,alpha] (S2) / m’
| S IfTrue : ∀ i b m S1 S2, ##m = pid ids i →
(beval m b = Some true) →
(IIF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 FII) / m ==> [i,Act LTau] (S1) / m
| S IfFalse : ∀ i b m S1 S2, ##m = pid ids i →
(beval m b = Some false) →
(IIF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 FII) / m ==> [i,Act LTau] (S2) / m
| S WhileTrue : ∀ i b m S, ##m = pid ids i →
(beval m b = Some true) →
(WHILE b DO S END) / m ==> [i,Act LTau] (S ;; WHILE b DO S END) / m
| S WhileFalse : ∀ i b m S, ##m = pid ids i →
(beval m b = Some false) →
(WHILE b DO S END) / m ==> [i,Act LTau] (NIL) / m
where " S ’/’ m ’==>’ ’[’ i ’,’ alpha ’]’ S’ ’/’ m’ " :=
(com step (i) (S,m) alpha (S’,m’)) : sem scope.
Open Scope sem scope.
Tactic Notation "step cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "S Skip" | Case aux c "S Ass"
| Case aux c "S Out" | Case aux c "S In"
| Case aux c "S SeqHalfway" | Case aux c "S SeqFinished"
| Case aux c "S IfTrue" | Case aux c "S IfFalse"
| Case aux c "S WhileTrue" | Case aux c "S WhileFalse"].
Lemma inv step dom :
∀ i S S’ m m’ alpha,
S/m ==> [i, alpha] S’/m’ → (##m = pid ids i ∧ ##m’ = pid ids i).
Hint Resolve inv step dom.
Definition act from c rho vl :=
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match rho with
| Pol Ot ⇒ Act LOt c vl
| Pol In ⇒ Act LIn c vl
| ⇒ Act LTau
end.
Lemma inv step act :
∀ i S S’ m m’ alpha,
S/m ==> [i, alpha] S’/m’ →
((∃ c rho vl, (rho = Pol Ot ∨ rho = Pol In) ∧ alpha = act from c rho vl) ∨
alpha = Act LTau).
Lemma step det :
∀ i S S’ S’’ m m’ m’’ alpha1 alpha2,
S/m ==> [i, alpha1] S’/m’ →
S/m ==> [i, alpha2] S’’/m’’ →
(get pch alpha1 = get pch alpha2 ∧ get rho alpha1 = get rho alpha2 ).
Definition SysMem := Mapping pid Mem eq pid dec.
Definition sysmem def : SysMem := map def pid eq pid dec Mem m empty.
Definition u sysmem (m1 m2 : SysMem) := val of sysmem def (m union m1 m2 ).
Definition modif sysmem sysm i (m’ : Mem) :=
upd val pid eq pid dec sysm i m’.
Definition upd sysmem sysm i (sysm’ : SysMem) :=
upd val pid eq pid dec sysm i (&&sysm’ i).
Definition upd sm lst sysm pidlst (sysm’ : SysMem) :=
match pidlst with
| [i] ⇒ upd sysmem sysm i (sysm’ )
| [i;j] ⇒ upd sysmem (upd sysmem sysm i (sysm’ )) j sysm’
| ⇒ sysm
end.
Definition eq sysmem (m1 m2 : SysMem) :=
(##m1 = ##m2) ∧ (∀ i, List.In i (##m1 ) → (&&m1 ) i = (&&m2 ) i).
Lemma eq sysmem refl :
∀ m, eq sysmem m m.
Lemma eq sysmem sym :
∀ m1 m2, eq sysmem m1 m2 → eq sysmem m2 m1.
Lemma eq sysmem trans :
∀ m1 m2 m3, eq sysmem m1 m2 → eq sysmem m2 m3 → eq sysmem m1 m3.
Hint Resolve eq sysmem refl eq sysmem sym eq sysmem trans: eq sysmem eqv.
Definition conf : Type := prod Sys SysMem.
Reserved Notation "sys ’//’ m ’===>’ ’[’ pidlst ’,’ alpha ’]’ sys’ ’//’ m’ "
(at level 50, m at level 49, pidlst at level 49,
alpha at level 49, sys’ at level 49).
Inductive sys step : conf → list pid → action → conf → Prop :=
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| Sys Step One :
∀ i S m S’ m’ alpha sysm,
S/m ==> [i, alpha] S’/m’ →
##sysm = [i] → (&&sysm) i = m →
(i:S)//sysm ===> [[i], alpha] (i:S’)//(modif sysmem sysm i m’)
| Sys Step Left :
∀ i sys1 m1 sys1’ m1’ sys2 m2 alpha sysm,
sys1//m1 ===> [[i], alpha] sys1’//m1’ →
##m2 = get pids sys2 →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
(sys1 |P| sys2)//sysm ===> [[i], alpha]
(sys1’ |P| sys2)//(upd sysmem sysm i m1’)
| Sys Step Right :
∀ i sys1 m1 sys2 m2 sys2’ m2’ alpha sysm,
sys2//m2 ===> [[i], alpha] sys2’//m2’ →
##m1 = get pids sys1 →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
(sys1 |P| sys2)//sysm ===> [[i], alpha]
(sys1 |P| sys2’)//(upd sysmem sysm i m2’)
| Sys Step Sync :
∀ sys1 sys1’ sys2 sys2’ m1 m1’ m2 m2’
i j c vl alpha1 alpha2 sysm,
sys1//m1 ===> [[i], alpha1] sys1’//m1’ →
sys2//m2 ===> [[j], alpha2] sys2’//m2’ →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
(alpha1 = Act LOt c vl ∧ alpha2 = Act LIn c vl ∨
alpha1 = Act LIn c vl ∧ alpha2 = Act LOt c vl) →
(sys1 |P| sys2)//sysm ===> [[i;j], Act LTau]
(sys1’ |P| sys2’)//(upd sysmem (upd sysmem sysm i m1’ ) j m2’)
| Sys Step Res :
∀ sys sys’ C m m’ pidlst alpha sysm,
sys//m ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//m’ →
eq sysmem sysm m →
(alpha = Act LTau ∨
(alpha 6= Act LTau ∧ ¬ Ensembles.In C (get pch alpha))) →
(sys\C)//sysm ===> [pidlst, alpha]
(sys’\C)//(upd sm lst sysm pidlst m’)
where "sys ’//’ m ’===>’ ’[’ pidlst ’,’ alpha ’]’ sys’ ’//’ m’" :=
(sys step (sys,m) pidlst alpha (sys’,m’)) : sem scope.
Tactic Notation "step cases sys" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "Sys Step One" |
Case aux c "Sys Step Left" | Case aux c "Sys Step Right" |
Case aux c "Sys Step Sync" | Case aux c "Sys Step Res" ].
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Lemma com step inv act :
∀ S m S’ m’ alpha i,
S/m ==> [i, alpha] S’/m’ →
(alpha = Act LTau ∨
(∃ c vl, alpha = Act LOt c vl) ∨
(∃ c vl, alpha = Act LIn c vl)).
Lemma sys step inv act :
∀ sys m sys’ m’ alpha pidlst,
sys//m ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//m’ →
(alpha = Act LTau ∨
(∃ c vl, alpha = Act LOt c vl) ∨
(∃ c vl, alpha = Act LIn c vl)).
Hint Resolve sys step inv act.
Inductive sys multi step : conf → conf → Prop :=
| Sys step refl : ∀ C, sys multi step C C
| Sys multi step :
∀ sys sys’ sys’’ m m’ m’’ pidlst alpha,
sys//m ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’’//m’’ →
sys multi step (sys’’, m’’) (sys’, m’) →
sys multi step (sys, m) (sys’, m’).
Lemma sys step inv pid :
∀ sys sys’ (sysm sysm’ : SysMem) pidlst alpha,
sys//sysm ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
get pids sys’ = get pids sys.
Lemma sys step in pidlst :
∀ sys sys’ sysm sysm’ pidlst alpha,
sys//sysm ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
(∀ i, List.In i pidlst → List.In i (get pids sys)).
Hint Resolve sys step inv pid.
Lemma upd sm lst dom :
∀ sysm pidlst m,
##(upd sm lst sysm pidlst m) = ## sysm.
Lemma sys step inv mem :
∀ sys sys’ (sysm sysm’ : SysMem) pidlst alpha,
sys//sysm ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
(##sysm = get pids sys ∧ ##sysm’ = get pids sys’ ).
Hint Resolve sys step inv mem.
Lemma get com sub :
∀ sys1 sys2 i,
(common eq pid dec (get pids sys1 ) (get pids sys2 ) = false) →
(
(List.In i (get pids sys1 ) → get com (sys1 |P| sys2 ) i = get com sys1 i) ∧
(List.In i (get pids sys2 ) → get com (sys1 |P| sys2 ) i = get com sys2 i)
).
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Lemma sys proc trans :
∀ sys sysm sys’ sysm’ alpha i,
sys//sysm ===> [[i],alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
∃ S S’ m’’,
List.In i (get pids sys) ∧
S = get com sys i ∧
S/((&&sysm) i) ==> [i,alpha] S’/m’’.
Lemma sys step det:
∀ sys1 sys2 m1 m2 i c vl alpha’ m2’ sys2’,
sys1 // m1 ===> [[i], Act LOt c vl] sys2 // m2 →
sys1 // m1 ===> [[i], alpha’] sys2’ // m2’ →
get pch alpha’ = c.
Ltac inv sub cl :=
match goal with
| [id : (Ensembles.In ( |U| ) ) ` ] ⇒ (inversion id ; subst; clear id)
end.
B.3 Library Types
Require Export Semantics.
Inductive SecLev :=
| H : SecLev
| L : SecLev
.
Inductive Ordr : SecLev → SecLev → Prop :=
| LL : Ordr L L
| LH : Ordr L H
| HH : Ordr H H
.
Hint Resolve LL LH HH.
Definition lub l1 l2 :=
match l1 with
| H ⇒ H
| L ⇒ l2
end.
Hint Unfold lub.
Lemma L le : ∀ l, Ordr L l.
Lemma le H : ∀ l, Ordr l H.
Lemma ordr refl : ∀ l, Ordr l l.
Lemma ordr trans : ∀ l1 l2 l3, Ordr l1 l2 → Ordr l2 l3 → Ordr l1 l3.
Lemma ordr lub ll :
∀ l1 l2 l3, Ordr (lub l1 l2 ) l3 → Ordr l1 l3.
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Lemma ordr lub lr :
∀ l1 l2 l3, Ordr (lub l1 l2 ) l3 → Ordr l2 l3.
Hint Resolve L le le H ordr refl ordr trans ordr lub ll ordr lub lr.
Lemma self lub : ∀ l, l = lub l l.
Lemma le lub l : ∀ l1 l2, Ordr l1 (lub l1 l2 ).
Lemma le lub r : ∀ l1 l2, Ordr l2 (lub l1 l2 ).
Lemma both le lub le :
∀ l1 l2 l3, Ordr l1 l3 → Ordr l2 l3 → Ordr (lub l1 l2 ) l3.
Hint Resolve le lub l le lub r self lub both le lub le.
Lemma lub inc :
∀ l1 l2 l sm l lg,
Ordr l sm l lg → Ordr (lub l1 l sm) (lub l2 l sm) →
Ordr (lub l1 l lg) (lub l2 l lg).
Lemma lub with H : ∀ l, lub l H = H.
Hint Resolve lub inc.
Definition Assertion := Mem → Prop.
Definition PVarVal := Assertion.
Definition PVarSec := Mapping id SecLev eq id dec.
Definition pvs def := mkMapping id SecLev eq id dec [] (fun x ⇒ L).
Definition m’ def dom := mkMapping id nat eq id dec dom (fun x ⇒ 0).
Definition PVar := prod PVarSec Assertion.
Definition same ele (A: Type) (l1 l2 : list A) :=
∀ (a: A), (List.In a l1) ↔ (List.In a l2).
Definition PVarEnv := Mapping pid (Ensemble PVar) eq pid dec.
Definition empty pe :=
mkMapping pid (Ensemble PVar) eq pid dec ([]) (fun i ⇒ Empty set ).
Theorem eq ch dec : ∀ c1 c2 : ch, {c1 = c2} + {c1 6= c2}.
Definition PChP := pch → SecLev.
Definition PChCVal := ch → (Ensemble nat).
Definition PChCSec := ch → SecLev.
Definition PChC := prod PChCSec PChCVal.
Notation " a ’from’ A" := (Ensembles.In A a) (at level 20).
Definition PChEnv := sig (fun (CE : Ensemble PChC) ⇒ ∃ PcC, PcC from CE).
Variable PcP : PChP.
Variable PChCSet : PChEnv.
Theorem pcp dec : ∀ c, {PcP c = H} + {PcP c = L}.
Definition bassn b : Assertion :=
fun m ⇒ (beval m b = Some true).
Definition assn sub x a phi : Assertion :=
fun (m : Mem) ⇒
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phi (upd val id eq id dec m x (val of 0 (aeval m a))).
Definition assn sub n xl al phi : Assertion :=
fun (m : Mem) ⇒ phi (update n m xl (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) al)).
Notation "phi & x \-> a" := (assn sub x a phi) (at level 10).
Definition all assn xl phi : Assertion :=
fun m ⇒
(∀ (vl :list nat),
((assn sub n xl (map (fun v ⇒ ANum v) vl) phi) m))
.
Definition assert implies (phi psi : Assertion) : Prop :=
∀ m, phi m → psi m.
Hint Unfold assert implies.
Notation "phi -» psi" :=
(assert implies phi psi) (at level 80) : hoare spec scope.
Open Scope hoare spec scope.
Notation "phi «-» psi" :=
(phi -» psi ∧ psi -» phi) (at level 80) : hoare spec scope.
Notation "lst ’@’ i" := (nth (i) lst 0) (at level 20).
Notation "lst ’a@’ i" := (nth (i) lst (ANum 0)) (at level 20).
Notation "lst ’x@’ i" := (nth (i) lst (Id 0)) (at level 20).
Notation "’|’ lst ’|’" := (length lst) (at level 20).
Definition val sat sub (m: Mem) (P : PVar) x a :=
snd P (upd val m x (val of 0 (aeval m a))).
Definition val sat sub n (m: Mem) (P : PVar) xl al :=
snd P (update n m xl (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) al)).
Definition vl sat vl c (P : PChC) :=
∀ i, 1≤i≤|vl | → ((vl @ (i - 1)) from (snd P (Chan c i))).
Program Definition val sat c (alpha: action) (rho: polarity) (P : PChC) :=
Ensembles.In PChCSet P ∧
(rho = get rho alpha → vl sat (get vl alpha) (get pch alpha) P).
Definition num vl := map ANum vl.
Notation " x ’ido’ P " := (List.In x (il id SecLev eq id dec (fst P)))
(at level 20).
Definition secL (P : PVar) x := (mp id SecLev eq id dec (fst P) x ).
Inductive sLift (P : PVar) X : SecLev → Prop :=
| Lift L : (∀ x, x from X → (secL P x) = L) → sLift P X L
| Lift H : ∀ x, x from X ∧ (secL P x) = H → sLift P X H
.
Definition and assn phi b := (fun m ⇒ (phi m ∧ (bassn b m))).
Definition and nssn phi b := (fun m ⇒ (phi m ∧ ˜(bassn b m))).
Hint Unfold and assn and nssn.
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Definition eval al j m := (val of 0 (aeval m (al a@ (j-1)))).
Definition evxl xl j m := (val of 0 (aeval m (AId (xl x@ (j-1))))).
Reserved Notation
" K ’,’ i ’,’ X ’,’ l ’\-’ phi ’,’ S ’,’ psi ’-:’ X’ ’,’ l’ "
(at level 60, i at level 59, X at level 59, l at level 59,
phi at level 59, S at level 59, psi at level 59,
X’ at level 59, l’ at level 59).
Definition contained in X xl := ∀ (x :id), x from X → List.In x xl.
Inductive well typed (K : Ensemble PVar) (i : pid) :
(Ensemble id)→ SecLev→ Assertion→ com→ Assertion→ (Ensemble id)→ SecLev
→ Prop :=
| TP NIL : ∀ X l phi,
contained in X (pid ids i) →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (NIL), phi -: (Empty set ), L
| TP SK : ∀ X l phi,
contained in X (pid ids i) →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (SKIP), phi -: (Empty set ), L
| TP AS : ∀ X l phi x a,
contained in X (pid ids i) →
(∀ (P : PVar) m, ##m = pid ids i →
(P from K ) → snd P m → (phi & x \-> a) m →
(∃ Q, Q from K ∧
(∀ l’, sLift P (X |U| fva a) l’ → Ordr l’ (secL Q x )) ∧
(Ordr l (secL Q x )) ∧
(∀ x’, x’ ido P → x’ 6=x → (Ordr (secL P x’ ) (secL Q x’ ))) ∧
val sat sub m Q x a
)
)->
K, i, X , l \- (phi & x \-> a), (x::=a), (phi) -:
(Empty set ), L
| TP SEQ : ∀ X l Y1 l1 Y2 l2 S1 S2 phi phi’ psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S1, phi’ -: Y1, l1 →
K, i, (X |U| Y1), (lub l l1) \- phi’, S2, psi -: Y2, l2 →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (S1 ;; S2), psi -: (Y1 |U| Y2), (lub l1 l2)
| TP IF : ∀ X l Y1 l1 Y2 l2 b S1 S2 phi psi,
K, i, (X |U| fvb b), l \- (and assn phi b), S1, psi -: Y1, l1 →
K, i, (X |U| fvb b), l \- (and nssn phi b), S2, psi -: Y2, l2 →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (IIF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 FII), psi -:
(Y1 |U| Y2 |U| fvb b), (lub l1 l2)
| TP WH : ∀ X Y l phi b S,
K, i, Y , l \- (and assn phi b), S, phi -: Y , l →
Included (X |U| fvb b) Y →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (WHILE b DO S END), (and nssn phi b) -: Y , l
| TP OT : ∀ X l phi c al l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) →
((Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧ (Ordr (PcP c) l’) ∧
(∀ P m, ##m = pid ids i →
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P from K → (snd P m ∧ phi m) →
(∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧
(∃ Q PcC,
Q from K ∧ PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) ∧
(∀ x, x ido P → (Ordr (secL P x ) (secL Q x ))) ∧
(∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | →
(∀ l, sLift P (fva (al a@ (j-1))) l →
Ordr l (fst PcC (Chan c j )))) ∧
(snd Q m ∧
∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | →
(eval al j m) from (snd PcC (Chan c
j )))
)
)
) →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (c ! al), phi -: (Empty set ), l’
| TP IN : ∀ X l phi xl c l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) →
((Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧ (Ordr (PcP c) l’) ∧
(∀ P m, ##m = pid ids i →
P from K → (snd P m ∧ all assn xl phi m) →
((∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧
∀ PcC vl,
PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) →
|vl |=|xl | → vl sat vl c PcC →
∃ Q, Q from K ∧
(∀ x’, x’ ido P ∧ ˜(List.In x’ xl) →
(Ordr (secL P x’ ) (secL Q x’ ))) ∧
(∀ j, 1≤j≤|xl | →
(Ordr (lub (fst PcC (Chan c j )) (PcP c))
(secL Q (xl x@ (j-1))))) ∧
(val sat sub n m Q xl (num vl))
)
)
) →
K, i, X , l \- (all assn xl phi), (c ?? xl), phi -: (Empty set ),
l’
| TP ST : ∀ X Y l1 l2 X’ Y’ l1’ l2’ phi psi phi’ psi’ S,
contained in Y (pid ids i) →
K, i, X’, l1’ \- phi’, S, psi’ -: Y’, l2’ →
(phi -» phi’ ) → (psi’ -» psi) →
(Included X X’ ) → (Included Y’ Y ) →
(Ordr l1 l1’ ) → (Ordr l2’ l2 ) →
K, i, X , l1 \- phi, S, psi -: Y , l2
where " K ’,’ i ’,’ X ’,’ l ’\-’ phi ’,’ S ’,’ psi ’-:’ X’ ’,’ l’ "
:= (well typed K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ ) : hoare spec scope.
Hint Constructors well typed.
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Tactic Notation "well typed cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "TP NIL" | Case aux c "TP SK" | Case aux c "TP AS" |
Case aux c "TP SEQ" | Case aux c "TP IF" | Case aux c "TP WH" |
Case aux c "TP OT" | Case aux c "TP IN" | Case aux c "TP ST"
].
Definition m dom m := (il id nat eq id dec m).
Definition m val m x := (mp id nat eq id dec m x ).
Definition eq mdom m1 m2 : Prop :=
∀ (x : id), List.In x (m dom m1 ) ↔ List.In x (m dom m2 ).
Lemma nil impl:
∀ K i X l1 Y l2 phi psi,
K, i, X , l1 \- phi, (NIL), psi -: Y , l2 → (phi -» psi).
Lemma skip impl:
∀ K i X l1 Y l2 phi psi,
K, i, X , l1 \- phi, (SKIP), psi -: Y , l2 → (phi -» psi).
Lemma tp nil:
∀ K i X l Y l’ phi psi,
phi -» psi →
contained in X (pid ids i) →
contained in Y (pid ids i) →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (NIL), psi -: Y , l’.
Hint Resolve nil impl tp nil.
Lemma tp ot H prc :
∀ c al K i X l phi psi X’ l’,
PcP c = H →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (c ! al), psi -: X’, l’ →
K, i, X , H \- phi, (c ! al), psi -: X’, l’.
Lemma tp in H prc :
∀ c xl K i X l phi psi X’ l’,
PcP c = H →
K, i, X , l \- phi, (c ?? xl), psi -: X’, l’ →
K, i, X , H \- phi, (c ?? xl), psi -: X’, l’.
Lemma incl X Y: ∀ X Y b, Included id (X |U| fvb b) Y → Included id (Y |U| fvb b) Y.
Hint Resolve incl X Y.
Lemma eval num list : ∀ m vl, (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) (num vl)) = vl.
Hint Resolve eval num list.
Ltac pccfrom :=
match goal with
| [H : ∃ ( :PChC), from ` ] ⇒
inversion H as [ePcC H from]; ∃ ePcC ; simpl; try split; try assumption
end.
Ltac rwaeval :=
match goal with
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| [H : aeval ?m ?a = ` ] ⇒
match goal with
[H’ : context[val of 0 (aeval m a)] ` ] ⇒ rewrite H in H’
end
end.
Lemma contained in empty:
∀ X’, contained in (Empty set id) X’.
Lemma contained in incl:
∀ X1 X2 Y, contained in X1 X2 → Ensembles.Included Y X1 → contained in Y
X2.
Hint Resolve contained in empty.
Lemma block contained :
∀ K i X l X’ l’ phi S psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
(contained in X (pid ids i) ∧ contained in X’ (pid ids i)).
Lemma all assn all vl :
∀ xl psi m vl, all assn xl psi m → psi (update n m xl vl).
Lemma subject reduction proc :
∀ K X l1 Y l2 phi S psi m S’ m’ i alpha P,
K, i, X , l1 \- phi, S, psi -: Y , l2 →
S/m ==>[i,alpha] S’/m’ →
phi m → P from K → snd P m →
((∃ PcC, val sat c alpha Pol Ot PcC) ∧
((∃ PcC, val sat c alpha Pol In PcC ) →
∃ Q phi’, K, i, X , l1 \- phi’, S’, psi -: Y , l2 ∧
phi’ m’ ∧ Q from K ∧ snd Q m’)).
Definition AsnEnv := Mapping pid Assertion eq pid dec.
Definition asn empty : AsnEnv :=
mkMapping pid Assertion eq pid dec [] (fun (i :pid) ⇒ (fun m ⇒ False)).
Definition CompPSec := Mapping pid PVarSec eq pid dec.
Definition CompPVal := AsnEnv.
Definition CompP := prod CompPSec CompPVal.
Definition cps empty : CompPSec :=
mkMapping pid PVarSec eq pid dec [] (fun (i :pid) ⇒ pvs def).
Definition u cpp (CP1 CP2 : CompP) :=
(pair
(val of cps empty (m union (fst CP1 ) (fst CP2 )))
(val of asn empty (m union (snd CP1 ) (snd CP2 )))
).
Definition comp sat (m: SysMem) (AE : AsnEnv) :=
(##m = ##AE) ∧ (∀ i, List.In i (##m) → (&&AE i (&&m i))).
Definition comp from (CP : CompP) (PE : PVarEnv) :=
(##(fst CP) = ##PE) ∧ (##(snd CP) = ##PE) ∧
(∀ i, List.In i (##PE) →
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∃ P, (P from (&&PE i) ∧
pair (&&(fst CP) i) (&&(snd CP) i) = P)
).
Definition set m eq (m1 m2 : Mem) (A: Ensemble PVar) : Prop :=
eq mdom m1 m2 ∧
(∀ x, List.In x (m dom m1 ) →
(∀ P, P from A → secL P x = L) →
m val m1 x = m val m2 x).
Definition set act eq c rho’ vl1 vl2 A (rho: polarity) :Prop :=
|vl1 |=|vl2 | ∧
(∀ j,
1≤j≤|vl1 | → rho=rho’ → (∀ (P : PChC), P from A → fst P (Chan c j ) = L) →
(vl1 @ (j-1)) = (vl2 @ (j-1))
).
Program Definition nip (K : Ensemble PVar) :=
(∀ m1 m2, set m eq m1 m2 K
→ (∀ P, P from K → (snd P m1 ↔ snd P m2 ))) ∧
(∀ c vl1 vl2,
set act eq c Pol Ot vl1 vl2 PChCSet Pol Ot
→ (∀ PcC, PcC from PChCSet
→ (val sat c (Act LOt c vl1 ) Pol Ot PcC ↔
val sat c (Act LOt c vl2 ) Pol Ot PcC )))
.
Definition pve empty : PVarEnv :=
mkMapping pid (Ensemble PVar) eq pid dec [] (fun (i :pid) ⇒ (Empty set )).
Reserved Notation
" PVE ’\–’ Phi ’,’ sys ’,’ Psi "
(at level 60, Phi at level 59, sys at level 59, Psi at level 59).
Inductive well typed sys : PVarEnv → AsnEnv → Sys → AsnEnv → Prop :=
| TPSys One :
∀ K Y l’ S phi psi i,
(∀ P, P from K → ##(fst P) = pid ids i) →
K, i, (Empty set ), L \- phi, S, psi -: Y , l’ → nip K →
(mkMapping pid (Ensemble PVar) eq pid dec [i] (fun j ⇒ K ))
\– (mkMapping pid Assertion eq pid dec [i]
(fun j ⇒ if beq nat j i then phi else (fun ⇒ True))),
(i:S),
(mkMapping pid Assertion eq pid dec [i]
(fun j ⇒ if beq nat j i then psi else (fun ⇒ True)))
| TPSys Res :
∀ PVE Phi Psi Sys Omg,
PVE \– Phi, Sys, Psi → PVE \– Phi, (Sys \ Omg), Psi
| TPSys Par :
∀ PVE1 Phi1 Sys1 Psi1 PVE2 Phi2 Sys2 Psi2,
PVE1 \– Phi1, Sys1, Psi1 → PVE2 \– Phi2, Sys2, Psi2 →
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(common eq pid dec (get pids Sys1 ) (get pids Sys2 ) = false) →
(val of pve empty (m union pid eq pid dec PVE1 PVE2 ))
\– (val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2 )),
(Sys1 |P| Sys2),
(val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Psi1 Psi2 ))
where " PVE ’\–’ Phi ’,’ sys ’,’ Psi " := (well typed sys PVE Phi sys Psi).
Hint Constructors well typed sys.
Tactic Notation "well typed cases sys" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "TPsys One" | Case aux c "TPsys Res" | Case aux c "TPsys Par"
].
Lemma asnenv dom :
∀ PVE sys Phi Psi,
PVE \– Phi, sys, Psi → (##Phi = get pids sys ∧ ##Psi = get pids sys).
Lemma penv dom :
∀ PVE sys Phi Psi, PVE \– Phi, sys, Psi → ##PVE = get pids sys.
Hint Resolve asnenv dom.
Hint Resolve penv dom.
Lemma comp from one :
∀ i K CP,
comp from CP {| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ K |} →
(pair ((&& (fst CP)) i) ((&& (snd CP)) i)) from K.
Hint Resolve comp from one.
Lemma comp sat one policy :
∀ i (CP : CompP) m,
comp sat {| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ m |} (snd CP) →
(&& (snd CP)) i m.
Hint Resolve comp sat one policy.
Lemma comp sat split :
∀ (sysm1 sysm2 : SysMem) (Phi1 Phi2 : AsnEnv),
##sysm1 = ##Phi1 → ##sysm2 = ##Phi2 →
(common eq pid dec (##sysm1 ) (##sysm2 ) = false) →
comp sat (u sysmem sysm1 sysm2 )
(val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2 )) →
(comp sat sysm1 Phi1 ∧ comp sat sysm2 Phi2 ).
Lemma comp sat combine :
∀ (sysm1 sysm2 : SysMem) (Phi1 Phi2 : AsnEnv),
##sysm1 = ##Phi1 → ##sysm2 = ##Phi2 →
(common eq pid dec (##sysm1 ) (##sysm2 ) = false) →
comp sat sysm1 Phi1 → comp sat sysm2 Phi2 →
comp sat (u sysmem sysm1 sysm2 )
(val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2 )).
Hint Resolve comp sat split.
Definition restrict (CP : CompP) (pidl : list pid) : CompP :=
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(pair
{| il:=pidl; mp:=&&(fst CP) |}
{| il:=pidl; mp:=&&(snd CP) |}
).
Lemma comp from split :
∀ PVE1 PVE2 CP,
(common eq pid dec (##PVE1 ) (##PVE2 ) = false) →
comp from CP (val of pve empty (m union pid eq pid dec PVE1 PVE2 )) →
(comp from (restrict CP (##PVE1 )) PVE1 ∧
comp from (restrict CP (##PVE2 )) PVE2 ).
Lemma comp from combine :
∀ CP1 CP2 PVE1 PVE2,
(common eq pid dec (##PVE1 ) (##PVE2 ) = false) →
comp from CP1 PVE1 → comp from CP2 PVE2 →
comp from (u cpp CP1 CP2 )
(val of pve empty (m union pid eq pid dec PVE1 PVE2 )).
Hint Resolve comp from split comp from combine.
Lemma CP dom inv :
∀ (CP : CompP) (PVE1 PVE2 : PVarEnv),
(common eq pid dec (##PVE1 ) (##PVE2 ) = false) →
comp from CP (val of pve empty (m union pid eq pid dec PVE1 PVE2 )) →
##(snd CP) = (##PVE1 ++ ##PVE2).
Lemma trivial br :
∀ (f : pid → bool) (CP : CompP),
(fun (a : pid) ⇒ if (f a) then (&& (snd CP)) a else (&& (snd CP)) a) =
(fun (a: pid) ⇒ (&& (snd CP)) a).
Hint Resolve CP dom inv.
Lemma val sat c opp:
∀ c vl (PcC : PChC),
val sat c (Act LOt c vl) Pol Ot PcC → val sat c (Act LIn c vl) Pol In PcC.
Hint Resolve val sat c opp.
Lemma comp sat eq :
∀ m1 m2 Phi,
eq sysmem m1 m2 → comp sat m1 Phi → comp sat m2 Phi.
Hint Resolve comp sat eq.
Lemma comp sat one :
∀ sysm i m’ (psi : Assertion) mp0,
##sysm = ([i]) → psi m’ →
mp0 i = psi →
comp sat (modif sysmem sysm i m’ )
{| il := [i]; mp := mp0 |}.
Hint Resolve comp sat one.
Lemma upd sysmem eq:
∀ sysm i m’,
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List.In i (##sysm) →
(&& m’ ) i = (&& (upd sysmem sysm i m’)) i.
Hint Resolve upd sysmem eq.
Lemma upd sysmem neq:
∀ sysm i j m’,
i 6=j → (&& sysm) i = (&& (upd sysmem sysm j m’)) i.
Hint Resolve upd sysmem neq.
Lemma comp sat combine l :
∀ sysm m’ Phi1 Phi2 Phi1’ i,
##sysm = (##Phi1) ++ (##Phi2) →
common eq pid dec (##Phi1 ) (##Phi2 ) = false →
List.In i (##Phi1 ) →
comp sat sysm (val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2 )) →
##Phi1’ = ##Phi1 →
comp sat m’ Phi1’ →
(∀ j, List.In j (##m’ ) → j 6=i → (&&sysm) j = (&&m’ j)) →
comp sat (upd sysmem sysm i m’ )
(val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1’ Phi2 )).
Hint Resolve comp sat combine l.
Lemma n common equiv :
∀ (A : Type) (dec: Dec A) (il1 il2 : list A),
common A dec il1 il2 = false ↔ (∀ a, (List.In a il1 ∧ List.In a il2 ) → False).
Lemma sym n common :
∀ (A : Type) (dec: Dec A) (il1 il2 : list A),
common A dec il1 il2 = false →
common A dec il2 il1 = false.
Lemma comp sat combine r :
∀ sysm m’ Phi1 Phi2 Phi2’ i,
##sysm = (##Phi1) ++ (##Phi2) →
common eq pid dec (##Phi1 ) (##Phi2 ) = false →
List.In i (##Phi2 ) →
comp sat sysm (val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2 )) →
##Phi2’ = ##Phi2 →
comp sat m’ Phi2’ →
(∀ j, List.In j (##m’ ) → j 6=i → (&&sysm) j = (&&m’ j)) →
comp sat (upd sysmem sysm i m’ )
(val of asn empty (m union pid eq pid dec Phi1 Phi2’ )).
Hint Resolve comp sat combine r.
Lemma modif pidlst:
∀ sys sysm sys’ sysm’ pidlst alpha,
sys//sysm ===>[pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
(∀ i, List.In i (get pids sys) → ¬List.In i pidlst → (&&sysm) i = (&&sysm’ i)).
Lemma pid lst len :
∀ sys sys’ m m’ pidlst alpha,
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sys // m ===> [pidlst, alpha]sys’ // m’ → (length pidlst = 1 ∨ length pidlst = 2).
Lemma upd in pidlst :
∀ sys sys’ sysm pidlst m m’ alpha i,
List.In i pidlst →
sys // m ===> [pidlst, alpha]sys’ // m’ →
(∀ j, List.In j pidlst → List.In j (##sysm)) →
(&& (upd sm lst sysm pidlst m’)) i = (&& m’ ) i.
Lemma comp sat upd :
∀ sys sys’ m m’ sysm Phi Phi’ alpha pidlst,
sys // m ===> [pidlst, alpha]sys’ // m’ →
eq sysmem sysm m →
comp sat sysm Phi →
comp sat m’ Phi’ →
comp sat (upd sm lst sysm pidlst m’ ) Phi’.
Lemma sysm proj l:
∀ sysm m1 m2 j,
common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
List.In j (##m1 ) →
(&& sysm) j = (&& m1 ) j.
Lemma sysm proj r:
∀ sysm m1 m2 j,
common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
List.In j (##m2 ) →
(&& sysm) j = (&& m2 ) j.
Lemma comp sat same:
∀ (CP : CompP) (m1 m2 sysm: SysMem),
common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
comp sat sysm (snd CP) →
comp sat (u sysmem m1 m2 ) {| il := ##m1 ++ ##m2; mp := && (snd CP) |}.
Lemma sysm dom split:
∀ m1 m2 sysm,
common pid eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false →
eq sysmem sysm (u sysmem m1 m2 ) →
##sysm = ##m1 ++ ##m2.
Hint Resolve sysm dom split.
Theorem subject reduction sys :
∀ PVE sys sys’ (Phi Psi : AsnEnv) alpha pidlst
(sysm sysm’ : SysMem) (CP : CompP),
PVE \– Phi, sys, Psi →
sys//sysm ===>[pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ →
comp sat sysm Phi →
comp from CP PVE →
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comp sat sysm (snd CP) →
((∃ PcC, val sat c alpha Pol Ot PcC) ∧
((∃ PcC, val sat c alpha Pol In PcC ) →
∃ (CQ : CompP) (Phi’ : AsnEnv),
PVE \– Phi’, sys’, Psi ∧
comp sat sysm’ Phi’ ∧
comp from CQ PVE ∧
comp sat sysm’ (snd CQ)
)
).
B.4 Library Sec
Require Export Types.
Require Import Classical Prop.
Definition state eq (P :CompP) (PE :PVarEnv) sys1 m1 sys2 m2 :=
comp from P PE ∧
get pids sys1 = ##PE ∧ get pids sys2 = ##PE ∧
##(fst P) = ##(snd P) ∧
comp sat m1 (snd P) ∧ comp sat m2 (snd P) ∧
∀ i, List.In i (##PE) →
##(&&(fst P) i) = pid ids i ∧
##(&&m1 i) = pid ids i ∧ ##(&&m2 i) = pid ids i ∧
∀ x, List.In x (pid ids i) →
(&&(&&(fst P) i) x = L) →
&&(&&m1 i) x = &&(&&m2 i) x.
Definition eq sysconf (C1 C2 : conf) :=
fst C1 = fst C2 ∧ eq sysmem (snd C1 ) (snd C2 ).
Definition high comm alpha :=
∃ c rho’ vl, (rho’ = Pol Ot ∨ rho’ = Pol In) ∧ alpha = act from c rho’ vl ∧
PcP c = H.
Definition may step C1 pidlst alpha C2 :=
(sys step C1 pidlst alpha C2) ∨
(eq sysconf C1 C2 ∧ alpha = Act Eps) ∨
(eq sysconf C1 C2 ∧
(∀ alpha’ C2’, sys step C1 pidlst alpha’ C2’ → high comm alpha’) ∧
alpha = Act Suspd).
Inductive action sk : Type :=
| ActSk LTau : action sk
| ActSk LOt : pch → list nat → action sk
| ActSk LIn : pch → action sk
| ActSk Eps : action sk
| ActSk Suspd : action sk
.
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Definition fill bta vl’ : action :=
match bta with
| ActSk LTau ⇒ Act LTau
| ActSk LOt pc vl ⇒ Act LOt pc vl
| ActSk LIn pc ⇒ Act LIn pc vl’
| ActSk Eps ⇒ Act Eps
| ActSk Suspd ⇒ Act Suspd
end.
Definition act sk from c rho vl :=
match rho with
| Pol Ot ⇒ ActSk LOt c vl
| Pol In ⇒ ActSk LIn c
| ⇒ ActSk LTau
end.
Definition get rho’ (bta: action sk) :=
match bta with
| ActSk LTau ⇒ Pol Bot
| ActSk LOt ⇒ Pol Ot
| ActSk LIn ⇒ Pol In
| ⇒ Pol Bot
end.
Definition get pch’ (bta: action sk) : pch :=
match bta with
| ActSk LTau ⇒ pch def
| ActSk LOt c vl ⇒ c
| ActSk LIn c ⇒ c
| ⇒ pch def
end.
Definition get vl’ (bta: action sk) :=
match bta with
| ActSk LTau ⇒ []
| ActSk LOt vl ⇒ vl
| ActSk LIn ⇒ []
| ⇒ []
end.
Program Definition val sat c’ (bta: action sk) (rho: polarity) (P : PChC) :=
Ensembles.In PChCSet P ∧
(rho = get rho’ bta → vl sat (get vl’ bta) (get pch’ bta) P).
Definition act sk eq’ c rho’ vl1 vl2 (PcC : PChC) (rho: polarity) :Prop :=
|vl1 |=|vl2 | ∧
(∀ j,
1≤j≤|vl1 | → rho=rho’ → fst PcC (Chan c j ) = L →
(vl1 @ (j-1)) = (vl2 @ (j-1))
).
Inductive act eq : action → action → PChC → polarity → Prop :=
| AE HPrc : ∀ c rho rho’ vl alpha PcC,
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PcP c = H → (rho’=Pol Ot ∨ rho’=Pol In) →
alpha = act from c rho’ vl →
val sat c alpha rho PcC →
act eq alpha Act Eps PcC rho
| AE LPrc : ∀ c rho rho’ vl1 vl2 alpha1 alpha2 PcC,
PcP c = L → (rho’=Pol Ot ∨ rho’=Pol In) →
alpha1 = act from c rho’ vl1 →
alpha2 = act from c rho’ vl2 →
val sat c alpha1 rho PcC →
val sat c alpha2 rho PcC →
set act eq c rho’ vl1 vl2 (Singleton PcC ) rho →
act eq alpha1 alpha2 PcC rho
| AE TT : ∀ PcC rho,
act eq Act LTau Act LTau PcC rho
| AE TS : ∀ PcC rho,
act eq Act LTau Act Suspd PcC rho
.
Inductive act sk eq : action → action sk → PChC → polarity → Prop :=
| ASE HPrc : ∀ c rho rho’ vl alpha PcC,
PcP c = H → (rho’=Pol Ot ∨ rho’=Pol In) →
alpha = act from c rho’ vl →
val sat c alpha rho PcC →
act sk eq alpha ActSk Eps PcC rho
| ASE LPrc : ∀ c rho rho’ vl1 vl2 alpha bta PcC,
PcP c = L → (rho’=Pol Ot ∨ rho’=Pol In) →
alpha = act from c rho’ vl1 →
bta = act sk from c rho’ vl2 →
val sat c alpha rho PcC →
val sat c’ bta rho PcC →
act sk eq’ c rho’ vl1 vl2 PcC rho →
act sk eq alpha bta PcC rho
| ASE TT : ∀ PcC rho,
act sk eq Act LTau ActSk LTau PcC rho
| ASE TS : ∀ PcC rho,
act sk eq Act LTau ActSk Suspd PcC rho
.
Lemma alpha bta tau:
∀ alpha bta PcCOt rho,
act sk eq alpha bta PcCOt rho →
alpha = Act LTau →
bta = ActSk LTau ∨ bta = ActSk Suspd.
Hint Resolve alpha bta tau.
Lemma alpha bta n tau:
∀ alpha bta PcCOt,
alpha 6= Act LTau →
act sk eq alpha bta PcCOt Pol Ot →
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((∃ vl, bta = ActSk LOt (get pch alpha) vl) ∨
bta = ActSk LIn (get pch alpha) ∨
bta = ActSk Eps).
Hint Resolve alpha bta n tau.
Lemma bta for low ot:
∀ c vl bta PcC,
PcP c = L →
act sk eq (Act LOt c vl) bta PcC Pol Ot →
∃ vl0, |vl | = |vl0 | ∧ bta = ActSk LOt c vl0.
Lemma bta for low in:
∀ c vl bta PcC,
PcP c = L →
act sk eq (Act LIn c vl) bta PcC Pol Ot →
bta = ActSk LIn c.
Check (relation (prod conf CompP)).
Program Definition ca bisim (PE : PVarEnv) (R: relation (prod conf CompP)) :=
symmetric R ∧
∀ C1 C2 CP,
R (pair C1 CP) (pair C2 CP) →
state eq CP PE (fst C1 ) (snd C1 ) (fst C2 ) (snd C2 ) ∧
∀ alpha pidlst C1’,
sys step C1 pidlst alpha C1’ →
∃ PcCOt bta,
PcCOt from PChCSet ∧ act sk eq alpha bta PcCOt Pol Ot ∧
∀ PcCIn vl,
PcCIn from PChCSet →
act eq alpha (fill bta vl) PcCIn Pol In →
∃ C2’ CP’,
may step C2 pidlst (fill bta vl) C2’ ∧
R (pair C1’ CP’ ) (pair C2’ CP’ ).
Definition ca sec sys PE :=
∀ sysm1 sysm2 CP,
state eq CP PE sys sysm1 sys sysm2 →
∃ R, ca bisim PE R ∧
R (pair (pair sys sysm1 ) CP) (pair (pair sys sysm2 ) CP).
Definition u pe PE1 PE2 :=
val of empty pe (m union PE1 PE2 ).
Hint Unfold u pe.
Inductive R Res (R: relation (prod conf CompP)) : relation (prod conf CompP) :=
| R Res intro: ∀ sys1 m1 sys2 m2 CP1 CP2 Omg m1’ m2’,
R (pair (pair sys1 m1 ) CP1 ) (pair (pair sys2 m2 ) CP2 ) →
eq sysmem m1 m1’ → eq sysmem m2 m2’ →
R Res R (pair (pair (sys1\Omg) m1’ ) CP1 )
(pair (pair (sys2\Omg) m2’ ) CP2 )
.
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Hint Constructors R Res.
Lemma sym res :
∀ (R: relation (prod conf CompP)), symmetric R → symmetric (R Res R).
Hint Resolve sym res.
Lemma act sk mismatch :
∀ vl,
(fill ActSk Suspd vl = Act LTau ∨
(∃ (c : pch) (vl0 : list nat), fill ActSk Suspd vl = Act LOt c vl0) ∨
(∃ (c : pch) (vl0 : list nat), fill ActSk Suspd vl = Act LIn c vl0)) → False.
Hint Resolve act sk mismatch.
Lemma act sk mismatch’ :
∀ vl,
(fill ActSk Eps vl = Act LTau ∨
(∃ (c : pch) (vl0 : list nat), fill ActSk Eps vl = Act LOt c vl0) ∨
(∃ (c : pch) (vl0 : list nat), fill ActSk Eps vl = Act LIn c vl0)) → False.
Hint Resolve act sk mismatch’.
Lemma eq sysmem upd:
∀ m m’ sysm i,
eq sysmem m sysm →
eq sysmem (upd sysmem m i m’ ) (upd sysmem sysm i m’ ).
Lemma relevant mem :
∀ sys sys’ m m’ pidlst alpha,
sys//m ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//m’ →
(∀ sysm, eq sysmem m sysm →
∃ sysm’,
eq sysmem m’ sysm’ ∧
sys//sysm ===> [pidlst, alpha] sys’//sysm’ ).
Lemma upd sysmem self :
∀ (m: SysMem) i m’,
eq sysmem m’ m →
upd sysmem m i m’ = m.
Lemma upd sm lst self :
∀ (m: SysMem) lst m’,
(length lst = 1 ∨ length lst = 2) →
eq sysmem m’ m →
upd sm lst m lst m’ = m.
Lemma upd sysmem eq repl:
∀ m1 m2 m’ i,
eq sysmem m1 m2 →
eq sysmem (upd sysmem m1 i m’ ) (upd sysmem m2 i m’ ).
Lemma upd sysmem ul :
∀ m1 m2 m’ i,
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
List.In i (##m1 ) →
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upd sysmem (u sysmem m1 m2 ) i m’ = u sysmem (upd sysmem m1 i m’ ) m2.
Lemma upd sysmem ur :
∀ m1 m2 m’ i,
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
List.In i (##m2 ) →
upd sysmem (u sysmem m1 m2 ) i m’ = u sysmem m1 (upd sysmem m2 i m’ ).
Lemma eq sysmem eqv :
∀ m1 m2,
m1 = m2 → eq sysmem m1 m2.
Lemma sysmem u eq :
∀ m1 m1’ m2 m2’,
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem m1 m1’ → eq sysmem m2 m2’ →
eq sysmem (u sysmem m1 m2 ) (u sysmem m1’ m2’ ).
Lemma st eq sysmem:
∀ sys1 sys2 m1 m2 m1’ m2’ Omg CP PE,
state eq CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 → eq sysmem m1 m1’ → eq sysmem m2 m2’
→ state eq CP PE (sys1\Omg) m1’ (sys2\Omg) m2’.
Lemma upd sm lst in :
∀ m m1 pidlst i,
(length pidlst = 1 ∨ length pidlst = 2) →
List.In i pidlst →
List.In i (## m) →
(&& (upd sm lst m pidlst m1)) i = (&&m1 i).
Lemma upd sm lst nin :
∀ m m1 pidlst i,
¬ List.In i pidlst →
List.In i (##m)->
(&& (upd sm lst m pidlst m1)) i = (&&m) i.
Lemma upd sysmem eqv :
∀ sys1 sys2 m1 m2 i alpha m1’ m2’,
sys1//m1 ===> [[i], alpha] sys2//m2 →
eq sysmem m1 m1’ →
eq sysmem m2’ m2 →
eq sysmem m2 (upd sysmem m1’ i m2’ ).
Lemma upd sm lst eqv :
∀ sys sys’ m1 m1’ m’ sysm’ pidlst alpha,
(length pidlst = 1 ∨ length pidlst = 2) →
may step (pair sys m1 ) pidlst alpha (pair sys’ sysm’ ) →
eq sysmem m1 m1’ →
eq sysmem m’ sysm’ →
eq sysmem sysm’ (upd sm lst m1’ pidlst m’ ).
Lemma compositionality res :
∀ sys PE,
##PE = get pids sys →
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ca sec sys PE →
∀ Omg, ca sec (sys\Omg) PE.
Hint Resolve compositionality res.
Definition proj (sysm: SysMem) (pidl : list pid) : SysMem :=
{| il:=pidl; mp:=&&sysm |}.
Lemma u proj :
∀ sysm pidl1 pidl2,
(common eq pid dec pidl1 pidl2 = false) →
(pidl1 ++ pidl2 = (##sysm)) →
u sysmem (proj sysm pidl1 ) (proj sysm pidl2 ) = sysm.
Hint Resolve u proj.
Lemma u restrict:
∀ PE1 PE2 CP,
common pid eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false →
comp from CP (u pe PE1 PE2 ) →
val of asn empty
(m union pid eq pid dec
(snd (restrict CP (##PE1 ))) (snd (restrict CP (##PE2 ))))
= snd CP.
Hint Resolve u restrict.
Lemma dom combine :
∀ sysm CP PE1 PE2,
comp sat sysm (snd CP) →
comp from CP (u pe PE1 PE2 ) →
common pid eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false →
##PE1 ++ ##PE2 = ##sysm.
Hint Resolve dom combine.
Lemma state eq split:
∀ sys1 sys2 sysm1 sysm2 PE1 PE2 CP,
##PE1 = get pids sys1 → ##PE2 = get pids sys2 →
common pid eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false →
state eq CP (u pe PE1 PE2 ) (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm1 (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm2 →
(state eq (restrict CP (##PE1 )) PE1
sys1 (proj sysm1 (##PE1 )) sys1 (proj sysm2 (##PE1 )) ∧
state eq (restrict CP (##PE2 )) PE2
sys2 (proj sysm1 (##PE2 )) sys2 (proj sysm2 (##PE2 ))).
Hint Resolve state eq split.
Lemma st eq m cp:
∀ PE1 PE2 CP sys1 sys2 sysm1 sysm2,
state eq CP (u pe PE1 PE2 ) (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm1 (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm2
→ (##sysm1 = ##(fst CP) ∧ ##sysm1 = ##(snd CP)).
Lemma st eq m sys:
∀ CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2,
state eq CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 →
B.4 Library Sec 151
(##m1 = get pids sys1 ∧ ##m2 = get pids sys2 ).
Lemma st eq m pe:
∀ CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2,
state eq CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 →
(##m1 = ##PE ∧ ##m2 = ##PE).
Hint Resolve st eq m cp st eq m sys st eq m pe : st eq inv mem.
Definition oppo rho : polarity :=
match rho with
| Pol Ot ⇒ Pol In
| Pol In ⇒ Pol Ot
| Pol Bot ⇒ Pol Bot
end
.
Lemma u sysmem inv :
∀ m1 m2 m1’ m2’,
u sysmem m1 m2 = u sysmem m1’ m2’ →
##m1 = ##m1’ → ##m2 = ##m2’ →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
(∀ i,
(List.In i (##m1 ) → (&&m1 ) i = (&&m1’ ) i) ∧
(List.In i (##m2 ) → (&&m2 ) i = (&&m2’ ) i)).
SearchAbout "functional".
Lemma sysm dom combine :
∀ sys1 sys2 sysm1 sysm2,
##sysm1 = get pids sys1 →
##sysm2 = get pids sys2 →
(common eq pid dec (##sysm1 ) (##sysm2 ) = false) →
##(u sysmem sysm1 sysm2) = get pids (sys1 |P| sys2 ).
Hint Resolve sysm dom combine.
Lemma mp dom inv :
∀ (A B :Type) (dec: Dec A) (m1 m2 def : Mapping A B dec) a,
(common dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
List.In a (##(val of def (m union dec m1 m2 ))) →
(List.In a (##m1 ) ∨ List.In a (##m2 )).
Inductive R Par (R1 R2 : relation (prod conf CompP)) : relation (prod conf CompP)
:=
| R Par intro: ∀ sys11 sys21 sys12 sys22 m11 m21 m12 m22 CP1 CP2 ml mr,
R1 (pair (pair sys11 m11 ) CP1 ) (pair (pair sys21 m21 ) CP1 )→
R2 (pair (pair sys12 m12 ) CP2 ) (pair (pair sys22 m22 ) CP2 )→
eq sysmem (u sysmem m11 m12 ) ml →
eq sysmem (u sysmem m21 m22 ) mr →
R Par R1 R2
(pair (pair (sys11 |P| sys12 ) ml) (u cpp CP1 CP2 ))
(pair (pair (sys21 |P| sys22 ) mr) (u cpp CP1 CP2 )).
Lemma sym par :
152 Outline of Coq Proofs for Chapter 5
∀ R1 R2,
symmetric R1 → symmetric R2 → symmetric (conf × CompP) (R Par R1 R2 ).
Lemma state eq eqv:
∀ CP PE sys1 m1 m1’ sys2 m2 m2’,
state eq CP PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 →
eq sysmem m1 m1’ →
eq sysmem m2 m2’ →
state eq CP PE sys1 m1’ sys2 m2’.
Lemma state eq combine:
∀ CP1 CP2 PE1 PE2 sys11 sys21 sys12 sys22 m11 m21 m12 m22,
common eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false →
state eq CP1 PE1 sys11 m11 sys21 m21 →
state eq CP2 PE2 sys12 m12 sys22 m22 →
state eq (u cpp CP1 CP2 ) (u pe PE1 PE2 )
(sys11 |P| sys12 ) (u sysmem m11 m12 )
(sys21 |P| sys22 ) (u sysmem m21 m22 ).
Lemma eq sysmem proj l:
∀ m1 m1’ m2 m2’,
eq sysmem (u sysmem m1 m2 ) (u sysmem m1’ m2’ ) →
##m1 = ##m1’ → ##m2 = ##m2’ →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem m1 m1’.
Lemma eq sysmem proj r:
∀ m1 m1’ m2 m2’,
eq sysmem (u sysmem m1 m2 ) (u sysmem m1’ m2’ ) →
##m1 = ##m1’ → ##m2 = ##m2’ →
(common eq pid dec (##m1 ) (##m2 ) = false) →
eq sysmem m2 m2’.
Lemma eps impl:
∀ sys1 m1 C2 i,
may step (pair sys1 m1 ) [i] Act Eps C2 →
eq sysconf (pair sys1 m1 ) C2.
Lemma act eq oppo eps :
∀ c vl PcC,
act sk eq (Act LOt c vl) ActSk Eps PcC Pol Ot →
act eq (Act LIn c vl) Act Eps PcC Pol In.
Lemma act eq oppo comm :
∀ c vl1 vl2 PcC,
PcP c = L →
act sk eq (Act LOt c vl1 ) (ActSk LOt c vl2 ) PcC Pol Ot →
act eq (Act LIn c vl1 ) (Act LIn c vl2 ) PcC Pol In.
Lemma no step eq sysmem:
∀ sys1 sys2 i j sysm sysm’,
¬ (∃ alpha’ C2’, sys step (pair (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm) [i; j] alpha’ C2’) →
eq sysmem sysm sysm’ →
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¬ (∃ alpha’ C2’, sys step (pair (sys1 |P| sys2 ) sysm’ ) [i; j] alpha’ C2’).
Lemma compositionality par :
∀ sys1 sys2 PE1 PE2,
##PE1 = get pids sys1 → ##PE2 = get pids sys2 →
(common eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false) →
(ca sec sys1 PE1 → ca sec sys2 PE2 → ca sec (sys1 |P| sys2 ) (u pe PE1 PE2 )).
Theorem compositionality :
∀ sys1 sys2 PE1 PE2,
##PE1 = get pids sys1 → ##PE2 = get pids sys2 →
(common eq pid dec (##PE1 ) (##PE2 ) = false) →
(
(ca sec sys1 PE1 → ∀ Omg, ca sec (sys1\Omg) PE1) ∧
(ca sec sys1 PE1 → ca sec sys2 PE2 →
ca sec (sys1 |P| sys2 ) (u pe PE1 PE2 ))
).
B.5 Library Soundness
Require Import Sec.
Definition high K i phi S (m: Mem) (P : PVar) :=
snd P m ∧ phi m ∧ P from K ∧
∃ X l X’ l’ psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ ∧
(l = H ∨ ∃ x, x from X ∧ && (fst P) x = H) .
Definition low K i phi S (m: Mem) (P : PVar) :=
snd P m ∧ phi m ∧ P from K ∧
(∃ X l X’ l’ psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’) ∧
(∀ X l X’ l’ psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
(l = L ∧ ∀ x, x from X → && (fst P) x = L)).
Inductive low eq : PVarEnv → relation (prod conf CompP) :=
| LEQ LO :
∀ K i S P m1 m2 sysm1 sysm2 (CP : CompP) PE,
(∃ phi, low K i phi S m1 P ∧ low K i phi S m2 P) →
eq sysmem sysm1 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m1)|} →
eq sysmem sysm2 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m2)|} →
##(fst CP) = [i] → &&(fst CP) i = fst P →
##(snd CP) = [i] → &&(snd CP) i = snd P →
##PE = [i] → &&PE i = K →
state eq CP PE (i:S) sysm1 (i:S) sysm2 →
nip K →
low eq PE (pair (pair (i:S) sysm1 ) CP) (pair (pair (i:S) sysm2 ) CP)
| LEQ HI :
∀ K i S1 S2 P m1 m2 sysm1 sysm2 (CP : CompP) PE,
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(∃ phi1 phi2, high K i phi1 S1 m1 P ∧ high K i phi2 S2 m2 P) →
eq sysmem sysm1 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m1)|} →
eq sysmem sysm2 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m2)|} →
##(fst CP) = [i] → &&(fst CP) i = fst P →
##(snd CP) = [i] → &&(snd CP) i = snd P →
##PE = [i] → &&PE i = K →
state eq CP PE (i:S1 ) sysm1 (i:S2 ) sysm2 →
nip K →
low eq PE (pair (pair (i:S1 ) sysm1 ) CP) (pair (pair (i:S2 ) sysm2 ) CP)
.
Lemma dist not exists : ∀ (U :Type) (P : U → Prop),
(∀ u, P u) → ¬ (∃ u, ¬ P u).
Lemma not exists dist :
∀ (U :Type) (P : U → Prop),
¬ (∃ u, ¬ P u) → (∀ u, P u).
Lemma not forall dist :
∀ (U :Type) (P : U → Prop),
¬ (∀ u, P u) → (∃ u, ¬ P u).
Lemma not exists dist’ :
∀ (U :Type) (P : U → Prop),
¬ (∃ u, P u) → (∀ u, ¬ P u).
Lemma not L then H :
∀ (l :SecLev), ¬ (l=L) → l=H.
Lemma not low then high:
∀ K i X l (phi : Assertion) S psi X’ l’ m (P :PVar),
(∀ x, x from X → List.In x (pid ids i)) →
P from K →
snd P m →
phi m →
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
¬ low K i phi S m P →
high K i phi S m P.
Lemma both high or low :
∀ S (sysm1 sysm2 : SysMem) (K :Ensemble PVar) i P (Phi : AsnEnv) PVE Psi,
P from K →
(&&PVE i) = K →
PVE \– Phi, (i:S), Psi →
##sysm1 = [i] → ##sysm2 = [i] →
(snd P (&&sysm1 i)) → (snd P (&&sysm2 i)) →
(&&Phi i) (&&sysm1 i) → (&&Phi i) (&&sysm2 i) →
(
low K i (&&Phi i) S (&&sysm1 i) P ∧ low K i (&&Phi i) S (&&sysm2 i) P ∨
high K i (&&Phi i) S (&&sysm1 i) P ∧ high K i (&&Phi i) S (&&sysm2 i) P
).
Lemma beq nat i i : ∀ i, beq nat i i = true.
B.5 Library Soundness 155
Hint Rewrite beq nat i i : trivial eq.
Lemma both high or low’ :
∀ S (sysm1 sysm2 : SysMem) (K :Ensemble PVar) i (P :PVar) phi psi X l X’ l’,
(∀ P, P from K → ##(fst P) = pid ids i) →
nip K →
P from K →
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
##sysm1 = [i] → ##sysm2 = [i] →
(snd P (&&sysm1 i)) → (snd P (&&sysm2 i)) →
phi (&&sysm1 i) → phi (&&sysm2 i) →
(
low K i phi S (&&sysm1 i) P ∧ low K i phi S (&&sysm2 i) P ∨
high K i phi S (&&sysm1 i) P ∧ high K i phi S (&&sysm2 i) P
).
Lemma state eq sym :
∀ CP PE sys1 sysm1 sys2 sysm2,
state eq CP PE sys1 sysm1 sys2 sysm2 →
state eq CP PE sys2 sysm2 sys1 sysm1.
Lemma sym low eq:
∀ PE, symmetric (low eq PE).
Lemma high nil :
∀ (K : Ensemble PVar) i (phi : Mem→Prop) (m: Mem) (P : PVar),
snd P m → phi m → P from K → high K i phi (NIL) m P.
Lemma trivial modif :
∀ sysm i m,
##sysm = [i] →
eq sysmem (modif sysmem sysm i m)
{| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ m |}.
Lemma trivial modif simp :
∀ sysm i,
##sysm = [i] →
eq sysmem sysm (modif sysmem sysm i ((&& sysm) i)) .
Lemma st eq alt com :
∀ P PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 sys1’ sys2’,
state eq P PE sys1 m1 sys2 m2 →
get pids sys1’ = ##PE → get pids sys2’ = ##PE →
state eq P PE sys1’ m1 sys2’ m2.
Lemma assn sat sysm:
∀ sysm m i x a (phi : Assertion),
eq sysmem sysm {| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ m |} →
(phi & x \-> a) m →
(phi & x \-> a) ((&& sysm) i).
Lemma aeval some dist :
∀ m a val,
aeval m a = Some val →
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∀ x, x from (fva a) → in list eq id dec x (##m) = true.
Lemma in dom aeval dist :
∀ m a,
(∀ x, x from (fva a) → in list eq id dec x (##m) = true) →
∃ val, aeval m a = Some val.
Lemma assn sat m sysm:
∀ phi x a m sysm i val,
eq sysmem sysm {| il := [i]; mp := fun ⇒ m |} →
aeval ((&& sysm) i) a = Some val →
(phi & x \-> a) m →
phi (upd val id eq id dec ((&& sysm) i) x val).
Definition secL’ (P : PVarSec) x := (mp id SecLev eq id dec P x ).
Lemma update mp eq:
∀ (A B : Type) (dec: Dec A) (m: Mapping A B dec) a val,
List.In a (il m) →
(&& (upd val dec m a val)) a = val.
Lemma update mp neq:
∀ (A B : Type) (dec: Dec A) (m: Mapping A B dec) a val a’,
List.In a (il m) → a 6= a’ →
(&& (upd val dec m a val)) a’ = &&m a’.
Lemma eval eq:
∀ m1 m2 a,
(∀ x, x from (fva a) →
List.In x (##m1 ) ∧ List.In x (##m2 ) ∧ &&m1 x = &&m2 x ) →
aeval m1 a = aeval m2 a.
Lemma all fv low:
∀ P X a,
(∀ l’, sLift P (X |U| fva a) l’ → Ordr l’ L) →
(∀ x, x from (fva a) → secL P x = L).
Lemma all fv low lift :
∀ P X, (∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l L) → (∀ x, x from X → secL P x = L).
Lemma ex fv high lift :
∀ P X l, (∃ x, x from X ∧ secL P x = Types.H) →
(∀ l’, sLift P X l’ → Ordr l’ l) →
l = Types.H.
Lemma set m eq monotone:
∀ K1 K2 m1 m2,
set m eq m1 m2 K1 → Included K1 K2 → set m eq m1 m2 K2.
Lemma eq sysmem upd:
∀ sysm i x val,
##sysm = [i] →
eq sysmem
(modif sysmem sysm i (upd val id eq id dec ((&& sysm) i) x val))
{| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ upd val id eq id dec ((&& sysm) i) x val |}.
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Lemma from comp from :
∀ PE P i,
##PE = [i] →
P from (&& PE) i →
comp from (pair {| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ fst P |}
{| il := [i]; mp := fun : pid ⇒ snd P |}) PE.
Inductive well alg typed (K : Ensemble PVar) (i : pid) :
(Ensemble id) → SecLev → Assertion → com → Assertion →
(Ensemble id) → SecLev → Prop :=
| ATP NIL : ∀ X l phi psi X’ l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) → contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
(phi -» psi) → well alg typed K i X l phi (NIL) psi X’ l’
| ATP SK : ∀ X l phi psi X’ l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) → contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
(phi -» psi) → well alg typed K i X l phi (SKIP) psi X’ l’
| ATP AS : ∀ X l (phi psi psi’ : Assertion) x a X’ l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) → contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
(∀ (P : PVar) m, ##m = pid ids i →
(P from K ) → snd P m → (psi & x \-> a) m →
(∃ Q, Q from K ∧
(∀ l’, sLift P (X |U| fva a) l’ → Ordr l’ (secL Q x )) ∧
(Ordr l (secL Q x )) ∧
(∀ x’, x’ ido P → x’ 6=x →
(Ordr (secL P x’ ) (secL Q x’ ))) ∧
val sat sub m Q x a
)
)->
(phi -» (psi & x \-> a)) →
(psi -» psi’ ) →
well alg typed K i X l phi (x::=a) psi’ X’ l’
| ATP SEQ : ∀ l0 X l Y1 l1 X’ l’ Y2 l2 X’’ l’’ S1 S2 phi0 phi phi’ phi’’ psi,
well alg typed K i X l phi S1 phi’ Y1 l1 →
well alg typed K i X’ l’ phi’’ S2 psi Y2 l2 →
Ordr l0 l → (phi0 -» phi) →
Included (X |U| Y1 ) X’ →
Ordr (lub l l1 ) l’ →
(phi’ -» phi’’ ) →
Included (Y1 |U| Y2 ) X’’ →
contained in X’’ (pid ids i) →
Ordr (lub l1 l2 ) l’’ →
well alg typed K i X l0 phi0 (S1;;S2 ) psi X’’ l’’
| ATP IF : ∀ X l X1 Y1 l1 X2 Y2 l2 X’ l1’ l2’ l’ b S1 S2
phi phi1 phi2 psi psi1 psi2,
well alg typed K i X1 l1 phi1 S1 psi1 Y1 l1’ →
well alg typed K i X2 l2 phi2 S2 psi2 Y2 l2’ →
Included (X |U| fvb b) X1 →
Included (X |U| fvb b) X2 →
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((and assn phi b) -» phi1 ) →
((and nssn phi b) -» phi2 ) →
Ordr l l1 → Ordr l l2 →
(psi1 -» psi) → (psi2 -» psi) →
Included (Y1 |U| Y2 |U| fvb b) X’ →
contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
Ordr (lub l1’ l2’ ) l’ →
well alg typed K i X l phi (IIF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 FII) psi X’ l’
| ATP WH : ∀ X1 l1 X2 l2 Y l phi psi phi’ b S,
Included (X1 |U| fvb b) Y →
Ordr l1 l →
(phi -» phi’ ) →
well alg typed K i Y l (and assn phi’ b) S phi’ Y l →
(and nssn phi’ b -» psi) →
Included Y X2 →
contained in X2 (pid ids i) →
Ordr l l2 →
well alg typed K i X1 l1 phi (WHILE b DO S END) psi X2 l2
| ATP OT : ∀ X l phi psi psi’ c al X’ l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) → contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
((Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧ (Ordr (PcP c) l’) ∧
(∀ P m, ##m = pid ids i →
P from K → (snd P m ∧ psi m) →
(∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧
(∃ Q PcC,
Q from K ∧ PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) ∧
(∀ x, x ido P → (Ordr (secL P x ) (secL Q x ))) ∧
(∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | →
(∀ l, sLift P (fva (al a@ (j-1))) l →
Ordr l (fst PcC (Chan c j )))) ∧
(snd Q m ∧
∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | →
(eval al j m) from (snd PcC (Chan c
j )))
)
)
) →
(phi -» psi) → (psi -» psi’ ) →
well alg typed K i X l phi (c!al) psi’ X’ l’
| ATP IN : ∀ X l (phi psi psi’ : Assertion) xl c X’ l’,
contained in X (pid ids i) → contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
((Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧ (Ordr (PcP c) l’) ∧
(∀ P m, ##m = pid ids i →
P from K → (snd P m ∧ all assn xl psi m) →
((∀ l, sLift P X l → Ordr l (PcP c)) ∧
∀ PcC vl,
PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) → |vl |=|xl | →
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vl sat vl c PcC →
∃ Q, Q from K ∧
(∀ x’, x’ ido P ∧ ˜(List.In x’ xl) →
(Ordr (secL P x’ ) (secL Q x’ ))) ∧
(∀ j, 1≤j≤|xl | →
(Ordr (lub (fst PcC (Chan c j )) (PcP c))
(secL Q (xl x@ (j-1))))) ∧
(val sat sub n m Q xl (num vl))
)
)
) →
(phi -» all assn xl psi) → (psi -» psi’ ) →
well alg typed K i X l phi (c??xl) psi’ X’ l’
.
Tactic Notation "well alg typed cases" tactic(first) ident(c) :=
first;
[ Case aux c "ATP NIL" | Case aux c "ATP SK" | Case aux c "ATP AS" |
Case aux c "ATP SEQ" | Case aux c "ATP IF" | Case aux c "ATP WH" |
Case aux c "ATP OT" | Case aux c "ATP IN" ].
Lemma slft monotone:
∀ P X a X’,
sLift P (X |U| fva a) Types.H→ Included X X’ → sLift P (X’ |U| fva a) Types.H.
Hint Resolve slft monotone.
Lemma assn sub trans:
∀ phi rho psi x a,
(phi -» rho & x \-> a) →
(rho -» psi) →
(phi -» psi & x \-> a).
Hint Resolve assn sub trans.
Lemma wtp awtp’ :
∀ K i X l X’ l’ S (phi psi : Assertion),
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
(∀ X1 l1 X1’ l1’ phi1 psi1,
Included X1 X → Included X’ X1’ →
contained in X1’ (pid ids i) →
Ordr l1 l → Ordr l’ l1’ →
(phi1 -» phi) → (psi -» psi1 ) →
well alg typed K i X1 l1 phi1 S psi1 X1’ l1’ ).
Lemma wtp awtp:
∀ K i X l X’ l’ S phi psi,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
well alg typed K i X l phi S psi X’ l’.
Lemma awtp wtp:
∀ K i X l S X’ l’ phi psi,
well alg typed K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ →
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K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’.
Lemma upd eq val eq :
∀ (sysm : SysMem) x val0 (val : nat) (i :pid),
List.In x (##(&&sysm i)) →
upd val id eq id dec ((&& sysm) i) x val0 =
upd val id eq id dec ((&& sysm) i) x val →
val0 = val.
Lemma a eval same :
∀ m1 m2 a,
##m1 = ##m2 →
(∀ y, y from fva a → &&m1 y = &&m2 y) →
aeval m1 a = aeval m2 a.
Lemma b eval some dist :
∀ m b val,
beval m b = Some val →
∀ x, x from (fvb b) → in list eq id dec x (##m) = true.
Lemma in dom beval dist :
∀ m b,
(∀ x, x from (fvb b) → in list eq id dec x (##m) = true) →
(beval m b = Some true ∨ beval m b = Some false).
Lemma b eval same :
∀ m1 m2 b,
##m1 = ##m2 →
(∀ y, y from fvb b → &&m1 y = &&m2 y) →
beval m1 b = beval m2 b.
Lemma eval from dist :
∀ al m c PcC,
PcC from proj1 sig PChCSet →
(∀ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |al | →
eval al j m from snd PcC (Chan c j )) →
val sat c
(Act LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) al))
Pol Ot PcC.
Lemma all some dist:
∀ m al,
all some (map (aeval m) al) →
∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | → ∃ v, aeval m (al a@ (j-1)) = Some v.
Lemma some all some:
∀ m al,
(∀ j, 1≤j≤|al | → ∃ v, aeval m (al a@ (j-1)) = Some v) →
all some (map (aeval m) al).
Lemma eval from dist sk :
∀ al m c PcC,
PcC from proj1 sig PChCSet →
(∀ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |al | →
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eval al j m from snd PcC (Chan c j )) →
val sat c’
(ActSk LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) al))
Pol Ot PcC.
Lemma val sat c c’ 12:
∀ c m1 m2 PcC al,
PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) →
(∀ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |al | → eval al j m1 from snd PcC (Chan c j )) →
(val sat c (Act LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m1 )) al)) Pol Ot PcC →
val sat c (Act LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m2 )) al)) Pol Ot PcC
) →
val sat c’
(ActSk LOt c (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m2 )) al)) Pol Ot PcC.
Lemma act eq len vl :
∀ c vl vl’ PcC,
act eq (Act LIn c vl) (Act LIn c vl’ ) PcC Pol In → |vl | = |vl’ |.
Lemma trivial map vl :
∀ m vl, (map (f compose (val of 0) (aeval m)) (num vl)) = vl.
Lemma update n in:
∀ xl x j vl m,
lst distinct xl → |vl | = |xl | → 1 ≤ j ≤ |xl | → x = (xl x@ (j - 1)) →
List.In x (##m) → (&& (update n m xl vl)) x = (vl @ (j - 1)).
Lemma low chan eq val:
∀ c vl vl’ j PcC,
1 ≤ j ≤ |vl | →
act eq (Act LIn c vl) (Act LIn c vl’ ) PcC Pol In →
fst PcC (Chan c j ) = L →
vl @ (j - 1) = vl’ @ (j - 1).
Lemma update n nin:
∀ m x xl vl,
¬ List.In x xl → List.In x (##m) → |vl | = |xl | →
(&& (update n m xl vl)) x = &&m x.
Inductive upd next : com → id → Prop :=
| UN As : ∀ x a, upd next (x::=a) x
| UN In : ∀ c xl x, List.In x xl → upd next (c??xl) x
| UN Seq : ∀ S1 S2 x, upd next S1 x → upd next (S1;;S2 ) x
.
Lemma n upd same :
∀ S m S’ m’ i alpha,
S / m ==> [i, alpha] S’ / m’ →
(∀ x, List.In x (##m) → ¬upd next S x → &&m x = &&m’ x ).
Definition high’ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ m P :=
snd P m ∧ phi m ∧ P from K ∧
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ ∧
(l = Types.H ∨ ∃ x, x from X ∧ secL P x = Types.H).
162 Outline of Coq Proofs for Chapter 5
Definition low’ K i phi S psi X’ l’ m P :=
snd P m ∧ phi m ∧ P from K ∧
∃ X l, (K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’) ∧
(∀ X l, K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
(l=Types.L ∧ ∀ x, x from X → secL P x = Types.L)).
Lemma upd next dec :
∀ x S, {upd next S x} + {¬upd next S x}.
Lemma tp impl contained:
∀ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
contained in X (pid ids i).
Lemma tp impl contained’:
∀ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’,
K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ →
contained in X’ (pid ids i).
Hint Resolve tp impl contained tp impl contained’.
Lemma high step :
∀ K i phi S psi m P alpha S’ m’ X l X’ l’,
(∀ P, P from K → ##(fst P) = (pid ids i)) →
high’ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ m P →
S / m ==> [i, alpha] S’ / m’ →
(
(∀ c rho vl,
(rho = Pol Ot ∨ rho = Pol In) →
alpha = act from c rho vl →
PcP c = Types.H) ∧
(∃ PcC, PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) ∧ val sat c alpha Pol Ot PcC) ∧
(∀ PcC,
PcC from (proj1 sig PChCSet) →
val sat c alpha Pol In PcC →
(∃ P’,
P’ from K ∧
(∀ x, (List.In x (##m) ∧ upd next S x → secL P’ x = Types.H) ∧
(List.In x (##m) ∧ ¬upd next S x →
Ordr (secL P x ) (secL P’ x ))) ∧
∃ phi’, high’ K i X l phi’ S’ psi X’ l’ m’ P’ ))
).
Lemma nupd eq :
∀ S S’ m m’ i alpha x,
S / m ==> [i, alpha] S’ / m’ →
List.In x (##m) →
¬upd next S x →
&&m’ x = &&m x.
Lemma askeq high comm eps:
∀ c rho vl alpha PcC,
PcC from proj1 sig PChCSet →
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val sat c alpha Pol Ot PcC →
(rho = Pol Ot ∨ rho = Pol In) →
PcP c = Types.H →
alpha = act from c rho vl →
act sk eq alpha ActSk Eps PcC Pol Ot.
Lemma high’ high :
∀ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ m P,
high’ K i X l phi S psi X’ l’ m P → high K i phi S m P.
Lemma same ch pol dist:
∀ alpha1 alpha2 c rho vl,
get pch alpha1 = get pch alpha2 →
get rho alpha1 = get rho alpha2 →
rho = Pol Ot ∨ rho = Pol In →
alpha1 = act from c rho vl →
∃ vl0, alpha2 = act from c rho vl0.
Lemma leq hi sim :
∀ PE i P0 K S1 S2 sysm1 m1 sysm2 m2 (CP : CompP),
K = (&& PE) i → (∀ (P : PVar), P from K → ##(fst P) = pid ids i) →
##PE = [i] → nip K →
##(fst CP) = [i] → (&& (fst CP)) i = fst P0 →
##(snd CP) = [i] → (&& (snd CP)) i = snd P0 →
(∃ phi1 phi2, high K i phi1 S1 m1 P0 ∧ high K i phi2 S2 m2 P0 ) →
eq sysmem sysm1 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m1)|} →
eq sysmem sysm2 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m2)|} →
state eq CP PE (i : S1 ) sysm1 (i : S2 ) sysm2 →
(∀ alpha pidlst C1’,
sys step (pair (i:S1 ) sysm1 ) pidlst alpha C1’ →
∃ PcCOt bta,
PcCOt from proj1 sig PChCSet ∧
act sk eq alpha bta PcCOt Pol Ot ∧
(∀ (PcCIn : PChC) (vl : list nat),
PcCIn from proj1 sig PChCSet →
act eq alpha (fill bta vl) PcCIn Pol In →
∃ C2’ CP’,
may step (pair (i:S2 ) sysm2 ) pidlst (fill bta vl) C2’ ∧
low eq PE (pair C1’ CP’ ) (pair C2’ CP’ ))).
Lemma high’ nil nil :
∀ m1’ m2’ (P’ : PVar) X’ l’ K i (psi : Assertion),
contained in X’ (pid ids i) →
P’ from K → (snd P’ ) m1’ → (snd P’ ) m2’ → psi m1’ → psi m2’ →
(
high’ K i X’ H psi (NIL) psi X’ l’ m1’ P’ ∧
high’ K i X’ H psi (NIL) psi X’ l’ m2’ P’
).
Lemma get trivial upd :
∀ sysm i m,
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(##sysm)=[i] →
(&& (modif sysmem sysm i m)) i = m.
Hint Resolve get trivial upd.
Lemma tp seq tp first :
∀ S1 S2 K i X l phi psi X’ l’,
well typed K i X l phi (S1;;S2 ) psi X’ l’ →
∃ psi’ X’’ l’’ X’’’ l’’’,
well typed K i X l phi S1 psi’ X’’ l’’ ∧
well typed K i X’’’ l’’’ psi’ S2 psi X’ l’ ∧
Included (X |U| X’’ ) X’’’ ∧ Included X’’ X’ ∧
Ordr (lub l l’’ ) l’’’ ∧ Ordr l’’ l’.
Lemma high’ fst high’ seq :
∀ K i S’ S2 m’ X l X’ l’ X’’ l’’ X’’’ l’’’ phi psi psi’ P’,
high’ K i X l phi S’ psi’ X’’ l’’ m’ P’ →
K, i, X’’’, l’’’ \- psi’, S2, psi -: X’, l’ →
Included (X |U| X’’ ) X’’’ → Ordr (lub l l’’ ) l’’’ →
Included X’’ X’ → Ordr l’’ l’ →
high’ K i X l phi (S’;; S2 ) psi X’ l’ m’ P’.
Lemma high’ nil high’ S :
∀ S2 K i X l phi psi psi’ X’ l’ X’’ l’’ X’’’ l’’’ m’ P’,
high’ K i X l phi (NIL) psi’ X’’ l’’ m’ P’ →
K, i, X’’’, l’’’ \- psi’, S2, psi -: X’, l’ →
Included X X’’’ → Ordr l l’’’ →
high’ K i X l phi S2 psi X’ l’ m’ P’.
Lemma act eq vl sat eps :
∀ c vl vl0 PcCIn,
act eq (Act LIn c vl) (fill ActSk Eps vl0 ) PcCIn Pol In → vl sat vl c PcCIn.
Definition may step simp C1 pidlst alpha C2 :=
(sys step C1 pidlst alpha C2) ∨
(eq sysconf C1 C2 ∧ alpha = Act Eps).
Lemma leq lo sim:
∀ PE i P0 K X l S psi X’ l’ sysm1 m1 sysm2 m2 (CP : CompP),
K = (&& PE) i → (∀ (P : PVar), P from K → ##(fst P) = pid ids i) →
##PE = [i] → nip K →
##(fst CP) = [i] → (&& (fst CP)) i = fst P0 →
##(snd CP) = [i] → (&& (snd CP)) i = snd P0 →
(∃ phi, phi m1 ∧ phi m2 ∧ K, i, X , l \- phi, S, psi -: X’, l’ ) →
eq sysmem sysm1 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m1)|} →
eq sysmem sysm2 {|il:=[i]; mp:=(fun ⇒ m2)|} →
state eq CP PE (i : S) sysm1 (i : S) sysm2 →
(∀ alpha pidlst S1’ sysm1’,
sys step (pair (i:S) sysm1 ) pidlst alpha (pair (i:S1’ ) sysm1’ ) →
∃ PcCOt bta,
PcCOt from proj1 sig PChCSet ∧
act sk eq alpha bta PcCOt Pol Ot ∧
(∀ (PcCIn : PChC) (vl : list nat),
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PcCIn from proj1 sig PChCSet →
act eq alpha (fill bta vl) PcCIn Pol In →
∃ S2’ sysm2’ (CP’ : CompP),
may step simp (pair (i:S) sysm2 ) pidlst (fill bta vl) (pair (i:S2’ ) sysm2’ )
∧
(
(∃ phi1 phi2 X1 l1 X2 l2,
Included (X1 |U| X’ ) (X |U| X’ ) ∧
Included (X2 |U| X’ ) (X |U| X’ ) ∧
Ordr (lub l1 l’ ) (lub l l’ ) ∧ Ordr (lub l2 l’ ) (lub l l’ ) ∧
high’ K i X1 l1 phi1 S1’ psi X’ l’ (&&sysm1’ i)
(pair (&&(fst CP’) i) (&&(snd CP’) i)) ∧
high’ K i X2 l2 phi2 S2’ psi X’ l’ (&&sysm2’ i)
(pair (&&(fst CP’) i) (&&(snd CP’) i)) ∧
state eq CP’ PE (i:S1’ ) sysm1’ (i:S2’ ) sysm2’
) ∨
(∃ S’ phi’ X’’ l’’,
Included (X’’ |U| X’ ) (X |U| X’ ) ∧ Ordr (lub l’’ l’ ) (lub l l’ ) ∧
S’ = S1’ ∧ S’ = S2’ ∧
K, i, X’’, l’’ \- phi’, S’, psi -: X’, l’ ∧
phi’ (&&sysm1’ i) ∧ phi’ (&&sysm2’ i) ∧
(&&(snd CP’) i) (&&sysm1’ i) ∧ (&&(snd CP’) i) (&&sysm2’ i) ∧
state eq CP’ PE (i:S’ ) sysm1’ (i:S’ ) sysm2’
)
)
)
).
Lemma sound one :
∀ S PE (Phi Psi : AsnEnv) i,
(&&Phi) i = (fun ⇒ True) →
PE \– Phi, (i:S), Psi →
ca sec (i:S) PE.
Definition true assn : Assertion := fun ⇒ True.
Definition ase true sys : AsnEnv :=
mkMapping pid Assertion eq pid dec (get pids sys) (fun ⇒ (fun ⇒ True)).
Lemma neq beq nat f:
∀ (n1 n2 : pid),
n1 6= n2 → beq nat n1 n2 = false.
Hint Resolve neq beq nat f.
Lemma true outside dom:
∀ PE Phi sys Psi,
wf sys →
PE \– Phi, sys, Psi →
(∀ i, ¬List.In i (get pids sys) →
(&&Phi i = true assn ∧ &&Psi i = true assn)).
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Theorem soundness:
∀ PE sys,
PE \– (ase true sys), sys, (ase true sys) →
wf sys →
ca sec sys PE.
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